

THE
Knowledge of the World:
OR, THE
Art of Well-Educating
YOUTH,
Through the Various Conditions
of LIFE.


By way of LETTERS.

V O L. I.

To be continued in that *Method* till the
whole Design is finishd.

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at *Amsterdam*, and now done into *English*.

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is Remov'd from the *Poultry*, to the
Raven in *Jewel-Street*.



T H E
P R E F A C E.

A *Ltho the Sciences were never improv'd in Franceto that degree as now they are, and that it may be also said, that never our Country men Thought so Exactly, or Wrote with so much Delicacy; Experience however shews us, that there are abundance of things of which we are ignorant, or know but imperfectly, or else learn too late. This is justified by the Custom of the World, and by Conversation among Men that pretend to Learning. The Remeay is easy; 'Tis only imbibing Youth with solid Principles, in regard that what they are Taught is too superficial.*

A Person bred up in the Sciences by good Rules, accustom'd from his Youth to dive into the bottom of Things, and known by his Reputation in Forreign Countries, paid a Visit not long since to one of the Chief Lords of the Court, who had always Honour'd him with his Esteem, and who was overjoy'd to see him return'd into France, whither important Affairs had recall'd him. After they had Discours-

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ed for some time, the Lord sent for his Son, and desir'd the Gentleman to Examin him as to several Questions, and to tell him what he thought of the Young Lad. He did so; and soon found that the Youth was Endu'd with good Inclinations, but that he wanted to be Instructed in things much better digested then what he had Learnt till that time. This he signified to his Father, and let him know mthal, That it was time to Replenish the Mind of his Son with more solid Knowledg, and chiefly with that of Philosophy; not that which Teaches to Dispute, and becomes unprofitable by how much the more it Erects it self into an Art of Teaching by Ruies; but that same overflowing of acquir'd Wisdom, which extends the Mind of a Young Man, as it fills it, which Enlightens the Natural Confusion of the Faculties of the Soul, and which, as a Man maxes Elder, teaches the Art of Cultivating his own Ground, that he may be the more capable of those Employments to which he is design'd. This beginning engag'd the Gentleman in a long Discourse upon the Truest and most Easy Method to Frame and Compose the Mind of a Young Person; with which the Lord was so well satisfyed, that he desir'd him to put down in Writing what he had told him, to the end he might make the greater Benefit of his Instructions.

To this the Author gave his Consent, and thought to have stopt there, not having any other Design then to please the Lord. But hardly had finish'd it, but his Dissertation was seen by

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by several Persons of the Court; *they who had heard talk of it, desir'd to read it, and they who read it, were extreamly well satisfy'd with it; Ladies also, whose Vertue was Exalted above the Rank which they hold, spoke well of it; and the Author receiv'd Compliments from all parts.*

And because it is thought that the most flattering Commendation of an Author, is to solicit him to Print his Works, they fail'd not to tell him, That it behov'd him to Publish so necessary a Peice of Instruction: 'Twas in vain to Resist, and therefore he must needs make 'em a Promise. And because a Subject so Vast and so Profitable could not be handl'd in an Abridgment, without loosing much of its Efficacy, and for that it was also to be fear'd that a large Volume would prove Troublesome, the Author has divided his Matter into several Letters, which he intends to set forth by one at a time every Month. This shall be the Art of well Educating Youth, and Forming their Minds betimes, to the end they may be the better enabl'd to supply the Duties of their Calling.

Now in regard this Design will be of a large Extent, we shall take care that there be neither Confusion nor Verbosity in it; we shall avoid proposing our selves for a Model, it being ridiculous for a Man to set himself for a Pattern to others: It shall not be stust with either Flattery or Praises to no purpose; nor hopes of Applauses, always unjust when bestow'd upon a Mans self. And because we are willing that

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Youth should Comprehend what we are going about to Teach 'em, to the end it may stay by 'em, we shall make use of Comparisons, and endeavour, above all things, to render the Matter profitable in the Delivery, Elevated in the Inferences, and short in the Proportions of it, to the end that while we are Instructing, we may not prove Icksome.

We shall carefully avoid Criticism, Satyr and Flat Jeasts, because they are for the most part unprofitable, and not to be endur'd. They are Viands which are pleasing to the Taste, but never to be Digested; and whatever Pleasure they procure at first, the Reflection that follows is rarely favourable to the Author. We shall handle the Conditions of Life, rather as they ought to be, according to the Rules of Natural and Christian Equity, then as they are, that we may not disgust those who may be apt to believe that we go about to instruct others at their Expences, and that we have not yet the Art of making known what is Good, and Practising it, but by the Evil which they know and Commit themselves. If any thing escaped us that was contrary to Charity and Decorum, we disown it for the time to come, and shall be always ready to amend it.

In the **First Letter** we Treat of the Principles of good Education, as being the Foundations upon which it ought to be Establish'd. Those are the Lights of Universal Reason, which serve to Enlighten the Mind, and Fortify the Heart against Prejudices, the Injustice, the Infidelity and Corruption of the Age.

These

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These are the First Notions of that perfect and uniform Understanding, which raises the Judgment above ordinary Precepts, and which hinders the Soul from being seduc'd by the Maxims and Arguments of the Time, which fixes in it the Knowledge of Religion, which teaches it true Morality, and renders it proper for Civil Society.

The Subject of the Second Letter shall be the Choice which ought to be made of a good Governour, and what Qualities he ought to have, because it is as impossible to arrive at the Knowledge of Good, without a Wise Director, as for a piece of Land to produce Corn without Tillage and Sowing. And that we may not enter here upon a Particular of all the Subjects that are to be handled successively, we shall give notice in the Letter of the present Month of what we intend to Discourse the next.

After we have given some Wholsome and Important Precepts upon Education, we shall treat of all the Conditions of Life; and in every condition, shall speak of every thing that concerns it. In the first place, of all that may be serviceable for Instruction; Secondly, of every thing that may bring it to Perfection; And lastly, Of every thing that may have any relation to it. In the First, We shall teach the Learner to know the Duties of a Condition; In the Second, the Qualities required in that Condition; And by the Third, The Ties and Habitudes that are necessary for it. We begin with the Church, go on with the Court, the Sword, the Gown, and end with Trade.

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We shall consider the Church according to the three different Classes that Compose it ; Benefices with Charge of Souls ; Simple Benefices and Cloysters ; that is to say, the Apostolick, Ecclesiastick, and Monkish Life.

We shall examin the Court, in the first place, in it self ; by its Maxims, and by its Designs, and afterwards, with relation to the three sorts of Persons that belong to it, Counsellours or Ministers of State, Domestick and Military Officers of the Prince.

The first are set a part for three sorts of Employments, Negotiations, War and the Treasury. In reference to the first Employment we speak of Politicks in general, and afterwards of the Speculative and Practical Part ; The Proportions and the Use of Policy, with Reference to the Genius of the Prince, and the state of Affairs, and the good of Kingdoms in Forraign and Domestick Negotiations ; Of the Method of Treating with Forraign Ministers, and of the Qualities required in a good Negotiator. After which, we make a particular Description of the States of Europe, of their Laws, Customs, Manners, Maxims, Interests and Politicks.

In reference to War, we Treat of the Foundations and Rights of Universal Reason ; Of Publick and Respective Justice ; That War is permitted by the Law of God ; wherefore, how long since, and to what end : That it is necessary for the Preservation of the Publick Peace, and for easing Kingdoms of their Multitude : That it ought to be the Maturity of Policy, Experience

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perience and Judgment which decides a War : That Vigilance, Activity and Exactness are requir'd to maintain it ; and what ought to be the Method of concluding it. By what Principles all these Qualities are acquir'd, improv'd and brought to Perfection ; What Correspondence ought to be held with the Friends and Enemies of the State ; How to begin a War, and how to get rid of it. And Lastly, Many other things both Profitable and of great Importance to be known upon this Subject.

As to the Publick Treasury, we unfold what Sagacity and Knowledge it requires for the Management of it : How Money ought to be Raised, and how to be used ; What Vigilancy is requisite in respect of the Publick Good, The Severity and Circumspection in reference to Misdemeanours ; The Oeconomy and Precautions to be used in the Administration of the Publick Treasure ; The Avoidance of being sway'd by Interest in whatever concerns the Common Good of the Prince and People, and the Discretion requisite for Employments that depend upon it.

After that, we Enter into a particular Display of what ever concerns a Courtier, whether he serve a Prince in his Palace, or in his Armies : What Inclinations he ought to bring along with him to Court, who intends to prosper in it : What the Practice of a Courtier ought to be ; where we take care to Explain the Difference between Religion and Policy, which are frequently there confounded both together : What sort of Education a Man ought to have to be there Employ'd and Satisfi'd : What
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Choice of Friends a Man ought to make there : What he ought to rely upon, and hope for : What ignominious things Ignorance, Laziness and Perfidiousness are: As also what are the Duties, Obligations, Maxims, Qualities, and Knowledge of the other Conditions of Life ; the particular consideration of which leads me farther, and encloses many things worthy the Curiosity and Instruction of every man. For example, what ought to be the Qualities requisite in an Embassador, in reference to the Courts whither he is sent: What a Man of the Sword ought to do, whether he serves his Prince, or leads a Private Life : What ought to be the Virtues of a good Magistrate, either as an Officer of Justice, or a Politician. Lastly, The Nature, Extent, the Benefit and Designs of Trade, where every thing is Authoriz'd that concerns Men of Business and Merchants.

We shall strive to render these Discourses as Solid as may be, to set 'em above all Rational Objections ; to the end a Young Man may the better know what we are about to teach him, and that he may have a desire to know betimes what we owe many times, but imperfectly, to Age and Experience.

Once reading these Little Peices is not sufficient to benefit by 'em: The manner requires Application; because it is not carried on in a Florid Stile, which leaves almost no impression in the Mind, because it is not serious in any thing. We shall strive to render things which are Abstracted and Serious, the most delightful that we can : But we ought withal to give notice, That the

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the Little Application which some things require, will be amply recompenc'd by the pleasure of knowing something more or better than they knew before.

Men ought not to suffer themselves to be persuaded of the benefit which they shall receive hereby, but as they shall perceive themselves mov'd by the Discoveries, or the Reasons that shall be alledg'd; or till the Reading of Five or Six Letters have fully convinc'd 'em of the Profit and Importance of these Instructions. For then they will perfectly understand what Advantages are to be reaped from a better Education, then that which they have already had. The Father will be overjoy'd to have procur'd it for his Son. The greatest difficulty is to find out Men that are capable of being Taught and Improv'd.

For that end it is, That we are desirous to publish the Knowledge that we have acquir'd by Conversation with all degrees of Men in the Principal Courts of Europe; and by long Experience. And in regard the generality of Men, that are usually employ'd, is indocible and vain, comparatively to what is thought requisite for 'em to know, 'tis no wonder if the Education which is bestow'd upon Youth now adays, be so imperfect, and full of unprofitable Things.

The Author repeats it once again, that he has no design to wound the Reputation of any one, tho he intends not to spare any Body, when it concerns him to speak the Truth. His Morals shall not be altogether meerly Christian, they would be too Frigid and Languishing; but they shall be
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an Assemblage of Honest, Profitable and Delightful. He looks upon the Person that he has a desire to Teach, as a Man of Worth, according to the Notions of Religion, and as a perfect Honest Man, according to the Maxims of the World. That is to say, That the principal things which he would inspire, and which are look't upon as the real Foundations of a Civil Life, are to be an Honest Man, and a Man of Worth.

THE

THE
Knowledge of the World :

OR,

The Art of Well-Educating
Youth, through the Various
Conditions of Life.

To Monsieur, *The Duke*——
Peer of France.

*The First Letter, concerning the
Principles of Good Education.*

My Lord,

YOU have often desir'd that I
would tell you my Thoughts of
the Manner how Youth ought to
be Educated ; and I am going to
speak to you, as a person, who
having travell'd the greatest parts of the
States of *Europe*, have taken care to observe
the various Methods of it, and to frame a
System, the practice of which would prove
ex-

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extreamly useful. It behoves me then to undeceive you, Sir, as to what may have been told you by such, perhaps, as only sought to flatter you. The Education of your Son will be still imperfect, whatever Merit or Distinction he has acquir'd abroad by your Cares, and his Conversation with Men, so long as he wants the solid Principles of human Wisdom.

'Tis not my aim to speak of that same Sophistick Philosophy, envelopp'd in certain Terms, and subjected to certain methods of reasoning. I can never suppose that that sort of Philosophy can form the Mind of a Young Man: 'Tis that same clear Judgment, that exact abstraction of the Original of Causes, which is acquir'd by Speculation and Time, to which the Mind of Man cannot of it self apply it self, without the assistance of an Able, Wise and Clear sighted Master, to replenish him with the Seeds of that acquir'd Wisdom, with which he makes the Infusion to sprout forth. And to this successive unfolding of that infus'd, and acquir'd Wisdom it is, that you are beholding for the Progresses which your Son shall make in the true knowledge of his Animal, Rational and Christian Being; after such a manner as to satisfie himself in the first place, according as he improves in sufficiency, and raises himself above Persons of his Quality by his Wisdom and his Reasoning.

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A superficial Knowledge of some part of the Mathematicks, produces no more then a weak amusement, or at most a certain aptitude to be sufficient for certain Employments of Fortune, for the success of which we think our selves in some measure responsible. The reading of Books of the Times, is a way to abridge the Mind, and draw it wholly to the choice of Terms, and ranging 'em in Order, to procure himself a kind of Honour among the Idolaters of Novelty, while the Discussion of things is so Negligent and Irregular, that the Wits of the Time can no longer agree upon any thing: so unlike are things, through the False Glitter that dazles almost all Men.

Conversation among Persons is of no other Nature then their Education, and their Prejudices fortifi'd by a habitude of not desiring to apply themselves to any thing which a Man of sound Judgment requires. The more a Man complies with 'em, the more superficial he becomes, like them; and by that Deception, authoriz'd by Custom, Merit, as well as Vertue, are fallen to decay, and grown out of Knowledge.

But what will all this avail to Form a Wise Man, who is affected with his Religion? will some Critick ask me. This is only to frame a Model of Wisdom in civil Society.

Were it as true as some impious Persons, and Libertines would have us to imagine, that

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that we had no other Life to lead but this, it might be suppos'd, perhaps, that this sort of Education might serve: however, it would be precisely but for one part of the World, because the Maxims of knowing how to live are so different, that those which are practis'd in one Countrey, are frequently not to be endur'd in another.

Let 'em suppose a Portion of my self that thinks, that recollects what is past, and forms a thousand conjectures upon what is to come; Let 'em permit me to be sensible of Infinite Desires, and a secret Vexation for not being able to satisfy 'em; Let 'em not be able to suppress within me a desire still to live after I am dead; And after all this, let 'em pretend to deny another Life, and a Portion of my self Immaterial and Immortal. In truth whatever they heap upon so false a Prejudice, no way satisfies me; because I well perceive they do not persuade me enough to supply what perplexes me, nor to clear those Objections which my Reason forms against those Natural Insurrections which the Passions of the Heart would render pleasing to me.

But we must quit these Tenents early or late; a World of Good Wits have surrender'd at last, and too many have Repented their Delay. How comes it to pass that they continue in their Deviations? Because they neglect too much to prevent 'em in their Youth: And that Negligence is the first Seed of Atheism and Irreligion. A
young

young Man ought to be Instructed betimes in the means to avoid 'em, or at least to recover himself when led astray through the Corruption of Bad Company. There is no Medium between these two Resolutions; either we must deny another Life that is to last for ever, or it behoves us to fit our selves for it with more circumspection then for that which is only Transitory. 'Tis also impossible to fulfil the Duties of this Life, when we are not strongly Propossess'd with the Prejudices of the other.

This Proposition cannot be consider'd at first sight; it must be ponder'd upon more then once, deeply to insinuate it into the Soul of a Young Man. There is nothing which Natural Order does not owe either to Society, or a Superiour Law, which has so order'd it. If you admit Society only, to be the Principle of this Order, you authorize the Disorders that necessarily arise in Opposition to so many Maxims, and contrary Interests, and throw your self into Irregularities that have no bounds, and to which Cruelty, Injustice, Tyranny and Open Force may give what Names they please, yet shall it not be thought a disorder in Society. On the other side, if you admit a Superiour Law, the wise Administration of which has a Right to determin, we are under an absolute Necessity either to submit to it, or oppose it. If you oppose it, you declare your self guilty so soon as you fail of Subordination; if you submit,

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it cannot be but either by Reason, or by Choice. Whence it follows that you act freely.

When Reason determines upon this submission, it behoves us to have consider'd the Consequences. Rewards and Punishments of Necessity attend the Laws; both the one and the other, then, may have determin'd our Resolution, and then a Man cannot resist the secret Conviction, that he feels some secret pleasure in submission, and some scruple to Rebel. But to the end that both the one and the other may make the more Impression, we must suppose within our selves a Principle capable of the Consequences of that Reward and Punishment. And thus the Mind of a Young Man is to be insensibly prepar'd for this great Conviction, that there is within him, and always will be a Portion of himself that cannot dye, that will not suffer him to be quiet in his most delightful Transgressions, and that the secret Prickings, of which he will be sensible during the whole course of his Life, for sinful Actions, will be as so many Proofs of this Verity. That the Inability of utterly appeasing these Remorses, is a Prepossession of Immortality, from a Principle that continually Peals it in our Ears: That the secret Repugnancy or inevitable Care and Caution that Men use in committing bad Actions, is a Tacit Declaration of the truth of that Principle; That that same inward Sweetness and Comfort which befalls us
after

after we have done well, is an irreproachable Testimony of the Care that Reason takes to Combat Corruption, and that all this engages us to a more extended Care of our selves, then the Order and Dispensation of a Civil Life. These Impressions increasing with Age, and strengthening themselves by Knowledge, will be a means to Establish the Funds of Christianity in a Soul Destin'd to that Subordination by the force of this Conviction, according to the Sentiment of *Tertullian*. Whence we must conclude, that in order to a good Education, it is requisite to fix it upon the Principles of Religion, and to know what a Christian Being is.

In regard that Religion is the Foundation of all our Duties, 'tis Morally impossible that a Man should have any true Merit, if he have not the solid Principles of it. He that does not know to the very bottom the Principles of Natural Morality, the Foundation of Laws, their Differences, their Obligations, their Dependencies and Vicissitudes, and the Principles of their Contradiction in respect of the different Persons who are appointed to observe 'em, how shall he ever learn to Conceive a Spiritual Being, which Attributes to it self those Rights which are above the Sences, without destroying 'em, and to which it behoves all Mankind to Devote himself, under the Penalty of an Eternal *Anathema*; How shall he be able to comprehend the Nature and

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the Just Punishment of a Transgression, of which they never understood the *Motive*, the *Object* nor the *Occasion*.

How many things become *Impenetrable* to us in the Sequel, through the Impressions of a *Corrupted Heart* that would have been easily Perceptible, had the *Corruption* of the *Heart* been prevented. For Example, Had a Young Man been accusom'd from his first Years that Reason Enlightens, to learn to say, or Argue with himself, *That it being impossible for God to produce any thing but what is perfect*, 'tis not likely that Man who is the most *Excellent Piece of his Handy-work*, should come from him in the State of *Corruption and Misery*, wherein we behold him: That this *Imperfection* must of necessity have some *Cause*, since it produces such *unhappy Events*; That the *Crimes and Disorders* that corrupt *Society*, are the *Effluvioms and Consequences* of it, and that of absolute necessity a Man must have been reduc'd thereto by his own Fault, because he bears such *visible Marks of the Punishment*. This *Convincement* coming to enlarge it self with years, would Infallibly oblige him to *Adore and Fear that First Being*, which we shall never otherwise comprehend in this Life: To *Adore* him, because he has not made use of all his *Priviledges* in respect of us, but has *Treated* us with *Indulgence*; To *Fear* him, because he might no more then have only delay'd the *Terrible Punishment*, the *Tryals* of which could not Reclaim us to our Duties,

Duties, and keep us in *Submission*. 'Tis believ'd that this would be a true means to make a deep and solid *Impression* of *Christianity* in the *Mind* of a *Young Man*; and to accustom him so well to *Submission*, that nothing would be able to shake his *Principles*; for want of which all *Persons* of *Quality* and *Learning* also totter at this Day, and play the *Sublime Wits*, as they have more Art or Interest to Erect their Doubts into *Presumptions*, contrary to the *Impressions* and *Maxims* of *Religion*.

You know, *Sir*, That there have been two *Objections* made me upon this *Subject*. The First is, That *Youth*, nor indeed *Mature Adolensency* can be made capable of these *Deductions*, which tho govern'd by a solid *Wit*, are very *Imperfect*, and subject to great *Disputes*. Secondly, For that *Religion* being the *Fruit* of *Liberty*, it requires a good *Judgment* or *Infusion* to dispose a *Young Man* to these things, without overwhelming him too soon in certain *Precepts* that rather *Torture* then *Extend his Liberty*; and which not always agreeing with the *Natural Impression* of him that *Receives* 'em, either through the unsuitableness of his own, and his *Governours Temper*, or deficiency of *Grace*, so variously dispenc'd among *Men*, often Form a *Contradiction*, which they take for a pretence of being releas'd, or for a *Motive* never to be reclaim'd again.

I Answer to the first by a very Familiar *Comparison*. Is not the Earth in *November*;

thought capable of bearing Wheat? Why then is the Seed Sow'd with so much Preparation, *Husbandry* and *Expence*? This explains it self sufficiently of it self: But the Method of *Tilling the Earth*, and using so much preparation before-hand, is worthy a *Second Reflection*. The more *Fertile the Ground is*, the more good *Husbandry* it requires to hinder *Weeds* from growing up and Stifling the *Corn*; Can it be deny'd that this do's not perfectly agree with the *Education of a Young Man*? Whom it becomes to be so much the more *Exact* and *Regular*, the more *Wit* and *Parts* he is Endow'd with; That Distribution well rang'd and dispens'd with more *Wisdom* then *Zeal*, is the *Seed* which is scatter'd into the *Mind* of that *Infant*, to the End it may take Root so deeply, that the *Drought* and *Coldness* of *Adolescence* for things of the other World, may not hinder it from sprouting up in due time, and growing afresh upon the *Return of a New Heat*. If a Land being Sown with Seed ill cleans'd from *Forraign Grain*, produces nothing but a *Harvest of Confusion*; judg you, whether the *Seed of Morality* can produce any thing better when it is not *Purish'd* from *Illusion*, separated from *Corruption*, nor advanced above *Ignorance*.

I Reply to the Second, That *Religion* is the *Fruit of Liberty*, but still it is the *Fruit of Reason*; that if a Man would make a rigorous *Judgment* of the thing, the *Use of Liberty* prevents, and that a great deal too, the

Use of Reason, and that that same Reasonable and Mature Choice so much boasted of, and so little known, is rather a proportion of *Habitude*, then an absolute Determination of the Understanding. That for the same Reason, that we cultivate the Wit, that it may produce, it behoves us also to Sow the Heart, to the end it may sprout Forth; and that in the midst of those Oppositions, that strive to Choak this pretious Seed, it may be so deeply rooted, as to grow up with Reason, and prove powerful enough to withstand the *Sophisms* of the *Imagination*.

Seeing that in a Youth it is not the Heart that Governs the Mind; and that we find that one Man has more Impatience to know, then another has to Enjoy, who can question, but that then is the Time to dispose the Heart to Enjoyment by Impressions that Flatter or Prepossess the Mind? Men will believe upon this Subject no more then what they please; but we are convinc'd by the Examples of all Ages and Sexes, as also of several Nations, as well as by the Sincere Confession of wise and Perspicacious Men, that the defect of Religion is now so great; the inconstancy, in reference to Spiritual Matters so general, and the Practise of Christian Maxims so little observ'd, that by means of this Enormous and Fatal Negligence it is, that the Minds of Children are so ill prepar'd for the Duties and Functions of Religion.

VVhoever has not apprehended, that the Conscience is, as it were, the Cradle of Moral,

ral Vertues, where they increase according to the Natural Inclinations which there they meet with, and where they only take root so far as they are Cultivated by Liberty and Grace, is it possible that such a one should easily apprehend how the *Moral Vertues* are the Channels of Divine Infusions? Can he conceive that the Difference of Temperaments are the first fore-boding and secret Testimony of Predestination? Will he ever suffer himself to be Convinc'd, That for a Man to be Devout in the Law of the Lord, it behoves a Man to have a Fund of Probity, Justice, Equity and a Natural Relish for Vertue and Goodness?

Usually we never dispence with the *Maxims* and *Practises* of Religion, but because we would not be oblig'd to those Measures of Probity, Justice and Relish for Truth and Goodness: But the contrary to what we Promise to our selves falls out exactly. We suppose we thoroughly know all these Vertues without the help of Religion; but we are deceiv'd. The difference between the Practise of 'em in several Countries, justifies, that they are no longer any other then Names, which every one Interprets after his manner, so soon as they cease to have a Universal or Natural End. Now they can neither have the one nor the other, unless they are directed by an intention that disposes 'em to it. That Intention cannot produce Exactness, and Uprightness, if no such thing be in it. This Uprightness is the First Law, or Natural Religion.

gion, of which the *Positive* is but the *Commentary*, or at most but the *Reproduction*, and of which the *Evangelick Law* is the *Perfection*.

And now we are fallen again into a necessity of admitting the Principles of *Universality* and *Spirituality*, which are at present unknown to so many Persons, and which are able to remedy so many *Deviations* and *Disorders*, were they but establish'd in the *Mind of a Young Man*.

No *Probity* without *Religion*, no *Religion* without *Probity*: The one is no less true than the other. No *Justice* without *respective Subordination* to a *superiour Law*, and no *sincere Submission* without *Justice*. This Alternative is beyond all Contradiction. No *Equity*, without the *Regulation* of its *Conduct*; No regulation of *Conduct* without *Equity*. What can be found more true in a *Proposition* that cannot be *Dismembered* but by *Violence*? Lastly, No relish for *True Goodness*, without a *Complaisency* for *Religion*; No condescending to the *Laborious Practises* of *Religion* without this *Relish*, and without this *inward Unction* which *Comforts the Heart*. You pretend nevertheless, to inform your *Pupil* in *Probity*, *Justice*, *Equity*, and a *Relish of Good Things*, without understanding the *Maxims* of *Religion*. Alas! What do ye do? You only shew a *starch'd* and *superficial Decency*; and what *Equity*, *Justice* or *Probity* can there be in that, if they are not grounded upon *Religion*? But you will answer, *We infuse the Practices of 'em into a Child, and that's sufficient*,

ent, because a Child is incapable of Dispute. I answer, That those Practices will not hold good against the *Insurrections of Self-Love*; and that when he shall come to make use of his Liberty, your Pupil will not find himself inclin'd to remember those Practices; which for want of being deeply imprinted in his Mind, submit to every thing that soothes his Heart, and perswades it to its Natural Propensity.

'Tis for want of infusing these Maxims into Youth, that Riper Years fixes em in their Passions; that we find so little Probity and Sincerity among Christians, even among those that pretend to be the most regular and most austere. The Church deplores it, the *Publick Interests* are Sacrific'd to it, and *private Interests* altogether disorder'd by it. Youth becomes Dissolute, and *Libertinism* Predominant. *Human Life* is a continual Commerce of Imposture and Infidelity. *Old Age* is a beaten Track of Malice and Injustice; and *Death* is either the Disowning, or the Punishment of it. Now in regard that we are to impute all these Disorders to the *Omissions of Education*; judg you, Sir, whether this Discussion be of that small Importance, as the People of the Age imagine. But let us go a little farther.

Whoever is not apprehensive that the *Conscience* is not as it were a kind of Medium between the Mind that Enlightens it, and the Heart that governs it; how shall he conceive that that same inward Delight which

Grace

Grace infuses into us, after a manner altogether incomprehensible, or which grows up in us from an exact *Knowledg* and *Relish* of *what is Good*, is all the Foundation of *Christian Resistance*, and the support of that *Integrity* which is *Temptation-proof* against all Carnal and Forbidden pleasures? There is nothing but this *secret Delight* which makes the Heart amends for denying itself, and submitting to a Law so opposite to the Motions of Sense; and without this *secret Compensation*, all the *Authority of Revelation* could never hinder a *Conscience* from suffering it self to be led away by the *passions of the Heart*. How is it possible for him who is ignorant of the *Original Principles of Vertue* and *Resistance of Evil*, to dare promise himself the Power of being able to do it with Success and Perseverance?

'Tis only from an exact Discussion of *Human Actions*, *Laws* and their *Oppositions*, that we draw the first Principles of this *Knowledg*. These Notions are always confus'd and slow, when we must be beholding for 'em to Age and Experience; and therefore they are not to omitted in *Education*, without failing in the principal thing that ought to form an *Honest Man*:

I would grant that you have bestow'd upon a Young Man the *Knowledg* of *Learning*, furnish'd his Memory with all that *History Values* in every Sense; I would grant you have imbib'd him with *Morality* regarded on all sides; *Philosophy* examin'd

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in all its Parts ; *Logic* clear'd in all its Subterfuges and Evasions ; and *Politicks* divid'd into, through all their most exact and most excellent Refinements. I will also grant that his Judgment began betimes to render all this peculiar to him, and that his Talents, answerable to this Fecundity of Matter, justify'd that you had been perfectly successfully in Moulding this *Young Man* to all the Duties of a *Civil Life*; but then I must ask you, *Whether you taught him the Art, and accusom'd him to the Habitude of making his Mind and his Heart agree in such a just proportion, as to maintain a Natural Harmony between 'em.*

You dare not Answer, that your care wrought that Effect, if you fail'd to infuse into him the *general Cause* or *Principle* that *regulates the whole*, that is to say, *Religion*. Too many People would accuse you of speaking an Untruth, should you maintain the Contrary.

It may be, you will be yet less of the Opinion, that without this inward compliance between the Heart and the Mind, which knits a perfect Correspondency between 'em, a Man cannot arrive to the Perfection of a *Civil Life*: But you will have too many Censurers. Agree then, that your *Education*, pretended to be so perfect, fails in the Principal thing, and that you have only moulded a superficial Man, more fit to disguise himself by dissimulation, than to vanquish himself in reference to the Symptoms and Corruption of his Heart.

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Your *Plato's*, *Socrates's* and *Seneca's* do but serve us for Authentick Proofs of this truth: Their Wisdom wanted improvement, speculation, discussion and fulness, when the Fame alone of their Reputation overspread all the World. For Example, What did they not utter concerning the contempt of the World, and publick Applause, when their Confident at the same time makes known to us their Voluptuousness, and their Itch after Praise. What is it that they have not taught us concerning Chastity, when at the same time, they who were their intimate Familiars tell us the contrary, and make it appear how disorderly and irregular they were in point of Debauchery. What, has not *Plato* Wrote to *Socrates*, and *Socrates* to *Plato* in their familiar Discourses upon the *Vulgar Idea*, and Divinity of several Principles, or of several Providences, while their Scholars inform us how weak they were, and how ridiculous the Idolatry which they Profess'd in Publick. Whence comes this Contradiction? From the Opposition of the Lights of the Mind, to the Motions of the Heart? They could not deny to their Minds the acknowledgment of their Condition. But had they not strength enough to make use of that Opposition, to regulate their Hearts? There was nothing certain as to the other Life in a Discovery not fully made out, and which only peirc'd through the thick Darkneses of the Jewish Law. What did they want? That Divine
Motive

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Motive, so worthy the *Creator* and a *Just Man*, to reconcile the Misunderstanding of the Mind and Heart by a *Supernatural Consideration* which is common to both; Religion, in those Principles and that Coherence which it has with the *First Law*, or *Natural Uprightness*? And because this Motive had not been infus'd into those Sages of Antiquity, together with their Reason, there could be nothing inspir'd into 'em by their own Reason that could raise 'em above themselves.

'Tis nothing but meer Delusion for a Man to tye himself without Judgment, to the receiv'd, and sometimes extravagant Practices in matters of Religion. That which is often thought to be pure Devotion, is frequently Superstition, or a false observance; Devotion is but a Moral Vertue, no more then Religion: And therefore it may be obnoxious to Excesses; and maugre the most notable Persons or Criticks; a Man may have too much Devotion, as well as too little Religion. Where there is too much Devotion, it wears out by being made use of, and the Habit which they pretend to infuse into a Young Man, without joyning with it *Knowledge* and *Judgment*, to fix the Principles of it, usually degenerates into an Insensibility, or a disgust of Piety. For either the Heart languishes with Self-opposition, or else those inward relishes, which proceed rather from Self-Love

Love Satisf'd ; then from effective Grace, grow dull and insipid, for want of being so season'd as to admit a Reviving and Refreshing of that Languishing Faintness. And this is that which Ordinary Education neglects; and this defect of Application, is the reason that Young People so little raise their Thoughts towards goodness.

A Gardner knows what sort of Tree such a Tree is by the Leaves, but his Art is very imperfect, if he stop there: He must know what sort of Soyl, and what Manuring that Tree requires: What Situation, and what *Aspect* of the *Sun* is most proper for it: When to let it Grow, and when to Prune it; without which, he not only lessens the Fertility of it, but prejudices the Bulk and Duration of the Plant. The Comparison speaks of it self: 'Tis a small thing for a Man to tie himself Scrupulously to the Rind of Religion, tho that be something: All Ages have made some Alterations in it. And that which has befallen the Practises and out-side of Religion being that which will be successive to the *End of Ages*, 'tis requisite that a Young Man should have understood betimes, how that is still no more then an Accessory to it, to the end he may adhere more Stedfastly and Religiously to the Principal.

What a Confusion do these Ranversements make in Christianity? Every thing appears *Religion* to some, and nothing is *Religion* among others. We find both Superstition

stitution and Impiety reigning successively, and sometimes in Opposition to one another: and what is left to be conceiv'd is this, that the Head-strongness of superstition augments Impiety, and the Irregularity of Impiety fortifies Superstition. The superstitious man cannot endure the Irreligion of the Impious person, without being scandaliz'd at his Extravagance: And out of an extraordinary and misunderstood precaution, for fear of falling into the same disorder, he becomes still more superstitious. Because the *Atheist* believes nothing, the superstitious Bigot believes every thing. To him, says *Salvian*, every thing is God, but God himself: And their ill conceiv'd Delicacy it is that fixes the *Atheist* in his blindness. He sees the excess into which the Bigot is fallen, and ridicules him; and judging by that Excess, that the other neither knows what he does, nor what he Believes, falls into a greater Precipice himself, while he seeks to avoid it.

They who profess the true Exercise of Religion behold these disorders and Lament 'em. The chiefest and most Substantial Part of Religion is almost unknown, or very little practis'd. In the room of which are set up certain empty, extravagant and rambling Practices, fitter to beget superstition, than to warm Religion. Particular and private Interests or Confederacies contribute too much toward 'em, to believe they will be of a short continuance. They who would in vain remove this Vail, come to be suspected or hated: Truth suffers

suffers under this sort of Tyranny: There is hardly any thing more of Christian Charity known but the Name: That Vertue dwells no longer among us; 'tis retir'd to some more innocent Land, and less enslav'd to iniquity and prejudice. People adhere to a Certain Custom which they neglect to examin, the Habit being strengthen'd by that custom. Both the one and other have corrupted Religion. Yet through this Corruption there is a real and fundamental Truth to be discern'd which cannot change, and which maugre the Industry of its Opposers, discovers what there is of False and Counterfeit in this same Translation of the Principal to the Accessory, and of the Accessory to the Principal. All things rowl upon the same Basis, but all things are not weigh'd with the same Weights:

According to this Demonstration it is that a tender Soul ought to be moulded to preserve it from Corruption. During the Flexibility of Youth it is, that Reason ought to be concern'd to make that difference, that so it may be accusom'd to adhere with all its might to the Principal, and but weakly to the Accessory.

We beset a *Young Man* with the tenderness of his Heart; we abandon him to the sallies of his Temper, upon the exterior Practises of Religion, while we neglect to unfold to him insensibly, and to the purpose what Faith, Hope and Charity are; how we are born without 'em; how they occur to us; how we ought to govern our selves that we

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may

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may Dye without 'em, for 'em, and by 'em; that is to say, how far they engage us; how they ought to be improv'd, that they may last as long as we live, by a continual growth, yet not to excess, with respect to the difference in the exercises of *Religion*, which being only Moral, are subject to too much, or too little, and always ready to degenerate into one of those Extremities.

'Tis for want of Employing to good purpose this dispensation of the solid Principles of *Religion*, that so few Masters are capable to discover the time, and proportion fitting for the different Ages of their Pupils, till what is most perfect in their Tempers and in their Inclinations degenerates, and that they only wait for time and opportunity to fall into that which is worst in matters of *Religion*. 'Twere to be wish'd that Persons of Quality did not find this too true by experience.

They who began with the Irregularity of the Passions, may hope to end with Wisdom and Tranquillity, which comes at last, as Years grow on, and that we begin to taste, when we have glutted our selves with every thing. But they who began more spiritually, in appearance, under certain confus'd and rambling Notions, and in the Habitual Exercise of certain Practices, which naturally constrain the Heart of Man, enlarge themselves as they get more liberty, and become Vicious proportionably to the Disgust and Insensibility that discourages 'em. A Young Man is to be order'd, that he may be made

to relish the Marrow of Religion, by laying vigorously, and at times, before him, the Inability of Human Reason, to quiet the Heart, upon the Contradictions of a Law which obliges by force, because it proceeds from the Almighty, while it puts violent and tedious restraints upon the Propensities of Nature: The more he dives into it by the strength of reflection, the more is he taught profoundly to humble himself, by reason of that inability, to expect from Heaven that assistance that may be sufficient for him in the Combat; to value those assistances that are perceiv'd, yet never seen, and to love as well him who bestows them upon him, out of his free Liberality, as those that contribute to engage him thereto. 'Tis onely by this unraveling of principles that a young Lad is to be taught to apprehend what it is, whence it proceeds, and whither tends the Loving of God withal his heart; that is to say, more then himself, and his Neighbour as himself: what is the Oeconomy of Faith with the mind, of Charity with the Heart, and of hope with the Conscience, which supports that Divine Correspondence by this Innocent way of seducing.

Without these Lessons of wisdom and solid Religion there is but little safety for Christianity in the hands of a Man that dyes, young; tho he may seem to have begun the course of his life with Maturity of wit, that he might draw to himself the esteem of the World: Every thing proves serviceable to him who

has learnt from his Youth to convert it to the true use which he ought to make of it. Every thing makes Living well troublesome to a man who never understood to what purpose he liv'd, nor why such wealth, such Palaces, such authority, such Honours, such Respects paid him by his Inferiours, were bestow'd upon him. The first turns all that he has into the means of going more assuredly to God, in the sentiments of a Reason able to confound *Atheism*. The second turns to his perdition whatever God entrusts to his disposal, and forgetting himself by how much he is the more known in the World, he makes the meaner sort of People question whether he believes in God, or at least, whether God be just, to give so much wealth to a man who makes so ill use of it, to the exclusion of so many Poor and miserable People, for whom Providence seem'd to have appointed onely that Relief.

Grant that there be falsehoods and Errours as to this matter in civil Life; Grant, that there be Omissions in Education; can reason satisfy it self about the Inequality of the Blessings of Fortune, when it observes, without passion, the Plenty that some enjoy, and the Want of others? Can we suppose an intelligent Being that presides over the preservation of Nature, without conceding that upon this Original Inequality he has form'd Designs which are to us unknown, and of the Wisdom of which we cannot judg but by the end; and that Religion being destin'd for no other
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end but to perfect Society, study'd to preserve and unite in favour of Society, what she knew might wast it self more easily by being divided, and contribute less to the Universal Good, by a more equal distribution. I shall explain my self. 'Tis necessary for the Duration of Society to reunite three things together; Authority in certain Chief Governours to watch over the common good; and who to that end should have Power to make the Refractory comply either willingly or by force; who should preside over a certain number of Families enclos'd within one Territory, or within a Circuit of Walls; and who should concern themselves in the Union of the Publick Treasures in a certain Heaps which Labour, Industry, or Rewards should rammas together; and who should preserve the Publick Justice, not to deprive the rest of his Fellow Countrymen of it, but that he might have Treasures and Magazines, to which he might have recourse in the Publick Exigencies, with more speed and success: where particular Necessities should find particular Assistan-ces; and upon which every Body might assuredly conclude, That the Publick Faith was interested in their preservation. All good Politicians agree, That Society is founded upon the Basis of these Maxims; and that it is only upheld by the use and praetise of 'em.

Here Religion comes in, but she prevails no otherwise then as the Gospel over the Old Testament. Far from changing this Order, she supposes it, and minds nothing more

then to preserve or prefer it. Submission to Powers establishes this first *Authority*, which the Choice of the People, or necessity of *Union* has render'd Absolute and Coercive: The extension of that *Charity* which it prescribes, and the *Alliance* of Proximity which it hinders, the better to tye *Christians* one to another; justifies her Adopting the *sharing of Goods*, the *dividing of Kingdoms*, *Provinces*, *Cities* and *Families*, and her acknowledging the necessity of it, for the more speedy *succour* and *relief* of one another, till she has made of all those that believe, says the *Author* of the *Acts of the Apostles*, but *one Heart and one Soul*. How! would it be only the *Ranmassment* of *Riches* that she would not be concern'd to dispence, upon the Considerations of a *Wisdom* conformable to her self? After so many *prohibitions* to dispoil our *Neighbours*, and after so many terrible menaces if we make no *Restitution* of what we have wrongfully possess'd ourselves, could it be possible that she should pretend to interrupt, or trouble the *designs* of *Society* in the *rammassing* of all *Riches* into one heap? They who suppose any thing so irregular in the Dispensation which *Religion* Ordains of *Common Estates*, lessen the Idea of a *wisdom* which has always infinitely surpass'd the full extent of *Policy*, tho that has cemented *Society*. I dare say, That they oppose 'em directly one against the other; since the *Right* of *Society* over the *Estates* of particular *Men*, would be much more powerful then that of *Religion*, tho their *Aim* be so unlike. For the *Aim* of *Religion*

gives

gion is to dispense 'em without distinction and profusely ; whereas the end of *Society* is to preserve 'em, and to *Transmit* 'em successively from *Father* to *Son*.

We must agree that *Society* with extraordinary *Wisdom* upholds Abundance where it is, without depriving it self of the Priviledg to distribute some Portion of it, to the *Necessitous Members* that compose it ; but we must as well agree, That *Religion*, in that respect, very much out-does *Society*, since she infuses this *Dispensation*, with a freedom so entire, that she pretends to interest *Self-love* only therein, by reason of the great *Rewards*, which she promises assuredly to those that give a share of their *Goods* to the *Necessitous*, for the *Love of God* who has bestowed 'em upon 'em. *Society* prescribes and puts in Execution ; *Religion* Demands and Promises. *Society* fixes the publick *Alms*, *Religion* leaves it without bounds. *Society* would think it ill done for a *Man* to dispoil himself of all his *Wealth* in one day ; because it always ought to remain upon the same Principles, and the same Assurances within the Limits of Time. *Religion* on the other side advises to quit all, nevertheless, without interrupting the Order of *Universal Charity*, which cannot forget it self, because it only aims at Eternity, without any regard to Time, but only to reign beyond time. Lastly, *Society* prescribes the *Objects* of publick *Liberty*, because it is the welfare of *Community* that determines it ; whereas *Religion* excludes no *Body* from his share in common of

the Goods which are bestow'd, because she knows not who is nearest to her, whether this or t'other Person. Thus you see how *Religion* and *Society* agree, and succour each other. *Nature* has serv'd 'em for a Pattern. They have taken notice whence it comes to pass, *That in Rivers, which have not a deep Channell, and sometimes want Water, there are many deep hollow places, and certain profound Receptacles which are never without Water, whither the Fish resort together in Shoals to avoid that Drouth which would destroy 'em upon the burning Sands.* Were there not such places of Refuge in Rivers, *Nature* would be accus'd for want of *Wisdom*. But what would you say if any one of these Retreats should deny Water and coolness to the Fish? To what would you impute it? You would not blame the retreating Place for being the occasion of such a Defect; But you would rather believe there was some secret evil Quality in the Stream, which caus'd the Watty Fry to forsake it for fear of being Kill'd, and to seek out other where for a Lively hood.

Let us apply this *Comparison* to the meanest Circumstances. This Water embody'd in the Hollow places, proceeds from the Gliding of the Rivers, and from the Disposition of the Soyl which attracts and preserves 'em. So plentiful Estates fall into a Family by a certain Dispensation only, of which we neither know the moving Springs, nor the *Wisdom*, but which Unites into that Family

Family the Goods which lay diſpers'd before in ſeveral Hands, to the end that this Union might be the more concurringly advantageous to *publick Deſigns*, ſays *St. Thom.*

There are ſome of theſe Dikes where the Water gathers, and whither the Fiſh retire, that are fill'd up from time to time, but others are ſtill to be found in other places; thus we ſee wealthy and powerful Families fall every day to Decay, but others Spring up, which from Beggery riſe to the the higheſt degrees of *Elevation*. Thoſe Retreating Places admit all manner of Fiſh, tho different in their Shape and Qualities. So the Treasures of Particular Perſons ought to be freely Diſtributed to all ſorts of People in Neceſſity, tho never ſo mean and obſcure. Laſtly, If there be any retreating Places which the Fiſh avoid, 'tis an evident ſign of ſome Infection, or ſome ſecret bad Qurlity, that drives 'em thence: And in truth nothing expreſſes better the Rough Nature, and bad Education of the moſt part of Rich People, whom the Poor are conſtrain'd to avoid, for fear of being ſwallowed up by 'em.

This Diſcuſſion ought to ſerve as a *Leſſon* to *Young Men* that are Born Wealthy, or Heirs to great Eſtates. 'Tis upon this Parallel of *Society and Religion*, as alſo upon the excellency of the latter above the former, That he ought to be Moulded from his Youth, if his Parents deſire that he ſhould be Taught aright to know himſelf,

self, and to govern himself in the midst of his *Happy Enjoyments*. Generally through a *deplorable Blindness*, Youth is never instructed but in what concerns the World; And do's it take effect? I question it. Rather have we not Reason to doubt it, by reason of the infinite number of *Examples* to the contrary. You shall hardly meet with a *Wealthy Young Gentleman* who has heard talk of Religion as he ought to do. Is it to be wonder'd then that *Riches* should encourage their *Pride*, support their *Arrogance*, authorize their *Luxury*, and render 'em so insolent, as to be almost unsupportable? That they should look upon *Poverty*, as a Kind of *Infamy* and *Servitude*; that they should have so little *Uprightness* and *Discretion*; that they should place *Merit* altogether in our side, and *Ostentation*; That they should talk with so little *Exactness* and *Reason*, that you would think *Impertinencies* grew in his Mouth; always *hairbrain'd*; *Presumptuous* upon all occasions, and *Ignorant* of all things?

Have we taken notice that the *Hearts of Children* are *Naturally* softn'd with outward *Miseries* that they see before their *Eyes*? You will say that the *Principle of Society* that Acts within 'em before *Reason* discovers it self, infuses this *Fellow feeling*. Whence proceeds that *Motion*? 'Tis from an inward and *Natural Disposition* to the *Duties of Society*, and the *Maxims of Religion*. A Child being mov'd at the sight of a *Poor Body*, *Loves*, *Seeks* and *Studies* to impart; and some there are who have stript themselves of their
Cloaths

Cloaths to give away. This *inclination* and *proneness* is usual in *Children*. Whence comes it then, that Age renders them more Harsh, more Indifferent, and more Covetous? 'Tis because the *Seeds of Religion* were not Sow'd there in time, nor loon enough: Or if the generality of young People have had some smattering of it, the ground was not sufficiently Till'd to receive the Seed, and produce Fruit. 'Tis because the Reason was never touch'd but by feeble *Demonstrations*. And because it is not sufficiently Fortified by this sort of *Discoveries*, it happens that the Heart abandons the Motion which the Mind never concerns it self to support.

Never let 'em boast to me a *Propensity to Devotion*, to assure me of its *Duration*: The *Heart of Man* is unequal: Every moment of his Life shews him unlike to himself, particularly in different Ages. That which determines his Conduct to Good, is no less uncertain, when it is oppos'd to common decisions, and the Example of other Men. It is then, more capable of producing matter to be ashamed of, than a steadfastness in his First Resolution: Like the Modesty of a *Young Virgin*, who has spent her *First Years* in the *Exercises of the Cloyster*: 'Tis a *Violence* done her, to approach her with the *Practises* of it, and to draw over their Images again before her Eyes, tho they had been reported to her, as the means to acquire Perfection. And whence proceeds this? 'Tis because that Remainder of Remembrance

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brance is as insufficient to hold out against the Actual Impression of the Sences, as it was Superficial in the Regulation of the Sences; by which means it comes to pass, that the stronger carries the Day, and the weaker submits.

In regard that every thing changes within us, according to the various alterations of Years, Employments, Knowledg, there are only these Seeds of Goodness in us, which nothing in the World can Eradicate, which cannot alter, when it is true that they are deep set in the Ground by Wisdom, that they sprouted up with Reason, and were Cultivated by a good Master. Employments and Revolutions in the Course of Life, may perhaps delay the Fruit; but it never can Choak it. And it is from this Fund of Probity stedfastly Establish'd, and severely examin'd, that the Conscience draws those secret Remorses and Stings, which we call *Pricks of Conscience*, and which the most Learned in Knowledg have always lookt upon as the Essential and Universal Principles of Goodness.

If the *Christian Being* cannot be Establish'd nor long sustain'd without this Wise *Distribution of Philosophy* infus'd or acquir'd above Precepts, the *Reasonable Being* is still more remote from its Perfection, when it is depriv'd of its Succour, and that a Man is oblig'd to Conform himself to Variety, to Times, Occasions, Prejudices and Persons before he can determin with himself. This

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is to suppose at first in a *Young Lad* an extent and Capacity of Mind fit to enclose every thing, without any supply, or any further trouble. This is to suppose him to have Fire enough to Melt and Dissolve, and Exactness enough to reduce to a certain Rule, what is so unlikely and unequal in its Production. But is there such a Disposition to be found? Where is the Foundation to presume such a thing? How many persons, the best Educated, want this Capacity of Mind, even at the very time that they imagin they ought to want nothing, because they well perceive they have all they can have without being able to expect an Elevation about their Sphear.

There are five things which must be perfectly known, to support the Character of a Wise Man of Knowledg in the World: And they must be absolutely known in the following Order.

The First is, to know his Mind, the Symptoms, Temper, Extent, Proportions and Defects of it.

The Second is, to understand the Mind of others, by the difference between that and his own, their Composition, their Palliations, particular Qualities, and Predominant Propensities.

The Third is, To have Studied to the very bottom, the Maxims and Reasons of State, of Crowns, Countries and Families.

The Fourth is, To have some Knowledg of the Order of Persons of Quality, the better to
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dive into the Ranking of the meaner sort, that is to say, that at least he must have enter'd upon this Examination, which has so many Parts in Universal Philosophy, every one of which would employ the vastest mind for some Ages.

Can you believe, Sir, that a Soul which is still Embarrass'd and Clogg'd with Matter, can conceive it self, without the help of a profound Wisdom, to make the Definitions of things arise in the Actions themselves? Let a Man spend a Hunder'd years in the Conversation of Persons limited and prepossess'd like himself, what will that produce? Either the Embastardizing himself with their Society, or else the leading them a Roving with his own.

Can a Man attain to the Knowledge of other Mens Minds, when he does not know his own? The Wise Man that hears us, stays till we come to Experience, assur'd that we shall there Miscarry, and that it would be a Miracle if we should mistake. That which comes to pass in the sight of all the World, is an Authentick Proof of this Truth; and I should suspect him for a Man of common Sence that should Dispute it with me.

To presume that a Man can become useful to the State, distinguish'd in his Country, and Original in his Maxims, when he neither knows his own, nor the Mind of Others, is to presume an impossibility.

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To deem him Rational, when we see a Man obstinate in believing nothing well done but what is done in his own Country, or his own Family, would shew but little Understanding, at the same time that an Opposition well establish'd, and a Wise Contradiction of other Laws and Customs confounded him. We must then conclude, that it behov'd him to have been thoroughly Learned in the Foundations of Customs, and the Reason of Laws, before they exert themselves against so many Inequalities: this is that which the Reading of some Books will never produce, much less Converse among some Persons of Quality. All that, is too superficial to Establish a sound Ratiocination. I shall make more clearly out a little lower.

We do not see how it can be suppos'd that a Man should understand what is in all the Parts that Compose him, if he have not borrow'd from the Oeconomy of the Grand World, the Assistances of those who have Labour'd therein for above five Thousand Years ago, and the Commentary of him that can receive 'em to purpose, and make 'em speak for the *Instruction of a Young Person*. If every one of them should come short, if all of 'em together have not drain'd the matter; they have at least extended *Human Reason*. What can we then expect that a Young Man should do, depriv'd of these Advantages? Or a dull Person, always in fear of being at a loss?
Or

Or an Idolator of what is most in Vogue, tho it be neither the most Just, nor the most True? They do him an equal injury both ways; since it is absolutely requisite that he should be sufficient for himself, before he can be fit for those Suffrages of publick Benefit, so worthy the Ambition of an honest Man. I shall resume this Deduction after I have justify'd the Connexion and Order of it. For it is first convenient to make an end of shewing, that for the attaining to it, the help of Philosophy either infus'd or acquir'd, is altogether necessary; but wisely, insensibly and successively dispens'd.

For a Man to conceive his own Mind, it behoves him to have learnt the difference there is between the sensation of Animals, as also their most conceal'd Instinct, and Human Understanding: How the latter Meditates an end by the Exclusion of all the means which it examines, and which it rejects with Discretion, for the Choice of that alone upon which it fixes. A Man must be well convinc'd that the Creatures cannot observe this Conduct. It behoves a Man to be determin'd to the necessity of Judging, what they do, only by what we know of 'em, and not by what we ought to suppose of 'em, because we know nothing of it. At least he ought to have a rough Draught of this difference, for fear of mistaking in the inward discernment of the Action of his Mind, with the sensation of Animals.

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He ought to know the Temper of it by the uses which he makes of it. He ought to represent to himself in order, how *Plenty* and the *Dispensation of Material Spirits* contribute to the *Elevation of the Mind*, and the strength of it, without rendring it *Material*. He ought to be *instructed* by himself of the Part where his own Mind appears to act most Vigorously; by the one to judg of the Situation of it, and by the other, of its Temperament. He ought to examin himself upon the Acquisition, or the streaming in of these *New Lights*, which convey to him that which he had not, or cause him to *Discover* it in himself, by clearing this Obscurity caus'd by the Materiality of the Organs.

He ought to discover all those Parts by which *Revelation* is capable to insinuate it self into the *Understanding* or first *Apprehension* of *Objects*: And into Reason, which is but the exercise and employment of it, when it tends to decision; to the end he may know how far the first Light can Penetrate, before it meet the Second; and what Authority *Revelation* can acquire between both. It behoves him to agree within himself, of the secret Conveyances that carry this Light into the very *Mists of the Heart*, and how the thick Clouds of *Sensuality* are clear'd up, scatter'd, receive that *Serenity* which is Forraign to 'em, and admit that *Sovereignty* which Rules over 'em.

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He ought to be accustom'd to understand how the degree of these *inward Examinations* produces the degree of a *Rational and sound Mind*, and that without this Rule, every thing becomes a false Glitter, Delusion and Sophism. He ought to know the Nature and the Causes of these Varieties of Ratiocinations which succeed one another, and destroy each other, according to the different Infusions of Lights, or different Exhalations of the Heart. After this, he ought to have measur'd, without Flattering himself, how far the Force, Elevation, Extent and Circle of that Infus'd Understanding, and acquir'd Ratiocination can reach, to render 'em supportable in Civil Society by their Subordination, before a Man can be Convin'd that he knows himself. This is not possible to be done without the help of a Wise Man; and if we cannot begin to be Rational till then, 'tis easy to conclude that we cannot begin to be so till we enter into the Discoveries of Philosophy.

Whatever is presum'd to be good in the greatest part of Books, ceases to be good for no other Reason, but because of this Defect. An outward Talent perswads us that we have a large Extent of Wit; nevertheless 'tis the use of this Talent which Justifies the Slenderness of it. We are desirous to go farther then we are allotted, and every thing becomes irregular by reason of this Violence. We suffer our selves to apply our selves, or else we throw our selves

into Employments, for which we are not fit; and while we neglect to do what should be done well, we act nothing but what is imperfect in what we go about to do. We Write as we think, and because it is without a plenary Knowledge, we are reduc'd to give precepts for the *Art of well thinking*, without minding that we corrupt the Natural *Judgment* which only causes right thinking.

All the Conditions of Life suffer under this first defect, and we can hardly conceive how it comes to be at present so much authoriz'd, and so well receiv'd to the Prejudice of our Experience of the bad consequences that attend it. For after all, 'tis much more easy to talk well, then to think well. And if it require such a train of observations to speak well according to the Mode, how much time, assistance and discovery will it require to think well? That is to say, to allow Reason all the extent, and all the Light which it was design'd to receive from Providence?

The knowledg of the Minds of other Men is only impossible to those who have omitted from their Youth to know their own. There is no remedy for this Neglect. Whatever Prejudice it Causes in all the Various Employments of Civil Life, we are contented with presuming, after a Thousand Superficial Reflections, that this Penetration is impossible of it self. We rather choose to stop at this false Principle, then to do justice to those, whom a better Education, a finer Temper of Mind, or a

Fund of Examination and Experiences ought to cause 'em to be esteem'd. This Injustice perpetuates Deviation; This Deviation prevents the Remedy; and this Misfortune erects it self into Custom. For if it be true that all Minds are of the same Nature as Reason and Demonstration Convince us, for that having all of 'em one and the same Cause, one and the same End, they only differ Essentially in the more or the less, 'tis easy to conclude that the exact Discovery of the one, contributes extreamly to the Discovery of the other. Let a Tree be never so deeply Ingrafted, an Experienc'd Gardner, will tell you what the Stock was, and when it was Grafted, because there are certain Marks that cannot fail him.

In the presence of a Skilful Wise Man, a person of Wit has much ado to compose himself to Dissemble, and Ridicule himself: The Art of Understanding Minds, and the Marks which are inseparable from it, must infallibly Discover him. Notwithstanding all the Precaution which he makes use of, he must act sometimes as he is, as well as he ought to appear, and the less he thoroughly knows himself, a Man shall not go far before he surprizes him, and constrains him to shew himself much more than he would: 'Tis by the knowledg of this Principle that a truly Wise Man applies to study himself; and 'tis only by a false Management of this Wisdom, that the most part of Publick Persons affect to be inaccessible, because they are afraid, least
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Men should dive into 'em, and discover their Failings: At what time it would be much more Advantageous to the Publick Good, that they would enter into Conversation, to the End they might make use of it to Penetrate others.

'Tis not with the Mind as with the Heart; the one is Impenetrable, because it can be without Action, as long and as often as it pleases, but the Mind must either Act or cease to be. Of necessity then we must know it by its manner of Acting, when he that observes it, perfectly understands it self. This Satisfaction which is the greatest and most innocent in a Mans Life, will be always wanting to him who has not been introduc'd betimes into the precious and secret Discoveries of that Wildom which grounded him perfectly in the Knowledg of himself: Because it suppos'd, that there could be nothing thereby impenetrable in others. Happy they who have apply'd themselves to it betimes, and have met with a good Guide to Conduct 'em.

Now a days we believe, and that vainly enough, that some Tincture of Policy, some Notions of those Sports of Wit, and Sallys of Imagination, which they call by the Name of Learning, and some superficial Idea of Morality, are sufficient to instruct a Young Person of Quality. If it be so, how can we suppose it possible that there should be any Religion or Society in the World? The Proof of it is this. 'Tis certain that Religion consists in an inward

and sincere Conviction of Reason, in respect of its Inability to Comprehend certain things that are Real, that it may make use of this Inference, to believe other things more exalted and more infallible, tho it perceive 'em less, and tho they contradict all the Presumptions of it. All this you would think impossible to be done but by a strong Application of the Mind and of Reason. But methinks I hear 'em say, that this Application is no longer in Fashion, that it is Troublesome, and that it is a Task which Men have not an Ability to undertake. Have we not more Reason then to conclude, that Religion is as much out of Fashion as Application among Persons of Quality? They stick close to outward shew, without Informing themselves of the inward Engagements which they suppose, and which they will let you suppose as long as you please, provided no other consequences attend it.

If the Principle of Civil Society be an innocent Pleasure, and a Delight to which every Body resorts; and if the difference of Minds causes Variety of Interests, and means to make 'em prevalent, how comes it to pass that he who has not the Art to understand and Reconcile 'em, can contribute to this Universal Good? 'Tis from this Irregularity authoriz'd by Custom, that Irreligion and want of Sincerity arise in all Societys.

Now

Now in regard that 'tis the Omission of this Knowledg that divides Societies and Families, we ought to instruct betimes those Persons that are design'd for Publick Employments in the first Principles of Speculative and Practical Policy, that they may do themselves the greater Honour, by speaking throughly of Matters; and may become more useful to the State, by reconciling with more Elevation of Mind, the Oppositions which they meet. They ought to be made to understand, that Speculative Policy consists precisely in knowing the Interests of every particular Person, according to the Considerations of his own Prejudice; and that practical Policy depends upon a certain Ascendant of Wit and Understanding, and a certain extent of Reason, which knows how to over-rule others after such a manner as to make 'em consent to what he requires from 'em. This is the true Art of Government: A Man cannot instruct himself in it too much; since we can never arrive to an absolute Perfection in it. We then may judg whether what is Written now a-days in such flourishing Terms concerning Policy, and with so little Solidity, can supply the Defect of that Knowledg, which makes Publick Society to rise from the Foundations of Religion.

But because it is onely by the sound knowledge of a Man's own mind, that we discover the minds of others, 'tis onely by the

discovery of others also, that we dive into their resolutions, that we unravel their Interests, that we penetrate their designs, and the pretences they make use of, and that we perfectly understand the motives and end of their *propositions*. This is that which ought to be taught, in order to the forming of a sound mind, a solid and universal Judgement, and a lively and sure Imagination. But if for want of knowing himself and the minds of other men, a man cannot discover their real Interests, he is less able to dive into the Reasons of their Customs, and to do their prejudices Justice. 'Tis a defect, the less supportable in an honest Man, to censure or condemn forraign manners, and Customs; since every Country has a Reason for their Usages, whatever they are. 'Tis from the Examination of a Wise Man, that we ought to be Convinced betimes, that Reason is in all Countries, and that Minds are every where of the same Nature, tho' the Sphere of 'em be very unequal in all Countries of the World by reason of the Ascendant which these Circles of Exactness have one over the other. Without this Foundation in matter of Argumentation, what ever is accounted good Tillage and Discretion, is very unstable, and cannot but beget Confusion. If we suppose a War, there will be nothing but Cruelty, or a belief that we ought to revenge our selves upon a *Turk* or a *Tartar* because they do not attack us according to the Rules
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that we make use of. If we suppose Conquests, we approach near to Tyranny. All the Nations of the World are not able to undergo the same Yoke; tho the Contrary be asserted in Favour of the greater Force. If we consider times of Peace, Plenty causes Irregularity among some, and Want among others. Take it which way you will, we offer Violence to the general Conversation of Civil Society, when our Ratiocination is grounded only upon the Knowledge of the Customs, Habitudes and Usages of his own Nation and Country. If a Man stops at the Accidents of a Negotiation, a thousand Obstructions are started by his way of Negotiation. If a Treaty be the business in hand, every thing is violent against himself, and Fraudulent on the others side. In short, without this Complacency, and Reconcilement of Wisdom to the Customs and Prejudices of others, there is nothing but Injustice, Falshood, and Confusion to be expected, from Mind the most Docible that ever could be brought to Perfection, if care were not taken to correct their first Ratiocinations.

If there be nothing that can remedy this first Omission, it must be agreed that this Knowledge which we Discourse of is a wonderful help to redress that prevailing Propensity that makes the Essential Difference between Kingdoms and Men of different Countries, since it is with Them that we ought to Reason, without yeilding to be
what

48 The Knowledge of the World.

what they are, and without pretending to reduce 'em to be what we are. 'Tis then impossible a youth to have a true and solid merit, if ignorant of the Principles of *Universal Reason*.

Let 'em vaunt as much as they please the happy Maxims of Policy; let 'em look upon 'em as solid, proportionably as they prove successful; nay, let 'em make use of Prosperity to Condemn a contrary Policy. This will make no alteration either in the Heart or Mind of those who are bred up in other Maxims. There is but one more Universal or more stable Good, that can procure this Change. They who argue best and with the most Impartiality, agree that Prosperity gives a Reputation to Policy; but they do not agree that Policy is the true source of that Prosperity; that which prov'd successful at one time, might happen to be unfortunate at another. The Circumstances of a Reign happening to alter, it has not always the same aspect, tho it ceases not to be the same. The greater his Prosperity was, the more his Fall discovers the Omissions and Falsities which lay conceal'd before. And by a Return, upon which every Body reck'ns, because it is Natural, the most Flourishing Kingdom, the best Govern'd, and best Regulated, will appear in Confusion and Disorder when attack'd by the continual Assaults of bad Fortune. This is that *Universal Reason* then, which it behoves a Young Man to have drawn from the first Natural Principles, which only can Light the Mind of a Young
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Person into these Truths. 'Tis from that time forward that he Accustoms himself to look upon different Interests, as Intelligent and Wise Reasons, which oppose themselves against attempts, and defend themselves from Seducements; and searching into the Principles of this Universal Reason, which is the source of various Prejudices, either he draws from thence Advantages and strength to Supplant 'em, or else he gains sufficient Succour from 'em to hinder him from succumbing or being Surpriz'd.

After this, let 'em boast their Learning that Produces so many things to outward appearance excellent, but so few that are really of any Value. Let 'em Prize themselves upon their well expressing feeble Conceptions, and forgetting the Force and Depth of a Thought; for wholly busying themselves with an Elocution, which never yet could be brought to be uniform; and which pretending to perfect the Language, frequently Enervates the Thoughts, Coops up the Mind, and puzzles the Judgment. What is to be got by this sort of Erudition so much in Fashion? Would to God that this were the way for a Man to know and possess himself, and to be Wise proportionably to these Study'd Refinements and Delicate Miniatures, which out of Vocabulary Wisdom Create the Wisdom and pretended Merit of your *Soaring Wits*.

But

But they who are most earnest for this sort of Merit, are constrain'd to agree upon what it is they want. When they observe themselves with Relation to other Wits, and other Minds that are otherwise prepossessioned, they readily apprehend that they have not what they seem to have avoided either to acquire or preserve upon their first Relish of Truth. These gaudy outsides that flatter the Lazy Courtiers and Women of the World, and against whom these Men of little Skill exclaim, are not sufficient to satisfy 'em; they find in the Variety of their Opinions, not their own Satisfaction, as a Flatterer gives it out, but their distrust, their disquiet, their Doubts, and their Trouble. The more they desire seriously and sincerely to dive into the Character of those who will not give their Votes for Peices of such base Alloy, tho neatly stamped, the more they are displeas'd with themselves for not having enlarg'd their inward Capacity; for not having with care enough Manur'd the Original of Human Reason; for having omitted, or bethought themselves too late of upholding or Examining in good earnest a Discussion contrary to their Maxims. Lastly, The more capable of Knowing they are, the more they discover the Merit of those who refuse the Insipid Praises, which Flatterers out of Complacency, and Fools, by way of Imitation, pay to the most Pompous Part of the World. What do they expect,

expect to gain by such a stupid seducement? What do they pretend to do? If this same sort of Learning, extoll'd by the Concurrence of Suffrages, were so good as it might be wish'd it were, or as it ought to be, besides, that it would be Universally approv'd, it would contribute still more and more to enlarge the Mind, and render the Thoughts truly Solid. But we find the contray to be true; seeing that among them who seem to be most jealous of it, we meet with anow that are Sincere enough to agree, that this sort of Learning is but like whipt Cream, meer empty stuff, out of a desire to be Writing *A-la-mode*. That which is imputed to so many late sittings up, and to so much exactness, becomes the Object of Raillery among all the Men of Sence in Forraign Countries. Not but that it has its Merit and its Value; but because men know not what to judg of it, for that they see it changes every Day. Thus you see whither tends the Learning of the Times: To Abridg the Mind instead of Extending it; to Puzzle it with the Choice of Terms, instead of improving its Discussions; and wholly to busy it with the Method of Writing, while the Writer is ignorant in the Solid Principles of that Wisdom which causes him to think well, and which furnishes him with the means of Writing well.

If it be so, my Lord, in that same sort of Learning wherein you desire to Employ your Son, you may Refuse my *System*. But
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if that Learning, to which he applies himself, never forms in him a solid Mind, far from Distinguishing him among *Persons* of his *Quality*, you loose a World of Time, your Expectations, and your Money; and you deprive your self of the sweetest Consolation which a Father can have, who can enjoy no greater, says the *Holy Scripture*, *then to have a Wise Son.*

You think perhaps that your Son may be able to attain to whatever we have hitherto Explain'd, and which you begun to think already necessary for the Education of Youth, by a wretched Deduction of *Morality*, represented under Pictures and Characters, wherein the Author omits nothing but every thing that he ought to say: but do you not see that that sort of *Morality* is not so much the Fruit of Reason as Prejudice? Consequently, if you neglect to teach him the Principles of Universal Reason, his Knowledg in matter of *Morality* must be very Particular; and as such directly opposite to other particular impressions which variously prepossess all Nations in reference to their Maxims, and the Method by which they cause their Reason to act. What then do you mean by that? That he shall thoroughly understand the Manners of his Nation and Province. This is exactly so much as will serve him for an Obstruction to delay the Prejudices of other Men. How then? You will have it that he shall make what Judgment he pleases,

ses, and then mustering up before him the most Reputable Antiquity, he shall be admitted to retail to us the Judgment he has made of it. But do you not see that by following this Impression, you debase your Son, instead of advancing his Credit. Will they not say in Forraign Countries of this Capacious Critick, that you give him for a Model in the use of Learning, what he presumes here to utter of the *Greeks* and *Romans*? Does not he deserve to be Satyriz'd, to Punish the Liberty he takes to think ill of all Men, and to ridicule the most renowned Actions of Antiquity? Whatever is Merit, whatever is Vertue, will have always Zealous Champions. And if all Ages have produc'd Persons both Jealous and Envious of true Learning, who presume to suppose that they set up themselves in the room of those against whom they so vehemently cry out; that their Reputation encreases by that Injustice, and that their Merit extends it self proportionably to their Lessening the deserts of others, there are few ages which have not produc'd some great wit so exact, as to render to every Man what belongs to him, maugre Envy and Prejudice, even to that degree, that he who pretends to raise himself by the silence of the dead, finds him frequently puzzl'd to answer the Living.

There is this to be said farther, My Lord, The knowledge of Morality depends upon the reunion of all the Principles which
infuse

infuse into us Religion, and clear our Reason; This is what cannot be contradicted. Of necessity then, what now adays we so improperly call Morality, must be a false signification of it, or else that they who make it their business to consecrate their Learning to it, must have but the first Tinctures of it. 'Tis an easie thing to prove this alternative. For if by Morality men understand no more then the Examination of the manners and Customs of their Country, the Term expresses too much. If by morality they mean the universal Principle of living well in all places, and with all the world, to argue and agree with others, the Term will not express anough according to the Idea which is now adays fix'd to it's signification. Since 'tis sufficient in the first sence to say, the Genius of the Nation. In the second sence, 'tis requisite to add the Art of discerning the Good through all the presumptions with which particular presumption covers and dilguises it. In the first there is not matter sufficient to mould a wise Man: In the second there is too much for a Man to hope to become wise without assistance, and without an Early Guidance. Every thing is partiality in the first Idea; and every thing is there improv'd by other Maxims which are no less true and sound. Every thing is Uniform in the second, and acknowledg'd for good by every thing that is Rational.

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Thus you see the false signification of the Term under the Idea of Morality. Whence it comes to pass that there are so few wise Men, tho there are so many Moral Instructions printed. What does the Learning of the times aim at, when it taxes Theology for being a Ramalsment of Impenetrable Mysteries and very difficult to be discuss'd? Philosophy, as being a Contexture of Sophisms and falsities that seduce Reason instead of enlightning it? Mathematicks as an Incertain and Indefinite Employment, for the least extent of which the Life of several Men is not sufficient, besides the Violent Applications which it requires? To what end is all this? Why onely to stick close to a simple Tincture of Policy; to the Reading of Books *A-la-mode*, which require neither attention nor Judgment, and to some Idea's of Morality, taken according to the Relish of the Age; that is to say to speak Properly, to nothing solid; nothing real, nothing true. If this Education be fit for your turn, the success can no way satisfie ye, much less be sufficient for your Son, if he be design'd for any thing of Grandeur. He ought to undeceive himself in reference to that blind Prejudice with which men are prepossess'd in that particular; When the Reading of a book or the Examination of a work renders us ne're a whit more learned then we were before, 'tis time lost: And all the Politeness and Beauty of the most Ornamental Terms

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cannot supply the necessity of meeting there in good Things, and to fetch new lights from thence, either for his own Conduct, or his converse with Men. Nothing of this stays with a Man after he has read the Greatest part of the Books of the Times, to which people addict themselves with far more Application then they deserve. You are able to Judge whether I speak truth or no, and whether a Man ought to content himself with so small a matter.

You have made me an Objection, my Lord, that Persons of quality have a Kind of Merit infus'd in 'em by their Birth, which advantage they who never receiv'd from Nature, have much a-do to attain by Labour and study. To which objection I made a twofold Answer.

First, that signal Merit was an acquir'd Birth by a more just title, then Birth it self is a Merit infus'd into those who degenerate from the Vertue and Integrity of their Ancestours; for the same reason that persons of high Birth owe to their Blood onely what persons of Merit are beholding for onely to their labour, by which means the latter merit far beyond the former.

Secondly, because Ambition has been always allow'd to Merit, tho Ambition is not to be justify'd till it has given Merit to a Person. Whence it is easie to conclude, that Ambition is never vain, rash or unjust, but when it is without Merit, and that Merit is above every thing, when it is above Ambition.

blion. 'Tis true that Persons of high Birth have a right to maintain their Ambition, by a Merit which is not fix'd to the Blood, as they imagin, but which seems to be infus'd into their Birth, by the care that ought to be taken of it, and by the conveniences which they have to communicate to 'em the sources of true Merit. But if everything be due to Merit onely, and precedency to Birth supported by Merit, People of Merit have more Right to pretend to Employments design'd for Birth, then others have to be employ'd without Merit; since it's certain that we see few Governments miscarry under Persons who have only Merit. History and the Establishments Justify this to be true; but we find several ranvers'd by such who had nothing but their Birth to advance 'em. 'Twas upon this Inference that I caus'd you to observe, and you were of the same Opinion, that persons of Birth were oblig'd to acquire Merit; since they were born for no other purpose; and for that Persons of Great Merit have a Right to acquire the Condition of High Birth, since they can do nothing for the Publick good without the assistance of Authority, and because they would many times hazard very much if they did not make use of their Parts.

This speculation will appear perhaps a little too bold, or too empty: 'Tis therefore good to justify it by an Example. In what a Condition was *Lacedæmon* under the

Reign of *Eunomus*, of the Family of *Pericles*? *Polydectes*, his Eldest Son, who reign'd after him, could not remedy the Disorders and Corruption, which had made of that City a Den of Theives, and a Nursery of Tyrants. Sometimes the Publick Interest became a Prey to Injustice, and sometimes Injustice upheld the Publick Interest. They who govern'd minded nothing less then the Government, and the Court of *Eunomus*, according to the *Historians* of those times, was wholly taken up with pleasure and an inordinate Ambition to aggrandize it self, which afterwards produc'd the *Peloponnesian* War, so fatal to the *Athenians*.

Lycurgus, the youngest Son of *Eunomus* saw his Brother Reign without being able to accomodate the Irregularity of *Lacedaemon*. He endeavour'd immediately to remedy it; He did all he could to bring it to pass; and finding no body to whom he could address himself in a City that was altogether corrupted, he went into *Egypt*, and as it is reported, travell'd also farther into *India*, where he learnt to perfection what he desir'd to know. He return'd into his Country, where he arriv'd soon enough to see his Brother dye, whose wife told him she was ready to make away the Infant in her womb, if he would marry her and Reign with her. But *Lycurgus* detested her proposal; and was so far from consenting to it, that he would needs be Tutor to his Nephew *Charilaus*, whose life he sav'd. The

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Moderation was ill interpreted : so corrupted was the Air of *Sparta*. They gave it out that he took that Resolution onely to get himself a greater Reputation, and to Reign with a more Despotick Power afterwards. His Conduct and manner of Living so different from the Disorders of the *Spartans* caus'd an Insurrection which enforc'd him to retire, but the Publick Exigencies having constrain'd 'em to recall him, he appear'd what really he was, and govern'd with that Authority that would no longer admitt of any Contradiction, reform'd the Government, restor'd Tranquility and abundance, and regulated all things so well, that the *Spartans* oblig'd themselves by an Oath never to alter his Conduct. So true it is that Birth in *Eunomus* and *Polidectes* could never obtain that Good which the wisdom of *Licurgus* procur'd his Country. A convincing Argument of what wisdom is able to do in a Kingdom when it is accompany'd with authority. A fatal prejudgment of what Authority operates when it is not directed by wisdom, and by the Law of the Publick welfare to the Prejudice of particular Interest.

I shall add two other observations to these Answers. The first is, that the Temperature of good minds is not deriv'd from the Quality of the Blood which produces the Organs, but from the meer dispensation of Heaven, which voutsafes not to bestow all upon persons born under Human Gran-

deurs, nor refuses every thing to those that are born mean and Indigent. Suppose that these were defects or Errours of Nature to lodge such vertuous minds in Persons of mean Birth, and weak minds in Persons of High Birth; suppose these Noble Souls displac'd, and deviated from their first Allotment; from the time they were lodg'd, they act; and it is by their Actions that they make themselves known. For as the Eternal wisdom takes pleasure to conceal it self in the Conduct of the World, there was no better way for it to obscure it self from our Penetration, then by obliging the Great ones to have need of the Lesser sort, and the Meaner sort not to be able to avoid concurring to the satisfaction and Employments of the Great ones. By this Enchainment the Principles of Moral Christianity become Natural before they are Evangelick: And we should be oblig'd to stick to 'em out of Interest, tho there were no superiour Law to enforce it. This is that which is to be div'd into, before we come to the discussion of Morality. This is the most Infalible Method of Reasoning, and maintaining in conformity to wisdom the Bonds of Civil Society above the Different prejudices that govern Mankind.

The Second Observation is, that the Knowledge of an Extraordinary Merit is not overwell assur'd in the hands of Persons of a high Birth, in regard that jealousy and self-love frequently agree together to judge ill
of

of it. And if there be but a Common Education in a weak soul, there is nothing else to be expected but Injustice in Decisions that of necessity require an entire discarding of Prejudice to be just. 'Tis true that Civil superiority gives a Right to Persons of Quality to examin Persons of Merit; but it allows them no Priviledg to bound 'em according to their Prejudices. 'Tis a Maxim both very advantageous and very judicious for a Man of Condition to observe, that seeing a Man of Merit can do more in favour of the publick weale then a Man of quality, 'tis but requisite that the Person of Quality should suffer himself to be guided and enlighten'd by the t'other, as a succour that Providence has sent him in his Exigencies. There are none but such as are Irregularly Ambitious, or people of *False Merit*, who will condemn this Maxim so wisely establish'd for the harmony of a Kingdom. And if they villify and prosecute this sort of People, as also an infinite number of others in the World, by scorning those who have Parts but no Fortunes, there cannot be a better Opinion conceiv'd of those People then by the contempt of others. He that commands in a ship has not always at the same time the Art of an excellent *Pilot* or a skilful Mariner: The Power, the Experience, the wealth of the one never displace the other without danger or confusion. On the other side, the one joins with the other for the safety of the Vessel: this Comparison speaks itself. Happy that Kingdom where

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great and wise men are equally employ'd in the Cares of the Government.

Having thus convinc'd ye, my Lord, that a rational Being depends upon an Insus'd or acquir'd Dispensation of wisdom, methinks you should also agree, that the knowledge of the Grand World or Persons of high Quality, contributes very much to the Guidance and preservation of the Lower sort : that the *Mathematicks* in General are Insufficient if they are not drain'd out in Demonstrations, which would require the Ages of several Men ; that there is an absolute necessity of opening some certain way into that Abyss by some General solid and assured Principles, which at first should busy the Memory onely, flatter the Imagination insensibly, and wait for Maturity of Judgment to form Decisions capable to uphold themselves upon good Grounds against the Different systems which Men have establish'd upon Nature and the order of the World. For by teaching a young Lad to apprehend betimes why there is more of watry surface in the terrestrial Globe, tho there be more of Earth in the Mass that composes it, is to prepare him to dive into one half of all the Questions of *School Philosophy*. To instruct him in the Natural and necessary Correspondence between the two Globes in the very difference of their Constitution, is insensibly to teach him the subordination of Reason to Revelation, of the Dependance of the Body upon the Soul, and

and of the Enchainment of different Agents that compose Society. By explaining Methodically to him the Order, the Change, and Oeconomy of seasons, this is to make him understand after an Infallible manner, the Different Ages, the Certain Principles of Revolutions of things in the World, and the absolute defect of every thing that flatters the sense and Pleasure. Lastly that upon the Composition of the Different parts of the Universe depends the first and most Essential knowledge of the formation of the parts which compose the Animal Being.

'Tis upon the Deduction of this Being that it is easy to Judge, that a young Man who never had the Principles of Universal Reason, nor the General Notions which I have mention'd, can never know himself in what he ought to love most, and which ought to flatter him most of all, which is the Duration of Life. How shall he be able to do it, if he be ignorant how the Nourishment is distributed into the Inward Parts, which ferment it and reduce it into Blood? What is the Dispensation of it, the Circulation, and degree of its Just Heat; The Method of keeping it in an Equal Temper, or to renew it; the symtomes caus'd by evacuation or Emptiness, the manner of evacuating or retaining the unprofitable parts; the structure of *Nerves* and *Muscles* supported by the Bones, their Connexion, their office, and their Qualities? How shall he regulate himself without, if he understands

stands not how he is compos'd within? How shall he be able to contribute toward the preservation of his Health, if he apprehends not how and why the Brain is the seat of Reason, tho it be not the seat of the Soul? How it concurs with the Functions of Animality? What Obstacles 'tis able to lay in the way? What is the inward structure of the Organs of Sensation, and what is the Temperament of 'em?

Is it because this knowledge does not sufficiently flatter Self-Love, that we neglect to acquire it? Wherefore is it that they never begin to think of it, till they are drawing almost near the end of their Lives? Nor to remedy the mischiefs which they might have avoided, had they been instructed betimes in every thing that concerns the Animal Being, and of what may be either convenient for it, or destroy it? This defect is unsufferable; this omission can it be excus'd in Education? If fathers love their Children better then themselves, are they excusable if they fail of teaching 'em to know themselves, to be able to preserve themselves, or at least to contribute very much toward their own preservation. But somebody will say, is that possible to be done in Youth, and is it not to be fear'd that it will rather overwhelm the Mind of a young Man then enlighten it? This might be true, if a Youth were enforc'd to dive to the very bottom of these Matters, and that he made it his whole Business. 'Tis at his hours of

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Recreation, in his *Promenades*, at his times of relaxation that these things ought to be instill'd into him. There is nothing so agreeable as Natural Philosophy; we accustom our selves easily to hear it discours'd of; and this Habit begets Application according to that degree of pleasure we take in it; and it is by this method and way of management that a Youth is to be drill'd on to Instruction.

After these General Discoveries, his Tutor ought to shew him how these compositions of Nature are made, to the end he may understand the Actions, the Qualities, the Properties, the Corruption and Restoration of 'em. From thence you certainly guide him to the Knowledge of Human Body, which is the most perfect Kind of Animal Being. And according as he advances in this Discovery, he finds what is the Original of Passions, their difference, their complication, and their Effects. This Knowledge serves him both to regulate and guide 'em; the more he discovers, the more perfect he grows, and this Perfection encreasing with age, he becomes perfect at a time when you would hardly think him capable of being so.

This my Lord, is the chiefest part of those things, concerning which I had the Honour to discourse your Lordship. I wish I may have satisfy'd your Curiosity upon a matter of so much Importance, which never the less is so much neglected. I must confess,

fess, I am not a little surpriz'd to find it so little heeded, whether it be that good workmen are wanting, or whether it be because the method is unknown. Certainly Parents understand not how much they have to answer for the Education of their Children, and of which they think themselves discharg'd both before God and Men when they have made choice of a Tutor who is nominated to 'em or who presents himself upon the Credit of a Certificate of a Colledg, or a Letter of begg'd Recommendation. What a strange Blindness is this! Is this the way of choosing a Man upon whom the preservation or Loss of a Youth in a manner always depends? Is it an Affair of so little Importance that it is so little minded? But this is that which I shall treat of in the second Letter, wherein I shall speak of the Choice which is to be made of a Tutor, and the Qualities which are requir'd in him. I am with a Profound Respect,

My Lord,

Your most Humble and

most Obedient Servant.

THE

Second Letter,

*Of the Choice of a Tutor, and
the Qualities which are re-
quir'd in him.*

My Lord,

TIs not the Choice that infuses the
the Qualities, as most People
imagin, when they consult their
humour only, or their Interest :
'Tis the Examination of the Qualities that Au-
thorise the Choice, and which Justify the
Wisdom of a Parent who knows how to
place a Man of true and solid Merit near
his

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his Son, to take care of his Education. If they may be believ'd whom something of *Literature* has set above the *Common sort of Men*, they have *Merit* and *Learning* enough to fit 'em for this *Employment*. But in regard they are not able to teach any more than what they know; and for that with all that they profess to know, they can never have *Wisdom* and *Perspicacity* sufficient to *Instruct* others as they ought to do, there is no likelihood that a Parent who has an earnest desire to build his *Glory*, as the Holy Scripture says, upon the wisdom of his Son, should ever be contented with so superficial a Choice.

We must go a little farther to prove successful in a right Election. The more rare the success is, the more difficult is the discovery of it. The more dangerous the surprize is, the greater ought to be the Circumspection. There is a necessity then, that neither outward Appearances nor recommendation, *President*, or *Interest* determine this Affair; Seeing that all that a Father expects from a Son, depending in a manner solely upon the Choice that shall be made for his Education, the success of his Breeding, whatever it may be, will be imputed to himself; and if it prov'd not good enough to procure him that Honour before mention'd, it will be Mortifying enough to cause him that Vexation that will never cease but with his Life.

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Certain it is, that there are few Parents so sufficiently heedful as not to be deceiv'd in this Point; and they who design themselves, or are enforc'd to bring up their own Children, ought first of all to examin themselves concerning their own Inclinations to it, and what may render 'em capable of undertaking it.

Three Qualities are Essential to a Tutor, for the perfect doing his Duty; that he have an excellent and Complying Wit, Extended and Exact, Fertile and Reserv'd. Now as every one of these Qualities encloses a Paradox, so every one requires a Commentary.

Were it the business in hand to *Discourse of one Man to another according to his Interest*, it would be sufficient for him to have an Excellent Wit, for then he would be able to draw others into his Opinion by the force of his Arguments. It would not then be necessary, nay it would be sometimes Dangerous to have a *Complying Wit*; because that since that *Condescendency* cannot but weaken the Reason, it may prove hurtful to the Interest which he has in Charge: Penetration would give way to *Obstinacy*; and that creeping Flattery which Corrupts the Judgment, more especially in Courtiers, coming to find every thing Good and Commendable to the Prejudice of Truth, the Corruption of the Heart would infallibly Corrupt the Mind, and the Passions would get the upper hand of Reason,

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• But when we talk of *Education* 'tis another thing. It would be to no purpose to have an *Exalted Wit*, without having a *Complying Wit*. This Difference proceeds from hence, That the Heart of a Child not being as yet Corrupted, and the Knowledge of Education consisting in the helping of Nature, 'twill be always more Advantageous to fill his Mind according to the Impressions of his Heart, or at least without contradicting it, then to undertake to regulate the Motions of his Heart by his Wit. The Reason of it is, because that in the first Case, 'tis Self-Love that extends it self, that Congratulates it self, and feels only an Earnestness after Learning; whereas in the Second Case 'tis the same Self-Love which Laments, and avoiding the Slavery which restrains it under Precept, is sensible of those Violences that Discourage it. In the first, 'tis the whole Man, 'tis Nature, and the Predominant Impressions that desires it; whereas in the Second 'tis Necessity, 'tis Reluctancy, 'tis Dissimulation which is welcome, and which will be always Impatient to set it self more at large, and as soon as it can.

Lastly, Tho Elevation of Wit drags a Child, instead of Instructing him, it can fill him with nothing. But when this Elevation complies, it knows how to descend officiously, and in time to take hold of the imagination of the Infant, and raise it Insensibly, and by degrees, above the Natural Reach, to the end he may only shew him the

the Progress which he makes by *Flattering* his *Self-Love*, and not to support it in that *Elevation*, but proportionably to the *Relish* which that *innocent Seduction* gives him for good things.

I am sensible that some *Application* is requisite to apprehend how this Acts in us, and how the Way to *Flatter Self-Love* is to shew it. But there is this Difference, as to what we our selves perceive in this Particular, and what a Youth is sensible of; which is, that the Corruption of our Heart must needs be extremely suspected when we are Flatter'd by that Opposition which there is between the *Principles of Christian Religion*, and *Secret Pleasure*, and that *inward sensibility*, which is but too often the *Foundation of Human Pride*: Whereas it is not the same with that Sensibility which stirs the Heart of a Young Lad. His *Innocence*, his *Inexperience*, his *Candour* and his *Sincerity*, secure him against all those Scruples that secretly disturb our *Self-Love*. Nature acts in him as it is, a long time before Grace discovers to him what it is. And in regard 'tis never the desire of Grace to destroy Nature, a Governor must make use of the Movements of Nature, more *Officiously*, and more at a Distance, to prepare a Young Man for the *Motions of Grace*. Nor is this all; for it is only by this Ingenious Discovery of the *Motions* and Symptoms of Nature, that a Wise Tutor may one day unfold to his Pupil the Obstacles of Nature corrupted by Sin,

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that obstruct the use of Right Reason, and the free impressions of Grace.

We ought to enlarge upon this Proposition, to make it more Perceptible. Every Body sees now a days that *Riches, Grandeur and Arts* are the usual Obstacles to that *Docility of Wit*, which *Religion* requires in submitting to her *Mysteries*; they who are *Born Poor, Necessitous, Abandon'd* and without *Breeding*, are much more capable of *Religion*, and much more *Submissive* to what they ought to *Believe* and *Practice*. Whence proceeds this difference? Few Persons understand it, and we shall hardly meet with any Body that has Discover'd the *Original* of it. But thus it is.

Nature has no Antipathy against *Religion*, when you suffer both the one and the other to act without intermixing the Considerations of *Self-Love*, which cause the Disorder. Nature inspires the *Knowledge* of a *first Cause* upon which it depends: That *Knowledge* supports the Right of that *First Cause* over its Inferiour: That Right binds the same *Knowledge*; and this Obligation brings Punishments, or Rewards, so soon as it is Verifi'd; and this same Sequel begins *Ficks of Conscience*, which Reproaches the Omission of the one or the other: This Remorse of Conscience does not exclude Repentance, but perswades it. This perswasion goes so far as to repair the Bad, or more exactly to Practice the Good. This Change is made by Concert with Grace, which assists

and procures : And this is the Oeconomy of *Nature* in *Subordination to Religion*; now for that of *Religion* above *Nature*.

Religion never pretends to alter *Nature*; since she still supposes it. Now in regard she Studies nothing but her own *Perfection*, she takes away nothing that is not contrary to it, and only supposes what is wanting therein. She never presents her self to Reason, before she is able to act, for fear of being *overwhelm'd* ; and in regard she is design'd to excel it, she never hinders it from Acting. She follows *Reason* in despite of it, to the end she may begin to Enlighten it, when it is unable to discover any thing farther. She presents her self in the *Order of the Actions of Life*, to be the *Ornament* rather than the *Obstruction* of it, after so mild and soft a manner, that a man may make use of her without altering the *Designs of a Civil Life*. And in regard the *Reluctancy of the Passions* no way hinders Reason from Penetrating through the Mist, the *Opposition of Reason* will never hinder *Religion* from discovering those Defects by which People pretend to secure themselves from the *Censures of their own Consciences*. *Religion* is design'd to conduct us to *Eternity* by time; and therefore she never shortens *Time* to advance *Eternity*.

From this same *Intercourse*, so preceptible to any Body that apprehends what passes within himself, there issues the same Force in the *Objection* , that *Riches*, *Grandeur* and

Parts infus'd or acquir'd, are benefits of Nature, which Religion never Condemns. If they who enjoy 'em, made use of 'em to the end, and according to the Dispensation that gave 'em Being, who questions but that Abundance would be as innocent now adays, as in Lot's time? To what a degree of Acknowledgment would it not carry a Man, if Man himself did not now a-days betray the use of 'em? Grandeur and Dignities would have the same Effect now a-days as they had in David's, and would Illustrate all the other Vertues. Is it because a Great Estate ought to lead a Man to Universal Injustice, that Great Employments ought to carry a Man to Pride and Contempt of others, and that prevailing Parts ought to serve him in order to delude his Inferiours? Whence then proceeds this Horrible Abuse, that causes Religion now a-days to degenerate into Atheism, Deism, Impiety, Superstition, or at least into Universal Pyrrhonism?

'Tis through bad Education that Men fall into this false Delusion that dazles almost all Men, especially Persons of Quality. 'Tis for a Wise Tutor to prevent this Defect. And if he have not a Wit sufficiently Exalted to discover, and afterwards to inspire into his Pupil, to what end these great Blessings were appointed, by a solid Examination drawn from the Principles of Nature, and settl'd upon the principles of Religion; if he understands not by a strict Proportion between Civil and Christian Life, to discover the

Original,

Original, the Necessity, the Method the Obligations, and the end of all *Grandeurs* both in *Church* and *State*, to make him sensible before-hand of the Foundations of *Human Misery*, reduc'd to make use of *Artifice* and *Delusion* to uphold themselves; If he have not the Gift of thoroughly Knowing his own Wit, the Capacity and Term of it, and to raise himself by that same *Knowledg*, to the Discernment of other Mens Wits, even to the very *Abstraction* of things, that he may be able insensibly to insinuate into his Pupil both the one and the other, so soon as he shall begin to make use of his *Reason*, abundance of *Riches* would be still now adays as innocent as they are happy; *Human Grandeurs* as Humble as they are Necessary, and the Noblest and Sublimest Parts, as submissive as they are Limited. Plenty would do Homage to the Gospel; *Grandeurs* would be Confounded at the Discovery of a God made Man, and acquir'd Parts would never believe themselves Perfect, but according as they most nearly approach, and as they most Respectfully submit themselves to Revelation. This ought to be read over more then once; it ought to be Study'd with great Application to understand it: However it is neither *Imaginary* nor *Mathematical*: This Seed of *Wisdom* is known to all those who either are, or desire to become Wise.

This Deduction, *My Lord*, seem'd to me very necessary to shew, for what Use an *Exalted Wit* was design'd in a Tutor, who ought to look upon the Fear of God as the Foundation of *Good Education*. Is it not to the want of this that we ought to ascribe all the Disorders in *Religion* and *Civil Life*, because they generally never speak to Young Lads of their *abounding in the Blessing of Fortune*, but with an abject and Flattering Esteem, or according to the Idea's of the Ambition of the Time and Nation? The Blessings of Life are now a days an Assistance to us to Rebel against him, who has entrusted us with 'em, as soon as his Law bethinks it self of Regulating the use of 'em against the Impressions of our Self-Love; and because a Tutor has only shew'd us in the *Grandeur of the World*, the *Luster*, the *Pomp*, and that *Quality* that sets one Man above another; because he appear'd to us no more then an *Idolater of his Wit or his Knowledge*, beyond which he supposes nothing possible, we find our selves Corrupted in the *Principles of Religion*, according as we Dive into the *Discoveries of Reason*; and as if New Lights were new Obstructions to that Submission which our *Understanding* knows not, when it knows not it self sufficiently, instead of Convincing our Selves by the Bounds of our Reason, that there is something Existent, and Real, which surpasses us (which the most Celebrated *Pagans* have acknowledg'd without stirring from the

the Order of Nature) we make use of this Term which we believe to be perfect Knowledge to limit the Priviledges of God over us, to hinder a Reason moderately Enlighten'd, from submitting to a Revelation that offends it, tho it never pretended to destroy it.

Now in regard that this is the Original of Atheism, of Irreligion, and the Disorders of Christian Life, there is no Question to be made, but that this Mischief proceeds from the want of an Elevated Wit in those who instructed us, and who not having these solid Notions above the Prepossessions of the Times, and School Sophisms, could never mould us otherwise then as they were themselves.

It behoves us then to suppose a Wit Exalted above the Matter, the Precepts and the Common Sphear of other Wits, that you may be able to ascribe to him the First of those Qualities that Form a Wise Tutor. This Exaltation is not acquir'd, because it is infus'd. He that was not Born with it by the Pure Liberality of the Creatour, will never attain to it, let him do what he can. For that if Christ has said, That all the Vehemency and all the Reflexions Imaginable cannot add one Inch of Height to the Stature of a Man, what probability is there that Pride, Plenty, Flattery, Fortune, nay, Labour it self should ever raise a Wit one Degree of Exaltation beyond what it is endu'd with?

This *Elevation* is the bottom of *Nature*, and the Fee simple of *Self-Love*. From thence it comes, that every one believes himself to have so great a share of *Wit*, tho it be a usual thing to have People complain for want of having their share of *Fortunes Blessings*. This *Elevation* is also the source of the Difference between Men and Men, by the Male Testimony of the *Cre- atour*, who made 'em one for another, and which conceals the Mysteries of his *Provi- dence*, only in the Inequality of Parts and *Wit*, which cannot fail of Forming the Difference of *Temper*s, *Passions*, and *Human Occasions*.

This *Elevation* of necessity has several degrees, tho there be a Certain Circle, beyond which a Man must be Born to excel others, and to be capable of Moulding 'em. Could the School, or the Cabinet supply this Defect, we should find very few Ambitious Men there. A Man that will judge whether another be Endu'd with an Exalted *Wit*, must refer himself to Tryal, and not to Prepossession. They who are of that Character never stick to the Trifles, or the Delusions of Time and Fashion. Which was the Reason that a Great Prince who Dyed some three or four Years ago, was wont to say, *So soon as I enter into a Master's Apartment, I presently understand what he is Capable of: Insignificant, Trivial People, Mean Spirits*. *Elevation* scorns all Superficial Things, and all vain Curiosities that only
Puzzle

Puzzle Idle People and Women. This Ascendant over the Common Sort of Men, perfectly discovers it self by the Expressions of a Man that Writes and Speaks; when you find him Embarrass'd about his Matter, or Formalizing upon a Word, conclude him Enclos'd, but that he Encloses nothing: That is to say, that he does not dispose of what constrains him, at his own Will and Pleasure, when 'tis his Business to let the World see that he Enjoys it. 'Tis the strength of Strenuous Thoughts, and the exactness of Imagination which determines the Business or *Elevation*; because it represents nothing but what the Examination of the Judgment does not conform to Reason, and the Design which it has suggested to it. A Man of Order, in every thing that he says, is always a Man of Wit above the common sort; no body can be deceiv'd therein.

Let us make some Application of these Maxims which will seem perhaps too much abstracted, or besides the Purpose, to those who know not the Reasons which oblige me to lay 'em down for such, and who will perceive by the sequel of this work, that it is in despite of my self that I have begun with matters so obscure and difficult, knowing that now adays a Man must write with more Politeness, if he intends to please. A Tutor that has an exalted wit, looks upon a Child through so many Parts, and al-

so

so far above his Composition, that he cannot fail of rightly understanding him. And then if his Inclination Corresponds with the Discovery he has made, he will actually desire what his Parts represent to him as possible and worthy of him, and that Impulse renders him compliant; he condescends, he varies himself, he thrusts himself into all the occasions and Inclinations of his Pupil; who is flatter'd by this Carriage, and feels a kind of spur, which obliges him to dilate himself that he may make the best of what is taught him. By that means it comes to pass that the Condescendency of the Tutor is the Scholars delight, and that the good Relish of the Scholar breeds in the Tutor a desire to instruct him well.

Without this Reciprocal submissiveness, Education will tend to nothing but what is Imperfect and Irregular: After this, is it to be wonder'd at, if there be so little order, so little Exactness and solidity to be met with in the Generality of young Persons, more especially those that are of high Quality? But must we not say as well, that 'tis not always their fault? If they are not wiser, more clear sighted, and more capable to discern good things, 'tis because they were bred up by Spirits limited to certain superficial Sciences, born with very mean Parts, bred up in the dust of the School; prouder of a Colledge Suffrage than of any true Merit, and so little fit for an Employment

ment to which Neceſſity or Vanity onely urges 'em, that they ought to be as much aſham'd to accept it, as they have reaſon eternally to upbraid themſelves for having ſo ill ſucceeded therein. This truth diſcovers it ſelf every Moment in the World: There needs no other proof of it, after what has been ſaid, but a little Reflexion upon that ſort of People who take upon 'em now adays to educate others. What Abuſes are there not to be ſeen in their Common Praſtiſe ! What blindneſs in thoſe that make choice of 'em.

'Tis not the ſame with the Perſon whoſe Portraiture I have here drawn: Becauſe every thing is good in him, nothing but good effects are to be expected from him; the Qualities which he ought to have, cannot chooſe but be excellent for Education: And his Exalted mind rendring him more facil and more complaiſant, there redounds from thence to his Pupil an eaſineſs to raiſe himſelf Inſenſibly above Children of his Age. It breeds in him an Impatience, and a daring and preſumptuous ſally, which cauſes him to do more then his Tutor durſt promiſe to himſelf; and ſhews what is to be expected from him, according as he ſuffers himſelf to know more, and which renders the moſt difficult things Eaſy to him.

I paſs, my Lord, to the ſecond Quality of a good Tutor, which is to have an extended and nice Wit; which perhaps will ſeem

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seem to be a second Paradox ; but I hope that you will be convinc'd of it. The extent of the wit is usually the fruit of it's Elevation ; but it is not infus'd as some imagin ; 'tis the effect of Application and Industry. We are Born with Elevated Inclinations ; but 'tis the Manuring that extends 'em, and *which* it self extends our wit upon many things according as they are more agreeable to it, and the more easily it can embrace 'em without Tormenting it self.

Of all the Symptoms of Study, there is not any one which is more perceptible then the Successive Extension of our Knowledge upon various Objects. We represent it to our selves, as a Streaming of our *Knowledge*, which is about to Peirce through new Clouds, and which breaks forth within us by means of that Discovery. 'Tis true that it puts nothing into the Mind, which is of it self above all which it is able to understand ; but we must agree that it fills the Capaciousness of it, proportionable as it extends it self upon more objects, and as it employs it upon different Matters. 'Tis this Extension that enables a Man to Think well, and to Argue well upon a greater Number of Subjects then another Man, and which forms your *Universal Wits*.

Wits thus Character'd they are, that must be employ'd in the *Education of Youth*, to the End they may Sow the Seeds of Good, and the Knowledge of Evil so very betimes, that the Impression of *Vertue* may increase with 'em,
and

and their Aversion against *Evil* may strengthen it self with Age, and never alter maugre the Disorders of the Passions. It would be requisite that a Tutor should be ignorant of nothing that Forms Originally the Principles of an Honest Man in all Conditions of Life. It behoves him to understand the Nature of all the Religions in the World, their Designs, their Drifts, their Rights, and the Reasons why one is prefer'd before another; the Duties of Civil Society in all Employments of Life, and the Principles and Maxims of Policy.

I much acknowledg 'tis a difficult thing to meet with such Men, because the greatest part of the Wits of the Time are form'd upon Prepossessions that spoil whatever is best within 'em, and keep 'em Enslav'd under certain Rules: But it does not follow from thence that 'tis impossible to meet with such Men, because that something of great may be expected from the *Education of a Young Man* who may have been Bred up by another hand. After this; to complain of the general Corruption of all *Conditions*, is to ask how it comes to be Day at *High Noon*.

Now in regard the Extent of the wit proves it self much better then its exaltation, they who have attain'd to it are generally too diffuse, and not concise enough in their Instructions; which is no less an Obstruction to good Education, then a Limited wit, which being but of a mean spear, can never extend nor raise it self, what.

whatever pains it takes to attain to it. Artificial Philosophy does but interpret the Natural, when it says, that 'tis the Aptness of him that receives, which makes the Quality, and many times the Benefit of what is entrusted with him; which is no less true in Moral then in Natural Life: And how well so ever an Infant may be inclin'd; 'tis necessary that three Things be granted, which are beyond all dispute.

First that he is Limited in his Destination, as well as the most learned among Men.

The Second is, that thereby he is Limited to a certain Portion of knowledge beyond which whatever he desires to add to it, does but dazle and overwhelm him.

The Third, that in the Dispensation of acquir'd knowledge, whether it be through the aptness or Temper of his wit, or through the secret Motions of his heart, he shall always find himself more inclin'd to one Science then another, even to the draining of that to which he has a particular propensity; whereas he shall not be able, after all the pains Imaginable, to apprehend any thing of that which is repugnant to his Genius, or of which the speculations surpass the sphere of his wit.

Now in regard that these are Truths in matters of fact, and known to all the World, observe how I argue. How great soever the Capacity of a young Mans wit may be (which cannot be known, but as the
Organs

Organs disincumber themselves, as reason awakes, and the Inward Faculties prevail one over another) certain it is that this Capacity imitates Nature in its Productions; that it begins with the Little before it ascends to the Great, and that frequently these Commencements deceive those who have not Exaltation sufficient to penetrate the Vigor of it, or have not experience enough to understand the Limit of it? Suppose at present a Man incapable of this discernment, who to make himself valu'd by the Parents, or to get an Air of Reputation in the World, labours to put his Pupil forward by Crowding into his Memory a heap of undigested things; what does he? He overloads him, he overwhelms his Inward faculties, on purpose to produce a young Man that knows every thing betimes; but he never takes any notice, that his Precipitation tends onely to mould a Person that knows but very ill what he knows, and who not being destin'd to be above all those Matters heap'd one above another, goes about to be all his Life-time a Man of Confusion, without Order, without Proportion, without Equality in what ever Condition of Life he be, or in whatever Employment. *Pyrrhonism*, which is now a days in a manner Universal, has no other particular source then this. How shall a Man determin upon the Choice of so many things which appear excellent as they are consider'd a part, or excluded from

from what may render 'em less Excellent, or less Expedient? Of necessity a Man must hesitate under an Irresolution; and what can be expected from a Mind that is unresolv'd, and sees nothing but what is uncertain.

So soon as a thing is limited, it does not follow that it should not be subject to a farther extent: Now as this is limited to such a degree, it ought to attempt nothing beyond it: Never the less it ought not to omit any thing that may contribute towards its Perfection, to that degree which it is destin'd to attain to. That is generally true, and supports it self in respect to the Subject we are Treating of. A Young Lad cannot be limited to any thing: How stupid so ever he may seem to be upon the first Appearances of Reason, or how insipid soever the Care may be which his Father takes of his Education, under pretence that the Child is not capable; 'tis certain that he is destin'd for something, since God and Nature do nothing in vain. 'Tis upon this Proportion that a Parent ought to be very watchful to supply the Child according as he opens himself, without presuming, as some Governours believe, that by hast'ning to fill himself, he will be forc'd to open himself sooner. This Mistake is usual among those who have a greater extent of acquir'd Parts, than infus'd Elevation of Wit: And here is the place to let 'em understand that there is nothing so prejudicial to the right mould-

moulding the Mind of a Child, as an Indiscreet and over hasty Zeal, by which they strive to force Nature.

In regard that all sorts of soyl will not bear all sorts of Grain, whatever manufing you bestow upon it, that little which comes up by the force of industry, decays and withers insensibly; and when this soyl shall be left to its self, it will quickly return to its first Nature. 'Tis the same thing with the ungrateful Wit of a Young Man; the more you desire to infuse into him, the greater Violence you offer him; and in regard that nothing violent is durable, that abundance wherewith you overwhelm a barren Imagination, and an ungrateful Soyl, will never produce any thing of permanent in the mind of that Young Lad. Wherefore? Because you have not manur'd him according to his Capacity, and according to the intention of Nature; and for having thought that he might be capable of every thing with great assistance; that his slender Capacity might extend it self by means of the diligent and officious Cares that should be apply'd to it; and that Self-Love, Emulation, Esteem, Praises, and the Considerations of his Family would spur him on. But because you hasten'd him forward by all these means beyond his Natural sphere, you have disorder'd him; and that young Man will never be fit for any thing as long as he lives, because you went about to make him fit for too many things.

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Did this Deduction need any other Demonstration then that of Experience, we might produce the Tryals of all Ages and of all Countries in the World. But this Truth is so well known, that we need not make any stop to justify the cause or the effect of a mischief which all those deplore who have extent of wit sufficient to see the Consequences of it, and Elevation enough to discover the Remedies.

So soon as it is agreed on all hands that the wit of a Child is naturally limited to a Certain degree, beyond which it never goes any farther, and that when you constrain it, you put it quite out of Order, 'tis easy to infer, that this Child is of necessity more fit for one thing then another, and that when you put him to that which agrees with him, he will infallibly prove successful, whereas he will but languish and faint, if he be turn'd out of his way, by putting him to other things that are above his reach or contrary to his Inclination. Now as this is more Customary and more usual then what has been hitherto asserted, the Difficulty becomes greater to grant this Precision with the extent of a wit well fill'd, and to regulate upon this proportion the Converse of a Child with his Tutor, who is already convinc'd, that the wit of his Pupils being bounded as well as his own, he ought not to pretend to impart to him a Universalty which he knows to be impossible, unless he be a Treacherous *Pedagogue*. 'Tis

his business onely to supply his Pupil well and bring him to perfection, without minding to stretch him beyond the Bounds of his Capacity: Because the Imagination of the Child will succumb, when stretch'd beyond the Limits that nature has given him. He is like a soyl that a Husbandman would have to bear more then it is able: there is a Certain Proportion of Goodness of which it is capable, being assisted by Manurement, and by the Hands of Men: beyond that, there is nothing to be expected but to render it incapable, and to make it loose all its Vertue. 'Tis the same thing with the Imagination of a Child. It has it's Reach and it's Bounds; and may excel while circumscrib'd within the One or the other: But farther, it is Impossible: It would be an attempt upon the Rights of Nature.

When 'tis the Business in hand to accommodate the Precision of one only thing with the Extent of a wit that feels it self fill'd and capable of different things, I acknowledge that the Entanglement is great, and that the Violence cannot but be very odious: However, there is a necessity for it; and notwithstanding all the management in the World, the education will never prosper, if there be never so little variation in it: A prudent Tutor must contract himself upon the proportions of his Pupil, as the scripture tells us that *Elishah* contracted himself upon the Body of the Child that

he was going to restore to life. 'Tis this measure of the Master and the Scholars Acting by concert; which unites the Instructions of the one with the inclinations and Talents of the other; which bends their wits together as if they were only one Pass, and which begetting a Real sympathy between 'em, accommodates 'em so well together, that the one is always ready to receive and benefit by what the other is ready to give him. 'Tis this Proportion which makes the Excellency of Education, and the Art of an able Master; and this it is to which a Tutor who loves his own Reputation and his duty ought chiefly to apply himself: 'Tis a Law that he ought to impose upon himself, if he desires to come off with honour in his Employment. Whence comes it then, that 'tis so little observ'd? 'Tis because of the Ill choices which are in a manner always made. Parents never mind any thing more then to get a Tutor for their Children: They never give themselves the trouble to examin whether he have those Qualities which are Requisite to make him capable of his Employment. 'Tis sufficient that the Publick sees that Man: they believe themselves discharged for all the Rest. What's the Issue of this negligence? They deceive themselves, and deceive the Child. Is there any Conduct less excusable in a Parent? Is there any Duty more Essential in regard of a Son? The Concern of the Reputation of the Child

Child, and his settlement in the World, is it of so little Consequence, to trust it with People that are hardly known to 'em, and of whom the greatest part want those Qualities which are requisite to enable 'em to discharge their trusts as they ought to do. So far from seeking after labour and Application, that they avoid 'em; and who bending all their studies to unprofitable and superfluous things, know neither what they ought to teach, nor what they ought to do. There is no Medium between these two sorts of People that Generally List themselves for these Employments, either they are thickscull'd Pedants bred in the dust of a poor thin furnish'd study, without the Air of the world, and without any thing of Politeness, rough hewen, headstrong and Opinionated, Laden with a number of things without choice, without method and without exactness, at a Nonplus in an easy Conversation, relishing nothing but the *Verbose Gibbrish* and *Barbarism* of the School, and visibly carrying in their Countenances, in their Actions and in their discourses the Infallible Proofs of their Character; Or else they are a sort of proud Coxcombs, who full of conceit, and fancying themselves a little handsom, mind nothing else from morning till night but to keep their Locks in order and well powder'd, to have a neat little Band, or a Cravat well starch'd; to practise their Gesture and Behaviour twenty times a day in the looking Glass, and

how to accompany their words with a Gracious smile; but never make any account of learning or study, provided they be satisfi'd with themselves, and who with five or six terms of Art, and a Certain number of Phrases, believe they can impose upon all the World. These are the Persons made use of in one of the most Important Functions of a Civil life. After this, is it to be a wonder'd at, that Youth is so ignorant and Irregular? Is there any thing else to be expected from such sort of Masters? Have they foundation sufficient, have they Application enough to enter into the true knowledge of their Pupils, without which whatever they do can never be to any purpose? Will not this Attention be a violence upon 'em, so soon as it shall appear to be necessary and Inevitable? Will they be ever able to manage the Capacity of a Child proportionably to the extent of it? And in regard they always want discernment and parts, because they have neither Conduct nor Experience, they will fall into the Extremities of either too much or too little. If he be a *Pedant*, he will load the Memory of the Child with a heap of ill digested things, as getting Parts by heart, and making exercises: Or if he be one of those *Buffs* already mention'd, he will no more then slightly Trim the Outside of his Imagination, because he can never give to another what he has not to himself. The first knows the Truth but very imperfectly,

ly, which renders his Instructions unprofitable. The second knows nothing at all, only has an Affectation of knowledge. Which of the two is the Greatest Cheat, and most dangerous in education? The one would undertake too much, the other can do almost nothing. The one does no less mischief by his universality, then the other by his Inability: Whence it comes to pass that the one has as little success as the other, and that they equally spoyl the wit and Genius of a Child, whether it be that the one would stretch it beyond the Bounds that nature has given it, or that the other is not able to furnish it with what it wants. But some will say, would it not be better, that a Child who has a Wit bound up, should fall into the hands of a Person limited to one Science, to the end they might sympathize the more by means of that resemblance? This might be true, were we not to suppose three things, which are equally impossible, or impenetrable,

The first is, That one *Science* may be perfectly acquir'd to Perfection, Exclusively from the Principles, the Consequences and Effects of all others. This is impossible, because if all the Vertues are necessarily annex'd, by the same Reason that the Principle which gives Being to one, is common to the Rest, how can we suppose that the Sciences, which are all *Partes of Human Reason*, can be separated from the

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*Principle that raises one of 'em to perfection? Is not that Principle the Foundation of Reason, which is call'd Natural Light, or Common Sense. Was ever yet seen the Man who was perfect in one Science, or in one Art, that was altogether ignorant in every thing else?

The Second is, That a Man may judge of the perfection of a Science by the Science it self: That is to say, by a precise Examination of the Demonstrations and Certainties of it. But I assert that this is equally impossible and impenetrable. Impossible, because that if we have no surer means to Judge of the difference of Wits, then by comparing 'em one with another, not by their Nature, which we can never penetrate; but by their Actions, which are perceptible to us, VVe ought also to be still more troubl'd about giving a Decision upon the Difference of Sciences, the Perfection of which we represent to our selves no otherwise then as our 'infus'd Elevation carries us, and extends us upon many things, but always after a manner so undetermin'd, that we hear only the Comparison or Opposition of Science to Science, and of Knowledge to Knowledge, that can humanly assure us of the Judgment which we make of 'em. How then is it possible to Judge of the Quality and perfection of a Science by it self? This is Impenetrable, because the most clear-sighted person in the world can never perfectly under-

understand the nature of his Soul, and the Essential Qualities of his wit, that is to say, the purest action of his Soul; how shall he then attain to the Penetration of the most inward and secret Production of the mind? The Root of Sciences is enclos'd therein, and sprouts forth in it more or less; this is true; but does it follow from thence, that I can penetrate what is the nature of the soils that produce with so much inequality; so little of the whole, and so much of one particular thing? By what sort of heat this action advances more or less? By what degrees this Growth encreases? What are the symptoms of it? What is the Motive of it? All this is to me impenetrable as, well as to all other Men. The Conjectures thereupon cannot be said to be so much as Conjecture; and this Examination is not possible but where it is Penetrable, that is to say, by comparing or opposing the Effects and Productions. So then there is no perfect Judgment to be made of one Science by another.

The Third supposition is, that a Man may absolutely Judge of the natural aptness of a Child's wit, while he is yet a Child, and precisely know whether he be more apt for one thing than another. This knowledge is no less impossible then that which I last discours'd of, and none but Ignorant people can flatter themselves to have acquir'd it. For if I know not the Bottom of my own Intellect; If I cannot comprehend the nature of my Soul, and the Radical Operati-

ons of it upon all the parts of which I am compos'd, at an age where every thing is unfolded by way of Discernment and Conviction, how shall I be able to apprehend what will happen in a Child ten, twelve or fifteen years hence? How shall I discern it through the Obscurity and Pesterment of his Organs; or a fearfulness which the Precept or Command causes within him, because he is constrain'd to submit to it? How, and which is more than all this, shall I precisely understand the Character and aptness of his wit? All the signs which he gives us for Proof of it, or at least for marks of it, are Equivocal; who shall tell us whether they flow from the knowledge of wit, or the Impulsions of the heart? How shall we Judge of a thing of which we understand not the Cause? Does not Experience every day give the lye to prepossessions and Horoscopes? How many Men do we see grown sots and Incapable of all manner of Employment in their Riper years, that promis'd much in their Childhood? And how many do we see distinguish'd in the World for their Learning, their Parts and Merit who in their Youth seem'd fit for nothing? History is full of these Examples, of which I shall repeat but one drawn from a Greek Manuscript which was entrusted in my hands by the *Archimandrite of Athens*, and wherein, among several other curious thingstouching the Lives of the Philosophers, and Men illustrious in Antiquity, there was this that follows.

Iseus

Iseus was descended from one of the most wealthy families of *Chalcis*, at this day call'd *Negropont*, which was said to have taken its original in a right Line from *Iphitus*, King of *Elis*, who renew'd the *Olimpick Games* in the Presence of *Lycurgus*, a Hunder'd and Eight Years before the First *Vulgar Olympiad*. This Family Flourish'd in *Elis* in the Hunder'd and Ninth *Olympiad*, which Answers to the Four Hunder'd and Ten Years after the Building of *Rome*. *Iseus* was Born about that time, and being an only Son, and destin'd to a Vast Fortune, his Father omitted nothing to give him a most singular Education; to which purpose *Clitonymus* of *Boeotia* was made use of to be his Tutor; and because he apply'd himself wholly to *History*, he would needs Teach it to his Pupil, before he had begun with any other Principles. This very much dissatisfy'd the Parents of *Iseus*, who therefore dismiss'd his Tutor; which so incens'd *Clitonymus*, that in revenge he gave out in all places, That the Boy would never come to Good. However, *Chalcides*, a Philosopher of the New Sect of *Academics*, was sent for from *Athens* to succeed him. But *Clitonymus* prepossess'd him, and so terribly cry'd down the Conduct of *Iseus's* Parents, and the Narrow Genius of the Boy, that he soon grew weary of his *Employment*, and return'd home again. All the City of *Chalcis* was surpriz'd at it, and lookt upon *Iseus* as a Lad of weak
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Parts, and unfit for all manner of Employment, since two such Learned Men could do nothing with him. His Parents were extreamly Troubl'd at it; nevertheless, whether Self-love perswaded 'em to make a new Attempt, or that *Iseus* gave assured marks of what he would be one day, and that his Masters, through Prejudice or ill Conduct had neglected him, they sent him to *Athens*, where *Arts* and *Sciences* flourish'd with so much Reputation, and where the most excellent Wits still met with able Tutors, and where he had the Good Fortune to light upon *Lysias*, who having done him the same Office that *Carnaeades* afterwards did *Clitomachus*; that is to say, to Teach him with extraordinary Patience, and fill his Intellects by degrees, and proportionably to his Capacity, he made the Young Scholar so Skilful and so Learned, that he became one of the most famous Oratours in *Athens*, and among other Disciples rear'd up the Celebrated *Demosthenes*; and to Eternise his Acknowledgment to *Lysias*, he compos'd in Honour of him sixty four Orations, wherein his method of Instruction was handl'd to the very Bottom, says the *Greek Manuscript*, and deduc'd into several *Energetical Discourses*, as may be judg'd by the Ten that are extant of that great Work, which rais'd the Jealousy and Envy of the Learned Men of *Athens* to that degree, after the Death of *Lysias*, that *Iseus* was forc'd to make his escape by private'y
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withdrawing himself from the *Persecutions* of his *Enemies*, who were preparing the same ill usage as befel *Cicero* in *Rome*. So that he Embark'd himself in a Vessel that carry'd him to the farthest part of the *Adriatick Sea*, from whence he retir'd into the Valley, now call'd the *Vale of Kamonica*, where he Built, according to Tradition, a City call'd by the Name of the *Lake*, near to which it is Built. Which probably *Vossius* might be ignorant of, when he wrote the *Lives of the Illustrious Men of Greece*.

'Tis easy to infer from this Example, and an infinite number of others that might be produc'd, that a Master who understands but one thing, how well soever he understands it, which is very uncertain in the Demonstration, and who has but one Method to Teach what he knows, is no way fit to Educate all sorts of Intellects, because a Child is much more discourag'd by a Master whose Method agrees not with him, then he is assisted by him; whereas he might do wonders under the Tuition of another. Let us conclude then from the impossibility of these suppositions, That an Intellect presum'd to be capable of one thing only, requires a Man that has the largest extent of Wit that may be, to perfect him in it. This Truth is easily prov'd by what we see before our Eyes every day.

We judg not of the difference of Sciences, but by Comparison. They have all of 'em
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one and the same Principle which is diversify'd by the Variety of particular Determinations; and the principal Notion of every Science would be equally impenetrable without this act of Comparing; nor can any Man become truly Knowing, but according as he makes this Comparison more exactly, and repeats it more frequently, and as he proportions it to the most different Objects. Let us suppose then a Man that knows but one thing, yet uncertain of knowing precisely whether the aptness and Capacity of a Child be bent to that one thing; certain it is that he will be more ignorant whether the Temperature of their Intellects will agree one with the other. And this uncertainty it is, which proves invincibly, *That for an infant that seems unfit for any more then one thing, the choice must be made of a Tutor who is endu'd with an Extended Intellect, and the most Universal that is possible to meet with.*

Not but that a *Father* may assure himself of a good Master for his *Son*, for that let his Character be what it will, which is not to be known but by time and successively, he finds wherewithal to extend, to fill and perfect himself. There is also this moreover in it: The Extent of wit alone is able to discover the *Inward Capacity*: For by hearing a Man open himself upon several things, and explain himself upon 'em, a child will desire to understand one thing better then another; and his Reason indifferent till

till then, will make choice of one, by the taste he has of it. This is that to which a Learned Man cannot be too Attentive nor too Circumspect: 'Tis his Wisdom not to determin easily; but to wait till several Actions determin the Judgment which he is to make, whether it be through Discretion or Passion that his Pupil inclines to one Thing more then another; and when he has made this Discovery, it behoves him to suffer the Appetite and Relish, which his Pupil shews for that thing wherein he may be perfected, to grow and increase, on purpose to keep him in Breath, and to give his Reason leisure to digest what he has Learnt, by observing to make him do it with order and exactness. A good Table never seems so delicious to the Stomach, as when a Man has Fasted a little: The *Viands* much sooner turn to *Chylus*, and with less Corruption. 'Tis by an Art much like to this that a Young Man ought to be Instructed: He must be made to desire what he Loves, to set his Talents at work, and guide 'em after such a manner, that they may insensibly attain to the Perfection of what he Relishes and is inclin'd to. This is that Guidance and Conduct which make the *Excellency of Education*. A Judicious Tutor ought not to make use of other things but as they conduce to this end, rather to please the Imagination then to constrain it. And as we never judg rightly of a Quality, but by comparing it with

with others, it behoves him to Discourse his Pupil in Accessory Matters, in another Tone, and after another Fashion, then that to which he desires he should apply himself; that is to say, by Inductions, Fictions, by Questions, by Answers, by Observations, or by Doubts, and then to make 'em fall neatly and insensibly upon the other, like so many Lines that are directed to the Center, where the Perfection is to be found. This Method, *My Lord*, is the most sure and concise, to make a Young Lad excel in those things which are to his Liking.

'Tis with a young Man that is to be rear'd up, as with a Picture that is but rough drawn: The Painter must still add to it, till it be finish'd. In like manner a Tutor ought still to add something to the Intellect of a Young Lad, not to change his nature, which is Impossible, but to bring it to perfection. The Painter neither made the straining Cloth, nor the Colours, nor the Oyl which he makes use of, he has only the skill to know what to do with 'em. A Tutor is not Master of the Choice of his Pupils (so many things concur to make 'em different) Age, Birth, Temper, Interests of the Family, and the Prospects of the Parents. He must accommodate himself with such as they are, not with such as he could wish 'em to be. How desirous soever a Painter may be to draw a Good Picture, he can no more reform the Natural defects
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of the Original, then he can expect to perfect his Art, by making the Picture appear otherwise than it is. Can we imagin that a Tutor can do more upon the Pupil that he is to mould, then a Painter upon the Body which he would represent? Both the one and the other suppose nature such as she is; but with this difference, that the one minds Imitation, the other Reformation.

Let us carry this Comparison a little farther, the Resemblances of which are so perceptible. The Art of Painting is to sweeten defects in representing 'em: The Art of rearing up a Young Lad, is to supply something instead of the Defects of the Intellect, which may make 'em appear less, because he cannot absolutely alter 'em. A Painter cannot be truly skilful unless he understands all Proportions, and unless he has a Certain Elevation to see 'em all together without confounding 'em: It behoves him to accommodate and connect together all the Varieties that are to compleat the Picture for the Beauty of Aptitudes, and he ought to have an Extended understanding not to represent any thing but what is according to the order of nature. These Qualities are no less requisite in a Tutor for the Education of a Young Lad. He must have an extended Intellect to enclose his matter, and to consider it all together without confounding one thing with another. This Elevation ought to be complaisant, to proportion his Instructions so, that he may not suffer the least circum-

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stances to escape: and it behoves him live: lily to represent not only things demonstrable, but all those *Metaphysical abstractions*, which carry not the Intellect of a young Lad beyond it self, proportionably as they discover to him something of Possible beyond Reality. Let us add something more: The Extent of Intellect in a Painter would become Confusion, if he had not the Just precision of what agrees not only with the *Objects* which he would represent, but with the *Objects* taken in such a part, and proportion'd to such a fitness. A Tutor ought to observe the same conduct in regard of his Pupil; he ought to proportion what he knows to agree not only with his Intellect but also with his Age, the time, and *Genius* of the *Nation*: He ought to do it with so much Order and Dispensation, that all these parts may one uphold another. 'Tis this Precision that rectifies the Pencil, and prevents the Confusion of Colours; the Painter has 'em all ready prepar'd upon his Palet; but when you see him at work, you admire that Ten or Twelve Colours produce so many others by their various Mixtures: You observe that he softens the one by the other, to form that Beautiful gradation of light which makes one of the Essential parts of the Picture: And you see, if he be an Artist, different layings on of the Colours in the same part, till his Eye, accusom'd to that exactness, knows that 'tis enough to bind

one part with another. This Exactness of Judgment is always proportionable to his skill. 'Tis not always that he will endeavour to express himself by Rules, if those Rules allow less extent and force to his expressions. He will set himself above 'em, and that Irregularity will be better esteem'd if it be more and better to be Justify'd then the more exact Regularity of another. Which I ground upon a very Great Truth, which I shall make out in the following Letter, that no Science is perfect in the Precepts of it; on the other side, that it does not come near it's Perfection, but as it finds it self rais'd above Precepts; which does not require that it should be censur'd and oppos'd by 'em, as some half learned people imagine.

A Tutor ought to practise the same thing: He ought to add to the Intellect of his Pupil, and touch it with different Colours, till he has brought it to the Perfection of which it is Capable; it behoves him pleasantly to intermix whatever may instruct him, to form, as in Painting, those different touches of Erudition which may render it valuable; and like a Good Painter he ought to vary himself, to render himself more profitable and Intelligible. But let him know those things by which he may attain that end; Let him be Master of 'em, that he may be able to dispose of 'em at his Pleasure; and let him have Experience, that he may know whether or no those

things are in their Proper place. Nevertheless this Fecundity must be religious, for fear of prejudicing the Religion of the Intellect by that of the sense. It must be chaste, for fear of wounding the Modesty of a Young Lad, and it must be rational, that it may be agreeable to publick Honesty, which Generally pleases all Men.

The Third Quality requir'd in a Tutor is to have a fertile and reserv'd Intellect. This Paradox would deserve a long Discussion, if the Deduction which I have already drawn from it did not in a good part explain it self. And in regard that many people may confound extent with fertility, and precise with Reserv'd, 'tis necessary before we go any farther to explain the difference. The Extent of Intellect does not of necessity produce fertility, tho it contributes to it: 'Tis as it were the moving part of it, nevertheless it is frequently Barren enough, when it is in a Learned Man who has not the Art to instruct others. Quite the Contrary, *Fecundity* being as it were the Production of Extent, does not suppose that Man to be always such. And indeed we see people deliver themselves with so much *Fecundity*, tho they know but very few things, that 'tis easy to infer that *Fecundity* depends rather upon the Disposition of the Organs then the strength of wit. Nor does *Preciseness* include that Reserv'dness which we speak of, since it concerns not the Me-
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thod of Insinuating into a Child that Learning which is fit for him ; whereas that Reserv'dness which we speak of is the Bound of a Tutor's wisdom. Preciseness concerns the dispensation of the matter with respect to the Person, Reserv'dness considers the Perfection of the Person by the Insinuation of Maxims that contribute to it. Preciseness is the first conviction of Humane Reason that Instructs : Reserv'dness is the Bound of the most Perfect Reason.

Lastly, Preciseness in a Right Intellect is only destin'd to render a Young Man Learned, at least upon some one subject or other ; whereas Reserv'dness has no other Aim, but to render him wise, and to preserve him such above *Sophisms*. There is then, as you see, my Lord, an Essential difference between Extended and Fertile, between Precise and Reserv'd. This may seem perhaps too abstracted ; but 'tis Impossible to explain it otherwise : And if a Man could tye himself to read and study solid things with a little Application, and lay aside the minding of those that are only superficial, he would have the satisfaction of diving into matters, and Instructing himself after a more profitable manner. A Man must undeceive himself ; true Learning is not easily obtain'd : And if he find it troublesome to quit an old Habit, which Custom has render'd almost Natural, he

will be well rewarded by the benefit he will get by it.

Fecundity is necessary for a Tutor, because if he have it not, he is not fit for his Employment, let him be never so Learned. The Question is not here, whether a Man knows what he knows, but whether he can teach what he knows; which he can never demonstrate, if he be not able to produce the same thing a hunder'd ways, till the Lad has understood it, and that he has render'd it proper for him. It behoves him to assist the Intellect by the Sences, and that by borrowing from the Comparing of Visible things, and the Conviction of those which he cannot render more perceptible, he omit neither slight nor labour nor management to insinuate what he has to say, not into the Memory of the Child, according to the usual, and most mischeivous Method; but into the first discernment of the Reason, which maketh the Precisions of it, which divides it, and views the different faces of it, and which being a slave neither to the Master nor the Term, wholly appropriates the thing to it self. This is the true Art of making Learned Men. What a mistake is it now a days to load the Memory of a Child? What fruit can so ungrateful a Toyle produce? Is it not an abuse of his Duty? Of the Confidence of the Parents, and of the Innocency of the Child? What can be expected from a memory
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stript of understanding? 'Tis to sow in a Ground that wants preparation and Husbandry. Is it to be wonder'd that it produces so little when the Expence bestow'd upon it is quite lost? The most part of the masters of these times are like ignorant Husbandmen who not having either Art or Experience, know not the Nature of the soyl which is entrusted to their care, nor the way to manure it. Therefore the Ground must be turn'd up again, that so the Instructions given, may spring up; and those instructions are to be explain'd after a Copious and easy manner, to the end they may penetrate the deeper into the Intellect of a Child.

'Tis with this Copiousness and facility of delivery, as with the elevation already spoken of, it is infus'd, nor will ever be acquir'd, but it is to be manur'd according to the Genius of the Language of the Nation. By that you attain to a perfect apprehension whence it comes to pass that there are so few Learned Men, and so few Persons Capable of Great employments. 'Tis because that before they have receiv'd from Heaven that Elevation of understanding which sets 'em above Affairs and Persons, they will never succeed therein, unless it be by a Miracle, or the Chance of some Conjunction; and if they have receiv'd that Elevation, without the outward Gift of rendring it useful, without that Copiousness which

exerts it, and which introduces 'em into the Heart and minds of those with whom they have to deal, they may judge of it in others, but they can never expect it in themselves. There are some on the other side who have receiv'd from heaven that Copiousness without Elevation, and these men please at first with the exactness of their Expressions, and the Method of their Discourse. But in regard that this is but a superficial Pleasure, they affect no Body, they never stir the Passions from the Bottom of the Heart: Nor do we ever find that these People have any success in affairs or Negotiations. Why? Because they have all their wit in their Tongues; and for that they are almost always intoxicated with their twittle twattle. To what purpose then serves this Fertility, when it goes alone, in Employments that require Solidity, strength of judgment and Resolution, that admit but few words, but deeply conceiv'd, which never look upon the outward Qualities but as nets that are spread to surprize others, or to prevent being surpriz'd themselves.

Having shewn how a Tutor ought to be copious to render himself profitable, 'tis time to shew likewise how he ought to be reserv'd to prevent his being dangerous. In truth we never mind so near as we ought to do, that the Position of the Master's Heart is almost always, and as it were of necessity the same with that of the Scholar's: The
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Intellects have much a-do to enlighten one the other; but the Hearts corrupt each other easily by Imitation. A Man if he be very Learned, has many times but little Religion, or too much if he be but half Learned: 'tis true he may have neither the one nor the other; but lastly, he has often either the one or the other, and there are a hunder'd of this Character to be met with for one that is not. For a Man to hope that the first will sow the Seeds of Piety in the Mind of an Infant, and that the second will infuse into him Probity, is to give himself blindly over to Pleasure; the Communication of thoughts is Imperceptible, because it is done insensibly: And tho' far greater precautions should be apply'd then are generally made use of, the end would never be attain'd.

The Conversation of Study gives a Master those frequent Opportunities to tell his mind; and notwithstanding all his wariness at those very times, his Earnestness upon things which he is desirous to teach his Pupil, would cause him to forget himself.

And in regard it is no easy thing to retrieve himself from what he thinks, 'tis less easy for him not to speak his thoughts when he meets with an occasion. Some pretend to preserve a Child from these Impressions, by admonishing 'em what they ought to avoid, and by preaching to him separate Lessons of Piety and Probity. But they are deceiv'd: For thereby the Imagination of the Pupil upon the Sentiments of the Master

ter is awaken'd. He shall be the first to ask Questions concerning 'em ; and the more sparing the Master is to satisfy, the more eager and inquisitive the Pupil will be : On the other side, the more hold the Scholar thinks he has of his Master, the more he will trust him in the Direction of his Heart. What I say in respect of Religion, is the same in Respect of Justice, temperance and other vertues, and vices which are opposite to 'em ; the Impressions of the Tutor are the Impressions of the Pupil. Happy, says *Seneca*, if he does not improve upon the mischief which is taught him, and abates nothing of the Good.

For this reason it is, that a wise and Judicious Man ought to be extreemly reserv'd, for fear of discovering himself to a Child, that by the General and undeniable Principles of Good and vertuous, and by the discernment of Good from Evil, and of the Lesser good from the Greater, so long as he stops there, runs no hazard. These Principles extend and turn themselves in the mind of a Child after such a manner as he is inclin'd. He appears what he is by this prudent Conduct. Hypocrisy and Dissimulation that bring forth double dealing and lying cannot corrupt his heart. In regard he believes himself to be no other then he ought to be, he gives his Master leisure and the moral assurance to be the Judge of what he is, as well by what he knows, as by what he does, and then it is, that

that his Master will begin to be convinc'd that he understands the predominant Inclination of his Pupil, by which he will regulate the Conduct which he is to observe in his Behalf.

This reserv'dness is of several sorts; one regards the Mind, that is to say, *That the Master ought to excite an Appetite in the Child; and beget in him an impatience to learn, by reason of the small number of things which he teaches him, rather than by overloading him with Multitude.* This is the true Method of Teaching well. A Stomach that desires Nurishment out of Sobriety, easily digests what is put into it, and turns it *almost* all into substance. But a Stomach overgorg'd, is no longer able to do its Duty. 'Tis even so with the Intellect of a Child, he must be fill'd by degrees, and must be inveagl'd into a desire to replenish himself. Then he Devours whatever is given him: for that acting according to his strength, he is neither constrain'd nor embarrass'd. We find every day that People are carry'd with greater Ardency to things which they have a long time desir'd, and that they neglect those things which they cannot have easily. They grow weary of good Chear, because their Relish decays with eating too much. But 'tis not the same thing with a frugal moderate Diet; the Appetite is still ready and vigorous, because it is not cloy'd. It behoves a prudent Tutor principally to mind this, and to imitate the Wisdom of
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a Physician, who desires at first to understand the Temper of his Patient? and then proportions the Quality of the Remedies, to the strength of the Temperament.

The second sort of Reserv'dness concerns the Nature of the things, upon which we are desirous to extend Erudition into the Mind; and in regard there are different sorts, the difference must be shewn, to the End the Pupil may avoid those that are unprofitable, and adhere to those that are solid and necessary. We cannot be too intent upon this Difference, which decides the Progress he will make in the Sciences. *Principis Obsta*, says the Poet. 'Tis over this determination that a Master ought to be very Vigilant. Upon this depends the Good or Evil sway which the Mind will take. And in regard the first Relish is always the most prevalent, it must be render'd good, to the end the Learner may accustom himself to Love good things, and despise those things that are superfluous and superficial.

The third sort concerns the vain Curiosity that usually fills the Mind of a Child; which cannot but create a kind of Vanity and false Erudition in a mind so tender as yet, that he will be only curious to learn what pleases him for diversions sake, never minding what should better instruct him, and be more to his Benefit. What a shame it is to stuff the Memory of a Child, and spoil his Imagination with the Trifles
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of the Times ! To what can that sort of Study tend, but to give a false Glitter that only dazles Fools and Ignorant persons ? This is the usual Rock against which young people split themselves, We think to render 'em more agreeable for the Conversation of the World, and take no heed that we corrupt their Judgments, and hinder 'em from being ever able to Reason truly.

The fourth sort serves to restrain the Imagination of Children, of whom the greatest part are impatient to change the object of their Studies, and have no sooner began to learn one thing, but they are desirous to know another. This Levity is always dangerous, and produces very mischievous Effects. This is one of the principal Rocks we ought to avoid : Nothing is so contrary to a Good Education : A Superficial Intellect is never to be well Moulded, which not having any good Stock can never but imperfectly do its duty, in any Imployment or Condition of Life whatever.

These, my Lord, are the Essential Qualities which I could wish in a Tutor to enable to discharge his Duty worthily and as becomes him. They seem to me not only Profitable but Necessary; and I dare add, that they include whatever is proper to form a Perspicacious, Prudent, and Judicious Man :
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profoundly Learned, but easy ; Solidly Vertuous, but complying, whose Parts are above his Precepts, and his Experience level with his Instructions, who knows how to supply what he wants, and brings what he meets with to perfection ; and who will always be a sure guide, because he has the Art of Guiding to the Purpose. Examin, I beseech ye, whether these Qualities are to be met with among the generality of those who profess the *Art of Education* now a days: Measure by this Model the use and success of *Common Education*, and you will suddenly see the source of the Disorders of Civil Life. They imagin that ten words of Latin, five or six of Greek, the Composing some sorts of Verses, the superficial understanding of Eloquence ; some ill conceiv'd and worse digested Lessons of Morality and Natural Philosophy, and a slight Notion of *Metaphysicks* and *Mathe-maticks*, are sufficient to form the Mind of a Young Man. Certainly I never could conceive so unparallell'd an Error, nor apprehend how men could e're expect any Fruit from such an Education. Experience too sadly Justifies that it only serves to corrupt Young People, instead of fixing 'em in Vertue ; because that not having any solid Principle, they cannot withstand the Transports of their Age, nor the irregular Mutinies of their Passions.

You know, my Lord, that one of the most Learned Men in the Court, made me
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three Objections when we last discours'd together upon this Subject. *First*, That Wits, so capacious as I desire, are very rare. *Secondly*, That we know not where to find 'em, nor how to make choice of 'em. *Thirdly*, That they are very difficult to be Rul'd; and that to subject a Child to their Instructions, a Parent is not always in a condition to subject himself to their Maxims.

I Answer to the *First*, That 'tis the Scarceness of Wits thus temper'd, which enhances their Merit; and which ought to serve as a Motive in a well govern'd State, to exclude from these employments all sorts of Persons that intrude themselves into 'em, and who not only have not Capacities requisite to discharge their Trusts, but want also inclinations needful to acquire 'em; insomuch that 'tis a wonderful thing to see such swarms of Pædagogues, and so little solid Learning in the generality of Scholars, and that it is not to be admir'd that Merit and Vertue are so little esteem'd in the World, since the Name of either is hardly known among Men.

I agreed that Persons fit to be good Governours were very scarce; but still I asserted that such as truly deserve that Character would hardly submit themselves to these Employments. Nevertheless, were rewards and degrees of Honour ordain'd for those that teach Children of Quality, there would be a now to be met with. But considering

sidering how Learned Men, and Persons of Quality are treated among Great Personages, there was no probability that they would Sacrifice their Lives to such a Peice of Drudgery. That it was not because that they who are made use of deserv'd more, that the Indignity to which they were Enslav'd was not approv'd; but that it was that same debasement that hinder'd'em from finding out Men more able and more Compleat: For that what made the one lament themselves, affrighted others, and the Complaints of the former, bred in the second a Continual precaution how they yoak'd themselves under such a dependency. Were this Abuse reform'd by doing justice to merit, and would they associate with Children of Quality other Children of meaner descent, but hopeful *Genius's*, and permit'em to receive the same Lessons, besides that it would be an Incitement to the one to ply their Studies, we should soon see a Nursery of Good Masters: For to suppose that the streets of a City are cover'd with 'em, is to suppose an Impossibility: For there are hardly three in a Hunder'd that are qualify'd as they ought to be for so great an Employment.

I refer, my Lord, what I answer'd to the second objection, to my Third Letter, where I treat of the Art of understanding Intellectuals. Which I resolve to do, so much the more willingly, because I know the objection seems to your Lordship to be of great
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est Force 'Tis upon that, that I have taken the Liberty to address my self more particularly to your Lordship, and to let ye know, that you would pull down with one hand what you build up with the other: That if he were a Person prepossess'd, as you are, whom you have design'd as a Pattern for your son, you need not seek him out another Master; you need no more then give your self the trouble; I say moreover, that it would be dangerous to find out such a one as you would desire to have. For as Prejudices are not alike in strength and Extent of Arguments, which is that which makes the difference between them and the Principles of Verity, which cannot be multiply'd, it would Infallibly come to pass that the prejudice of a Master, such a one as is to your liking, would add more or less to yours, and that inequality would never give certain Rules to your son, who would never understand what to stick to. Experience shews us every day, that Parents would limit the Master to the extent of his Prejudice, or else that the Master would reduce the Parent to take his. What shall a Child resolve upon in the Midst of this opposition? 'Tis in vain to conceal it from him; 'tis not always perceptible, but it cannot escape him; and all your cares will be to no purpose in that particular.

Let us make the thing more perceptible by Example. A Man of Quality is pre-

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possess'd

possess'd now a days that he ought to canvass for publick Employments, tho he is sensible of his Inability to undertake 'em, or at least that he is not so fit as others. He imagins with himself that being well defended he has all the Qualities requisite for the discharge of such an Employment; he seeks out a person to entrust him with the Education of his son, who is in that particular no otherwise prejudic'd then himself; he meets with one; But can the Prejudice be equal in the one and the other? That's Impossible and Ridiculous to suppose it. The Tutors will entertain the same prepossession as the father, who obstinately fancies that none but persons of Quality have a Right to be Ambitious: But he will still be adding something more; as for example, that when a Man has not the Principal Qualities requisite for an Employment, at least he ought not to have those that are opposite to 'em: That he ought to proportion his Ambition to the Employment which he is capable of: That Birth alone is not sufficient; and that Interest of state would oftentimes be endanger'd in the hands of a Man who had onely that advantage. In the mean time the Child grows up to years of Maturity, and opposes his Fathers Example to his Masters Lessons; his Docility for the one combats his Respect for the other: But it happens that when he is past *Guardianship*, he becomes more ambitious then his Father. Whence comes this? 'Tis because the Children joyning their own

own Prejudices with those of their Fathers and their Masters, are still more prejudic'd as to those things which they infus'd into 'em: And because the Corruption of the Age is such, that Vertue descends, and Vice ascends, 'tis no wonder if there be less Religion, Justice and Probity, but more Ignorance and Blindness.

I have often observ'd that the Intellect of a Young Man who hangs between the Prejudices of his father and his Master, is like a silk worm that covers it self with the froth that environs it, and which it winds about it self in such a manner till it be butied all over in it's Egg: It acts no longer to outward appearance, and one would think it were dead, but by continual pecking it makes a hole by such a time, and flies away. The wit and Reason of a Young Man seem to suffer themselves to be govern'd by Precepts: One would think they would onely act by the Prejudices that are inspir'd into 'em, and that his affection for 'em, were a Mark that he is convinc'd. But we are deceiv'd: So soon as he has got his Liberty, you shall see him appear quite another Man then he was before.

Nothing is so dangerous as to rear up a Young Man under Prejudices: 'Tis a mortal Poyson against which there is no Remedy, no cure when it is once imbib'd. A Parent ought wholly to despoil himself of his Self-Love when he intends the Education of his son. A Tutor endu'd with Probity

ought to have a Regard onely to Verity and Reason, whatever digresses from these Principles is false and uncertain. It would be better to leave a Child to his natural *Genius*, then to force him to take Impressions. The mind opposes all constraint, and mistrusts whatever you would force it to receive. 'Tis a suspicion not to be overcome, and which always produces bad Effects. A Father ought to have no other sort of Care then to make choice of a good Tutor; and when he has done it, he ought to leave the Conduct of his son entirely to the Master. This is the surest and most Advantageous Course, and every body finds the Benefit of it. The Parent is satisfy'd because he understands the Merit of the Person upon whom he Relies. The Tutor looks upon that Confidence as a Motive which obliges him to be the more intent upon his duty; and the Child benefits so much the more, because he is govern'd with more Liberty and affection. Nor is it enough for a Governour to have all the Qualities I have mention'd, his heart must act by concert with his wit, and feel as much delight in instructing his Pupil, as he has obligation to do it.

This my Lord, is all that I design'd to say to your Lordship upon the subject of this Letter. That which follows next will treat of the Art of understanding *Genius*, and you will there see things that will appear Novelties, and satisfy your Curiosity.

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I have endeavour'd as much as was possible to correct in that the fault for which I have been blam'd of being *too obscure*. I know that clearness is one of the most Essential parts of a Peice; and that People are usually discourag'd in this Country by things which they understand not at first, and which require seriousness of study. But 'tis a hard thing to be perspicuous upon certain matters; but more especially in Principles of Philosophy which require strength and Profoundity of understanding. I was the first that perceiv'd it, and I made no Question but that Exceptions would be made against it: But I hope to give better satisfaction hereafter. And in regard I am naturally Docible, and overjoy'd to benefit by the Advice that is given me, I am apt to flatter my self that the matter which I have to handle will carry it's delight along with it; or at least I shall be excus'd, if there be something in my manner of writing which is not agreeable to the Palate of all the World. I am most perfectly,

My Lord,

Your most Humble and

Most Obedient Servant.



T H E

Third Letter,

*Touching the Skill in Know-
ing Intellects.*

My Lord,

HAVING discours'd in my last touch-
ing the Qualities that are re-
quired in a Tutor for the rear-
ing up of a Young Lad, I
thought it requisite here to treat of the Art
of discovering Intellects; by reason that it
is very difficult and almost Impossible to
erect a solid structure if we have not a
Right knowledge of the Ground. Now
in regard that it is the mind and under-
stand.

standing of a Young Child that we are desirous to mould, it behoves us to begin with a true knowledge of it. And for a Man to attain to the knowledge of other Peoples Intellects, it behoves him first to dive to the bottom of his own, and to have examin'd it severely, Judiciously and without prepossession. To that purpose I have propos'd to my self to give some Rules in order to the means that may conduce to this knowledge, and as to the exactness which a Man ought to have that he may be able to judge a right of it.

I always thought, my Lord, that there was no other difference between the Intellect and Reason then there is between the matter and the Motion. Motion does not always shew it self, tho it be always in a Possibility to act, and coexistent with the nature of the matter, so far that the matter is not thought to exist, but as it is in a possibility to act and produce motion.

The Intellect is a Portion of Human being which we believe Immaterial, because we cannot absolutely confound it with the matter; because it thinks, and produces Effects which we cannot apply to that matter. Reason is the motion of it; that is to say, the action which of necessity must have a being coexistent and spiritual like the Principle which it produces. After this, to suppose that the first cause ever made any difference between the Principle and its motion, I mean, between the Intellect

lest and its Reason, would be for a Man to expose himself to the necessity of admitting a Perpetual repose, which would overturn the order of nature, or to acknowledge an Inevitable fund of Corruption, since all motion, to which no stop can be given, is the true cause of it.

The first Man then must have been created either by himself, which is never to be made out, because he must have been before he acted; as also, which is a visible Contradiction, for that he would have been deem'd the first Man, and yet not the first in the order of Existence: Or else he must have been Created by a Principle, which being superiour to him, has given him those Qualities which it was desirous he should have. This being suppos'd, it cannot be deny'd but that the faculty of Judging, Apprehending and measuring the Present by the Remembrance of what is Pass'd, and a foreboding of what is to come, which we call Reasoning; It cannot be deny'd, I say, but that this Reason must have a natural and necessary Connexion with a Portion of our selves which is capable of it; and by Consequence that it became us not to receive from the first cause a spiritual part more Excellent then all the matter, and fit to act conformably to what it is design'd for. For that Reason it is that *Adam*, who is thought to be the first of Men, and who is deliver'd to us by Prophan Antiquity under the name of *A'orus*, was cre-

created spiritual and reasonable at the same time; that is to say, always capable of Reasoning, tho his Reason, did not always Act. Whence in my opinion may be drawn a Certain Proof of the union which there was originally between the Intellect and Reason: Reason being onely the Act of the Intellect which is always capable to conceive, and produce new Reasons, tho indeed it does not always Produce 'em.

The first condition of Man visibly bore the Character of the wisdom of God by means of that dispensation; tho it may be said, not consequentially however, gave too much liberty to Man, according to the opinion of *St. Bernard*, who follow'd *St. Austin*. 'Tis true that God was willing to see what use Man would make of so great a benefit, that he might have an occasion to shew his Justice as wisely as he had shewn his Power and his Liberality, to the end that it being in the Power of Man to merit or do amiss out of his own choice, he might expect from his Justice Reward or Punishment.

But alas, the flesh, that terrestrial Part, is that able to sympathize any long time with the spiritual part, which being a stranger to it, superiour to it and above its nature, became more odious and less intolerable?

If the animal part of the first Man rebel'd against a subordination so severe, wherein all was despotick on the one side, and every thing submissive on the other,
was

was it likely there should be any long continuance between two such dissimilar Parts, while the soul would act all upon it's own account, and the Flesh should be lookt upon onely as her slave, subjected to meaner Functions, and charg'd with the servile execution of her Commands? 'Tis to this tryal so becoming a God, and so urgent for Man, that it behoves us to have recourse, to the end we may Rightly apprehend wherefore, how and whence it comes to pass, that the Passions now a days get the better of Reason, and that the Corruption of the heart so strongly imposes upon the Delicacy of the Intellect. You will reply perhaps, that God might not have put us to this Tryal, or at least might not have form'd us of Parts so dissimilar, of which the oppositions and Contrarieties were to be inevitable; and that perhaps it would have been better that the whole had been Matter for the Good of this being, then always to feel therein a Contradiction, which all the efforts of Man could never be able to pacify.

I answer to this objection, that God had the same Right over us as a Potter has of his clay: he was able to form us according to the Prospects of his wisdom, and assign us to what use he pleas'd, yet we had no right all this while to complain, no more then the clay to which the Potter gives what form he pleases.

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What we might be apt to think of a Figure of Clay that should mutiny against the Potter, for not having form'd him after such a fashion, let us think of a Man, that should go about to demand a reason of God upon the same subject, or upon the matter of our Dependences; which is an undeniable Proof of the Power of the Master that created us, but who nevertheless, because he would not discourage us by this servitude, has interested his wisdom therein, and was willing that one portion of us might at least dispose at it's own pleasure of that liberty, such as it was entrusted in our hands, to the end that being able to resist or acquiesce, we might apprehend of our selves what use God might make of his mercy and his justice: Attributes according to St. *Austin* in *Tertullian*, which had never been reveal'd to us without the Consequences of the Effects of our Liberty: a Liberty which never could have been prov'd to us, had we not had an occasion to make Tryal of it; a Tryal that would never have been expedient for us, did we not observe something of it in the remainder of the knowledge of the Intellect against the Irregularity of the Heart; a knowledge that proves what is Past by the present. Both the one and the other, teach us that there was a distinction between the Intellect and the Heart, before there was a division and misunderstanding between 'em. 'Tis this misunderstanding which is the first Proof
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of the Character of the soul, and of the Obstacles it receives from it's union with the body, which being proportionable only to the original, causes one part of the Irregularity of the Intellect; and this Irregularity it is that produces the Transgression of the Reason that causes the difference of Intellects.

I have always, my Lord, lookt upon the custome of judging of wits by the Inclination, as a strange kind of *Sophism*. There is little certainty in those Judgments; because the Inclinations are the Productions of the Heart, and are improperly confounded with those of the soul. The heart indeed has been corrupted ever since the Transgression of the first Man: But the soul is Immutable: It may fail in it's knowledge, and this failing it is that gives the Impulsions of the Heart an Advantage over it; but it continues always the same, and 'tis only the Reason that sins, and becomes so frequently contrary to it self. Do we not see, and are we not sensible, that *Prejudices are only an Effect of this Irregularity*? They arise in the Mind through the weakness of the Reason, and as the Reason decays, they gather Strength more and more. So that the weakness of the Intellect proceeds from the Heart, in the same manner as the Extinction of the Natural Heat is caused by the emptying of the *Blood*.

How violent soever a *Passion* be, it cannot extinguish the *Light of Reason*; it obscures

scures it, and is many times like to choak it up with Vapours. The Soul looses nothing of its Force, tho it does not always act with all its Vigour. But when the Action of it once begins to awaken, it exerts Remorce, which is as it were the *first Depository of known Truth*, and from this *double Motion* Reason springs up again.

Prejudices, which an Ancient Author prudently call'd, *Reasons abbreviated*, work in us very near the same Effect, as the Exhalations of the Earth, in respect of the Sun: The Thicker they are, the more *Unctuous* and *full of Impurity*, the more they obscure his Light: nevertheless he remains still the same; his Action still produces Day; and when the continuance of his Heat has augmented the Strength of it, those *Mists vanish*, and the Sky appears *Serene and Clear*, as it us'd to be. 'Tis almost the same thing with us. The *Fund of Corruption* which is fix'd to our Nature, being *always in action*, continually produces Vapours, which are more or less *thick and impure*, according to the Variety of Ages, which cannot raise themselves into the middle Region, or Moral Interval which is between the *Soul and the Heart*, without *obscuring it*: nor approach the *Understanding* without *troubling the Reason*, which indeed is *but the Action of it*. But certain it is, that the *Reason* has no less strength to dissipate those Clouds, then the Sun has to enlighten the World in a Cloudy Season. Nor is it less true that the Reason is over-
charged

charg'd with 'em; whence it comes to pass, that that which ought to be an *entire Knowledge*, is at most but a *Prejudice*, or *half a Reasoning*, which by consequence cannot be serviceable to the Guidance of Life, but after an imperfect and defective manner.

If it would be a kind of Madness to accuse the Sun for being the cause of *Close Weather*, how can we accuse the *Understanding* for being the cause of those *Obstacles* that form the *Contradiction* wherewith it is perplex'd, and by means of which, the *Operations* of it become so little alike?

'Tis according to the *Order of Nature* that the *Inferiour Part* obscures the *Superiour*; in like manner the *Corruption of the Heart* produces the predominant *Inclinations* that first appear in us. We may judge by that of the *Erronious Mistake* who give a *Judgment of the Understanding of a Man by his Inclinations*. Every cause of *Necessity* produces its *Effects*; and 'tis only by the *Effects* that we can understand the *Cause*. The *Inclinations* are the *Productions* of the *Heart*; 'tis they then that must make us understand it. The *Soul* has also her *Productions*; and by consequence 'tis from her that we must learn the *Art of understanding Intellects*, and not by the *Inclinations*, which are the *Productions of the Heart*.

'Tis not with the *Soul* as with the *Heart*. The *Heart* is difficult to be known; 'tis able to disguise it self as much as it pleases, and 'tis sufficient that it acts not at all to be
Impe-

Impenetrable, since it *absolutely* depends upon it to *act*, or not to *act*, wherein consists the chief *Mark* of its *Liberty*. 'Tis not so with the Soul, which is like to *Fire*, that *Acts* of necessity wherever it is; so that it cannot be said to be in Being where it *Acts* not at all. Which causes the Essential Difference between *Sleep* and *Death*. 'Tis by this necessary *Acting* of the Soul that we may attain to know it, according to the Vulgar Axiom, *Speak, that I may know thee*. And according as this *Action* is disingag'd from the Matter, or more remote from Corruption, the *Understanding* Argues more or less truly upon the *Judgments* which it makes of Things.

Let us grant at present the grand Principle of *Averroes*, concerning which he speaks so profoundly in his Treatise of the *Nature of the World*; that the *Understanding* cannot surcease acting, and that there is as much Disparity in this *Action*, as there are *Proportions* that appertain to matter, and by the least of which the *Understanding* makes it self known. This Principle being conceded, two things more must be also granted; That there is nothing so easy to know as the *Understanding*, and that there is nothing so *impenetrable* as the *Understanding*. The First Part of these *Propositions* may seem to be a *Paradox* at first. But it is to be prov'd by all the *Symptoms* which cannot fail to discover something of the *Qualities* of an *Understanding*, provided a Man has enough within himself to know'em, and to judge of the *Nature* of a Cause by the *Effects*. 'Tis

in this sence, That there is nothing so easy to know as the *Understanding*: But the Means are not so common as Men suppose; tho there are now -adays an infinite number of *Persons* that boast of their *Understandings*. Which serves to *Justify the second Part of my Proposition*: For to attain the *Knowledge of other Mens Understandings*, a man must be able in the first place, to apprehend the *full extent*, and all the *proportions* of his own; he must be assur'd of being able to *Govern himself* above his own *prejudices* and those of other Men, which is very rare, and a very difficult Peice of *Practise*. *Lastly*, He must have *exactness* enough to weigh the one by another; and *Justice* enough to pronounce in favour of others, to the prejudice of himself. But these ways appear *Impracticable*. Have I not then Cause to say, *That there is nothing so impenetrable as the Understanding*.

Let a man have the Art to unravel and separate all these waysthe one from the other. How many Men are to be pittied, as to their manner of *Judging of Understandings*, of *Sciences* and *Arts*, and whom *Ignorance* or *want of Application* have now a-days turn'd aside almost into a *Universal Deviation*? The *Judgment* a Man makes of another, does it not fall more frequently upon him that makes it, then upon the Person discours'd of? And if *Christian Charity* and *Natural Equity* did not permit us to publish the good *Opinion* we have of another;

other; forbidding us at the same time to judge ill, should we be able to make a wise decision upon what we should discover of that which was the best.

An Apostle has Reveal'd tous, *That every thing is Corruption in Man*; while an Evangelist declares to us, *That the Object and Exercise of this Corruption is wholly Employ'd in Pleasure, Ambition and Coveting other Mens Goods*. He ought then to examin himself how many of these *Forbidden Transgressions* tickle and side with his *Passions*, and how far a distance he finds himself remote from 'em. This Examination must be rigorously made, and without flattering himself. And this will be one means to begin to know his own Mind, and to acquire the Art of Judging soundly of the Minds of others by his nearness or distance from the Principles of Corruption, whose Vapours more or less obscure the Understanding, and weaken the Reason. 'Tis only from this Proportion that you will be able to derive a certain Knowledge? and then you will easily grant that it is uncertain, and to no purpose to judge of the Understanding of another by their Passions, since it is impossible to know any thing of certain concerning it; unless a Man sets himself above his Passions.

But some will say, *Has not God created all things that are upon the Earth, to the end that we should enjoy 'em, and that being Master of 'em, we should satisfy our selves? Wherefore should the Delight we take therein be irregular,*

see.

seeing it is Natural? And wherefore should Reason differ from that which is so agreeable to Nature?

By means of this Objection, which is very false, Men fall into a greater Sophism. Is it because there is no difference between enjoying of a thing, and suffering a Man's self to be govern'd by it? Because a Horse belongs to me, and is appointed for my use, does it follow that he may and ought to carry me in despite of my Teeth, wherever he pleases to go? On the other side, is he not thought to do me good service, when he suffers himself to be Govern'd, and carries me where I please, otherwise I ought to rid my Hands of him and take another? That which ought to be done to accustom a young high Mett'd Horse to the Curb, and to render him serviceable to me, teaches me what I ought to do to enjoy the Blessings of this Life, according to their true Assignment. Does there need any more for a Man to Convince himself that the *Enjoyment of the Blessings of this Life is Dangerous*, if they are not subordinate to Reason; and if we have not strength to Govern'em, without ever being Govern'd by'em.

Tho a Horse has been back't by a good Rider, nevertheless he will have his Humours and his Jades Tricks from time to time, especially if he be rid by a Man that does not understand his *Capriccio's*. The Master complies with him, because what

there is Good in him prevails above what he has of ill; and excuses his defaults, because of the Advantages which he draws from his *Good Qualities*. 'Tis impossible for a Man to be free from *Passion*, but it behoves him still to have more *Reason* than *Passion*, that he be always guided by the Former; and that he never abandon himself to impetuous and Irregular Motions so contrary to the Perfection of Civil Life.

'Twould be a peice of injustice to know a Man only by his Defects; it would be still more Unjust to weaken what is good in him; but it would be the height of Unjustice to suppose it impossible that he should ever have any good in him, because of some considerable Defect or Vicious Habit, which appearing after a more then ordinary manner, like Meteors in the Sky, and which increasing through the continual Influxes of his Corrupted Heart, disorder his Judgment, and consequently all his Actions. But in regard the serenity of the Air is only interrupted by the Appearance of the Meteor, that a Lowring Season does not altogether deprive us of the Daylight, but only render it somewhat more dim and gloomy; so the *Intellect* is always the same; the Vapours of a Corrupted Heart cannot alter it: Only they Cloud it as Mists and Fogs obscure the Light. So that for a Man to judg of the *Qualities of the Intellect* by the *Inclinations*, is to believe that Mists corrupt Day-light. An Error no less ridiculous then easy to be refuted.

A Man must be rais'd above his own, and the *Prejudices* of others, before he can presume to be able to know the *Intellect* of another. This Art, which is thought so easy, is very difficult for all that, and it costs more then people think, before it can be acquir'd. Might I be permitted to add something more to this Discussion, without being accus'd of deviating from my Subject, I would say, that in regard the Apprehension of another Life is not the *perfection* of the *Knowledge* of this, and that it is not rais'd above all *Prejudices*, but only as it discovers something beyond Sensual and Terrestrial, in like manner 'tis according to this stripping of a Mans self, this Refinement, and this Moral Separation of *Corporeal* from *Spiritual*, that the *Knowledge* of this Life approaches near the *Apprehensions* of the other; that is to say, that I may return to my Subject, no body can perfect himself in the Art of Understanding the extent and Capacity of another Mans *Intellects*, but according as he examines his own, and apprehends it above the *Prejudices* which are the *Obstacles* of it; I mean as it is perceiv'd to be more or less distinguis'd from matter.

This Conclusion is little favourable to those who seeking only to dive into Matter, deny nothing to their *Senses*, which they make the *Principles* of their *Systems*. Is it because those People are not apprehensive, that it is that *Sensuality* which the Heart makes use of to impose upon the Understanding,

could prevail after so many Ages against *Truth* and *Religion*, 'twould not have been long before there would have been neither *Truth* nor *Religion* but what would have been *Sensual*? Nevertheless, both the one and the other Subsist maugre the Number of these who are all for Matter. It might be also said, that *Truth* and *Religion* have not now a-days a better Defence, then that which they Derive from the *Insufficiency* of those *Strong Head-peices*, who can only boast of their *Extravagancy*. The inequality in the Extent and Variety of their *System* so visibly justifies the Error of it, that so soon as it is Discover'd to one of these Philosophers, that he acts nothing in Matter but we must become sensible of it, and that nothing at all of what they conceive to be there can suffice to Exclude every other Principle, he must be constrain'd to acknowledge, that their Opinion is meer Delusion.

These People would easily retrieve themselves from this Error, were they but made truly sensible that the Condition wherein they are, is an *Invisible Obstruction* of their *Discovering what they seek after*; that they must raise themselves above matter to conceive it aright, and truly to Understand themselves; and that it is only as they rightly understand these things that they will become susceptible of these New Lights that proceed from Reason, where it makes use of these Inquiries to dive into their own

Inability, and to agree upon the *Bounds* of it, beyond which it can do nothing.

These Conditions are harsh to those that are Bury'd in *sensual Pleasures*: However, they are as *Rational* as *Necessary*: For as it behoves the Eye to discover the *Obstacles* which it desires to see, so the Reason ought to remove the Clouds that hinder it from discovering what is about it; which nevertheless is destin'd to no other purpose then to possess, to replenish and perfect it. A Voluptuous Man would be willing to apprehend *Spiritual Things*, to the end he might have an Esteem of 'em; but because he is addicted to the *Flesh*, he cannot conceive 'em. *St. Paul* had never so effectually Combatted the *Sensuality* and *Arrogancy* of *Judaism*, but because he had a full Knowledge of the Means to dive into things that are superiour to Reason, and those Means are all included in a *Moral Separation* from sensible. After that, let 'em consider whether it be proper to judg of the *Qualities* of the *Intellect* by *sensuality*.

They who admit thereupon some difference between the *Soul* and the *Intellect*, agree that the Funds of the *Soul* are *Impenetrable*; but that the Operation of it, which is the *Understanding*, is not so: But that as it gives Motion to the *Passions*, 'tis by those *Passions* that we ought to judg of the Nature of the Cause which it produces. But these *Sophisters* never observe that the difference which they admit, is no more then a *Chimera*;

mera ; For the Action of my Arm, and the Arm it self, are not of a different Being, tho they differ in the Manner of Being. And that as the Action of my Arm, no more then my Arm it self, when it is without Motion, never discover what is in my Heart, tho they derive their Actual Being from it ; so it is not possible to suppose any other difference between the Soul and the *Understanding*, then what I have acknowledged between the *Understanding* and the *Reason*, or between *Matter* and *Motion*. *Matter* acts not always, tho it may do so ; and yet, according to the *Essential Property* of it, it has a Being capable of Motion. Neither does the *Understanding* always Argue, tho it may always do it, and that the Soul, which is the Principle of it, never ceases to concur with it.

If the *Knowledge* of the *Understanding* deriv'd from this *Sophism*, produc'd no more at most then likelihood and probability ; 'tis easy to infer, that the *Art of Knowing Understandings*, is more sublime and difficult then People suppose ; that the Prejudices of People concerning it, are obstructions that hinder us from knowing Rightly, and determin us to Judg amiss ; and that Custom Multiplies these Prejudices every day, yet no body takes care to get rid of 'em. Nevertheless, if there be any Satisfactory Employment in this Life, it ought to be that which raises us so high above Matter, which carries us into a *superior Region* where things appear

appear as they are : Where the Soul sees the Sences, and Slaves appointed to serve her, without daring to Mutiny, and where the *Understanding* finding it self above the Exhalations of Sensuality, beholds the Corruption of the Heart without any Danger.

I confess that this Employment is somewhat troublesome by reason it requires great Application. The business is to combat Custom, to abolish the greatest part of the systems of morality, which are not found to be good because they are not div'd into ; to strip themselves of their prepossessions and Prejudices, of their indigested knowledge, and as I may so say, of their very selves, they must betake themselves to more universal and more solid Principles : they must be strenuous and constant in study : Resist their Dislike of every thing that requires attention : Vanquish their own Temper ; renounce the *Genius* of their own Nation no way addicted to assiduous labour nor *Consideration* ; lastly be docible and modest, do Justice to Merit, and always stick to truth and Reason.

'Tis impossible but that the Fruit of so much Application must be very great, and produce very advantageous effects ; among the rest, it must raise the understanding above the sences, it must enlighten it with a *Flambeau* more or less bright, as it shines from another *Hearth* then that of the Heart, and approaches the Judgment the more that

that removes from *matter*. This being so, there will be no need of asking whence so many superstitions arise, so much impiety in Religion, so many false *Appearances* in Devotion, so many ill conceiv'd Prejudices in the Distribution of Arts and Sciences, and so little sincerity and solidity in Civil society.

Religion must be known in it self, before it can be known in our selves. That, say they, would require too much study in him that should apply himself to it : That would cost too dear ; a Man would be glad to be quit of it at a cheap rate by leaving Religion as it is. How's that ? Not to live under a Religion but as a Man finds himself inclin'd to the Religion ; without that exact Preciseness, which so scrupulously separates the senses from the understanding, as to reduce it under the exactness of the other, and to enslave both under a sad dependency upon the hopes of another life, to the Prejudice of the Enjoyment of this. Hence it comes to pass that a Man is desirous to know and Judge of every thing by himself and as he is : And because he cannot attain by his knowledge to matters of Religion, he makes a Prejudice of it, which he suffers to grow Bigger and Bigger till it has produc'd impiety. Another will believe every thing, because it seems much more easy to acquiesce in Revelation, or that which has some appearance of it, then to examin it, and he raises a prejudice upon it that will soon bring him to superstition.

Whence

Whence come these Disorders? Is it not because both the one and the other have made a *Judgment of Religion* according to their Hearts, and the Impressions of their Corruption? Instead of having sought for the Art of raising their reason above their senses, to bring it more near to Revelation, which by that Violence which Christ has so well explain'd in his Gospel, and of which the *Kingdom of Heaven* is to be the Recompence.

'Tis no otherwise with the false prejudices about Devotion: To search after the Cause of it, would cost those people too dear who *abandon themselves* to the Propensity of their hearts. Whereas with a little study and *Consideration* they might easily discover the Empoyson'd source of these Prejudices. 'Tis very near the same thing also with the Arts and sciences. Now a days they make none but half Learned Men, by reason of the obstructions which the Motions of *Partiality, Jealousy, Envy, false Emulation, Pride,* and foolish Vanity lay in their way to perfection. Men must disabuse themselves; for no body becomes an excellent Master but as he becomes more docible to strip himself of his prejudices, to the end he may substitute in their places, the knowledge of other Men.

Sincerity is not regarded in society, because it is not lookt upon but according to the Prejudices of Particular Interest, every body makes his own Interest a Law to himself;

self, to which he believes he ought to submit himself: And what likelihood is there that in the midst of this *Perpetual Contradiction* of *Particular Interest* the Publick, which makes the Tye of society, can subsist? 'Tis from this deduction that I conclude, that no Man can ever attain to the knowledge of another Mans understanding, nor of his own by the *Motions* of his Heart; that the *Judgment* Men make by the prevailing *Passions* is always false, and always uncertain; and yet that there is nothing so *Common* nor so much *Authoriz'd* as these sorts of *Judgments*, tho the *Consequences* are *Terrible*; because they tend to corrupt the Root of Good, and to substitute delusion and false appearances in the Room of it.

'Tis therefore more needful then 'tis thought to be, to accustom a Young Man betimes to the knowledge of that great truth, before the *Motions* of his heart enlarge and magnify the *Prejudices* which are so difficult to be alter'd or *vanquish'd* in an age of *Maturity*. 'Tis the means to prevent all the disorders of his life: And these are my thoughts upon the *Method* how to prove *successful*. There must be observ'd at first an *Interruption* between the first *Reasonings* of a Young Man, to the end that if his heart act first of all in what he desires, at least it may not be the only thing. It behoves a Tutor, after that, to be so *Complaisant* as to approve something, and never absolutely to acquiesce, till he has interested before-hand

hand the reason of the Child to Joyn with his, to beget a greater attention together, and to examin more profoundly the exactness of it. This is the true way to form the Principles of Good above Prejudices, and to infuse wisdom artificially.

This suspension of the first Reasonings, and this Concert of the Reason of a Child with the Reason of his *Governours*, are the first steps which must be taken to obtain a good Education. By this suspension the Child is oblig'd to make his Reflections both upon the things and the Persons. By the Concert, *foreign knowledge* is substituted in the room of the *Impressions* of the Heart that set up Prejudices. Lastly, by the one and the other, the Child cannot fail of becoming what his Master is, as also of surpassing him, if he have better Inclinations. We cannot meditate upon this too often. The sequel of my Instructions will justify, that it is the first Root of Good in whatever condition of Life a Man is engag'd. No Man can sufficiently cultivate early enough this sprout of wisdom, to the end it may gather strength with Age, and fructify by the accession of years.

'Tis then by the precise knowledge of things as they are in themselves, and not as they are in us, that is to say, according to the *Principles* that *Erreur* has introduc'd, and custom *Authori'd*, that we become capable of knowing the Temper, the Character and extent of a Childs understanding.

'Tis

'Tis only by joyning the Art of fadoming things in themselves, with the *Inclinations* that a Child may have to 'em, that we may be able to infuse into him the Choice of a *Condition* of Life, the study which is requisite to prepare him for it, and that sort of Erudition which is proper for him.

'Tis to the Omission of these Rules that we must attribute so many Acts of publick and Private Injustice as happen in society. I must confess, that knowledge is of too large an extent and the things that are to be known, too numerous in respect of the wit of Man. But besides that he cannot receive every thing to make himself fit for the whole, there are obstructions to be overcome in relation to some certain things which is a **Toyl** that other things require not. And if Grace does but accord with Nature to Sanctify us as we are, and without altering our Temper, by rectifying only that Intention of which we feel a secret Morion, tho we never explain our selves as we think, wherefore should Education ascribe to it self a right to offer Violence to the Passions, which it only ought to redress, and not to alter? 'Tis only by this Practise that we can hinder prejudice from growing Bulky, and from stifling Reason at the long Run. Therefore a Tutor who has not all the Exactness and Capaciousness of Wit that he ought to have toward his proving successful, shall never be able, what ever Talent he has otherwise to instruct his

his Pupil: On the other side, he will disorder and confound him by over-spreading his understanding with the first Distributions of *Knowledge* and *Reasoning*.

History tells us that *Cato*, out of an extraordinary Zeal for his Country, made a motion one day for Expelling all the Physicians out of *Rome*, notwithstanding the great respect which the *Romans* had till then for whatever came out of *Greece*, which they look't upon as the Center of *Human Wisdom*: And the Reason he alledg'd was this, *That instead of speedily Curing the Distempers of his fellow Citizens, they did but Encrease 'em by their Medicines, and prolong d 'em, that their Patients might have the more need of 'em, and they themselves get more Money.* Thereupon it was resolv'd that they should be Banish'd, and the Execution of the Decree was attended with this Excellent Reflection of *Cato*, *That the Greeks become jealous of the Prosperity of the Romans, had sent 'em Executioners to Kill 'em in their Beds, since they could never Vanquish 'em in open Feild.*

Let us but examin now a-days a little more severely what is the result of the Ordinary Education of Youth, and what is the Character of the greatest part of those who are Entrusted with it. Ought we after that to admire how it comes to pass that there is so little Religion in the Devouter sort, that carry such an out-side of Piety: So little Faith and Sincerity among the People of the World, after all the Demon-

monstrations of Friendship Imaginable? So little Depth, Ability, and Erudition among the Learned, that carry themselves with so much Pride and Arrogance? Lastly, So few fertile Soyles and good Inclinations in the Understandings, yet so much presumption and weakness in decision? I would rather that a Child should remain without Education, that he should be left to his own Inclinations, or to what he should himself Discover by Studying the World, then see him dragg'd up in that Universal Disorder that Erects Prejudices into Reasons of Demonstration, and which disapproves the most solid and most profitable Demonstrations, to turn 'em into Particular Prejudices. At least it would almost infallibly so happen, that whatever he had of God in him would be preserv'd as it was, without being alter'd by Superficial Mixtures that confound the Reason with the Passions, under refinements of Maxims and Terms that signifie nothing.

The Experience of the *Turks*, whose Education has nothing in it that resembles ours, tho they have a sort of *Theology* and *Philosophy* after their Mode, has made it out to me more then once, that they were so observ'd by their Parents or other Masters in their Youth, that they never put 'em precisely to those things for which they did not appear fit. Through this Wise Conduct it is, that Probity is so fundamental among 'em, and so unalterable, that excepting

cepting the Courtiers, who are as great Knaves there as in other places; you shall neither find Dishonesty in a Merchant, nor Infidelity in a Friend, nor Perfidiousness when any thing is Committed to their Trust, nor Irreligion in their Understandings, nor disorder in their Reason, nor Humour, Illusion, or Obstinacy in their Prejudices. 'Tis true, they have their Passions and Weaknesses like other Nations; and I must confess they abandon themselves to their Vices as in other Countries. But that which is to be wonder'd at, is this, that these Irregularities, of which they know not the Cause, because their Religion does not forbid 'em the use of 'em, never hinder 'em from mistaking Good and Goodness. They are so accusom'd from their Youth, to Judg of these things as they are of themselves, that you would think you saw the whole extent, and all the exactness of the Law of Nature Reviv'd within 'em, such a Uniform Justice do they pay to all the World, much above the Prejudices of Religion, Government, Manners and Maxims; which Invincibly Justifies, that they have the Advantage over us by Nature, which we presume to have acquir'd over them by Education and Study.

But you will ask me, How do they preserve what they have receiv'd of Good from Nature? 'Tis by the opposite to all that we make use of to destroy it. They acquiesce in nothing out of pure Compliance,

ance, base Flattery, or by Seducement. They examine profoundly whatever is told 'em; and the Younger they are, the more intent they are to perfect themselves; and when they begin to apprehend, they mistrust all Figur'd Expressions, which, as they say, may lead 'em out of their way. The more simple they are in the strength of their Apprehension, the more they desire to have of it, to render it absolutely compleat: The farther they have to go before they come at ye, the less they distrust that you intend to Surprize 'em; and through an Equity of Habit, in reference to Persons and Things, they are so Just, so Skilful, and so Prudent, that 'tis easy to apprehend that their Method of Manuring the Understanding, and Enfertilizing it, is infinitely better then ours.

They laugh at the False Glitter which we display, and our Refinements of False Literature, instead of admiring 'em. They pity the Laborious Endeavours of our *Europeans*; to get a great Reputation, their delicate and nice managements of themselves to acquire Credit, or to improve their Interest. Nothing of all this Imposes upon them, neither does it alter their Stock of Probity and Uprightness. 'Tis a wonderful thing to find among 'em Persons of all Ages so Prudent, so Regular, so Profound, and of so much worth, more especially considering their Religion, which is the most Stupid of the Prejudices in the world that

that may be thought capable to Stifle Reason. They Study to know things in themselves, and by means of that Knowledge to attain to the Discovery of the Understandings of those they meet, either upon Conversation or Business.

We differ extreamly from them, tho we are Bred up with much more care and expence. What was Good in a Youth is so alter'd by the Prejudices of his Master, that he Visibly degenerates into a Corruption which every day Augments; and 'tis only by Fathoming things in themselves, and by the Knowledge of Intellects, that we can remedy so great and so universal an Irregularity. What the Sun does to break through the Thickness of a Cloud, understanding or Reason ought to do to get the upper hand of the Exhalations of the *Heart*. And as the *Sun* dissipates 'em sooner or later, for no other reason then according to the Obstacles that he meets with, or according to the Variety of Seasons, 'tis the same thing with this or that Age, or as the Reason begins to display it self, or to shew what it may come to; and then it is, that the difference of *Understandings* begins to discover it self.

All *Understandings* are of the same kind, and that which renders 'em different the one from the other, proceeds not from the Nature of Reason, which flows from the same Principle, and is design'd to the same end, but from the Obstacles it meets with,

and which cause it to act more or less. These Obstacles, some are necessary and troublesome, as Corporal Necessities, such as they may be, because they draw the *Understanding* from its Cares for the Preservation of the Matter : Others are accessory, and spring up within us through the Corruption of our Hearts; as Love of Grandeur, Wealth and other things, and from our desire to Rule and raise our selves above others, which is so contrary to the Repose of the Understanding.

But some will say, From whence proceeds this Principle of Contradiction ? We cannot imagin how Man should Corrupt himself to be contrary to himself ; much less how the Corruption of the Body should diffuse it self into all the Branches. 'Tis very true. But do we question the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea, while we endeavour to discover the Cause of it ? Do we question the Truth of several other Things, which are in Being. and which are above all Controversy, tho we cannot give a reason strong and solid enough to be convinc'd of the Truth of 'em ? Can we doubt of a Cause of which we find the effects so apparent, so soon as we are capable to consider what passes in our selves ? Must we not agree that since Goodness is in the Order of Reason, which desires it, which approves it, and cannot deny it that secret Justice, since the opposite to this Goodness, which is so necessary and so rationally approv'd,

is the Object of the Importunity of the Heart, and of the Passion that bears sway therein: I say, must we not agree that this Misunderstanding is one Foundation of it?

These First Obstacles which Reason meets with, would but slightly touch it, would they not rule it Despotically, and Pretercribe it those Laws which Authorise their Excess; and when they have attain'd their End, they boast the Triumphs they have won.

—— *Video Meliora Proboque,
Attamen infusus deteriora sequor.*

Does not this Confession Convince us by the Light of Nature only, that every Understanding sees Goodness, and cannot but approve it; but that the heart draws it away to Evil, and perswades it, That there is no dispensing with it? This Contradiction which every Body Experiences in himself, is an undeniable Proof that our Faculty of Reasoning, nothing differs from that of another Man, nor from it self in different Ages and Conjectures, but according to the more or fewer Obstacles which it meets with.

But stay, say others, this inward Capacity of Reasoning, this Aptitude of Knowledge, this Distribution of Learning this Foundation of Human Reason; And lastly, The Understanding, is it of the same Conformation, of the same Temper, and

of the same Quality in all Men that we see so variously divided ?

I must confess I can alledg nothing sufficiently strong enough to destroy this Objection, only I am able to advance three things, which may be very serviceable to that purpose. The First, That common Sense, or that inward, close, ingenious, subtle Managment, not easily surpriz'd, which we observe in all Rational Creatures, when it is their chief concern to preserve or augment their own Interests, seems to prove that the Understanding is in all Men precisely of the same Kind, and that it differs only in the Action, which we call Reason, or the Production of Thought. 'Tis true that the Action of the Understanding is interpreted by the Inequality of the Organs which receive and distribute it, and that this it is, which has caus'd us to see, that the Understandings are different, tho we have not Proofs sufficiently strong enough to make it out to our selves.

But whence proceeds this Disparity in the Organs, since if the Understanding be said to be of the same Nature in all Men, the Inclinations, to make use of it, must be absolutely the same ? I Answer, That I know not exactly whence this inequality of the Organs in several Men proceeds, and that there is no better Argument for it, then for the Variety of Statures and Faces, and that if this difference surpasses all Human

Un-

Understanding, the Reason is much stronger why the other should be so conceal'd, which I leave to the farther Examination of Philosophers and Physicians. 'Tis sufficient for me, that this outward inequality, which no Body can deny me, contributes to justify the inward inequality, the Principle of which I cannot apprehend, nor the Distribution, and that, as I find by Experience in others, the Organs are very variously dispos'd in Men; and that from this difference the Variety of Understandings may arise.

The Second thing which I affirm, is this, That Mannuring and Education, whatever care and niceness be observ'd therein, not giving extent enough to certain Understandings, when we find others that produce a great deal with less care, we ought to infer that there is the same difference between Understandings, as between Souls, some of which being Good and others Bad, differ only in the more or less Good.

You will ask me perhaps, from whence, according to the Order of Nature, proceeds this Original Distribution of more or less, which makes a Good or Bad Soul under the same Climat. I Answer freely, that I never yet could apprehend it. But my Ignorance does not hinder it from being perceptible and demonstrative by the Effects; I say also that the more and the less, as to the Stock of the Understanding, is not penetrable; tho the more and the less in the

Reason, is not absolutely above the Conjecture which we make, in imputing the Difference in respect of the Disparity of the Organs that receive this Light, and which of necessity concur to the Distribution of it.

The third thing is, That the Deviation of the Understanding is of a different Kind in all Men. He that is fallen into this Misfortune, yet ceases not to Live, to Act, as also to take care more or less of his Preservation, according to the Nature and Strength of his Deviation. Whence could proceed this Motion and this Action of the Understanding, when it has lost the Distribution of it? Does not this justify past Contradiction, that the Action of the Intellect, in order to reasoning, depends upon the outward Organs, and that their different Conformation produces the difference of Intellects.

'Tis then by the Action of the Understanding that we apprehend what it is of its own Nature, tho imperfectly: and in regard that Thought is the first Production of it; 'tis because we think upon Persons and Things, that we begin to Judg of the temper of our Intellect, and to what extent, and to what Strength of Reasoning it is destin'd. But because we cannot discover the Thoughts of others, unless it be by their words, 'tis because men speak, and not because they act, that we are able to know the Temper, and judg of the Quality of the Understanding, There

There is one observation more to be added, which is, that the more the thing upon which we think, or which we have spoken is remote from matter and sensual Niceness, which tends all to the superficial folly of Terms, or to a vain appearance of Literature, the more we ought to be certain of the Strength of the Understanding, and of its being design'd to something more solid, then to the suffrages of the *Beaux* of the Times. Quite the Contrary, the more our Thoughts or Conversation which others apply themselves to things Material, or to Trifles, which are so pleasing now a-days, and take up so much of our time, the more easy it is to judg of the weakness of the Understanding, and of its being Be-seig'd by the Prejudices of Sence, and of the Irregularity of the Heart that most prevalently over-rules it. I never could apprehend any thing of the Nature and Difference of the Understandings, but I found my self enforc'd to examin it by these Principles; and by them it is that I have been convinc'd, that this difference did not proceed from the Understanding, nor the Imagination which examines it, but from the inequality of the Organs.

'Tis very near the same thing with *right understandings*, as with the Circles of the Sphear, which includes the whole Globe of the Earth; tho they be every one enclos'd in another Circle, to the end, that altogether they may Enclose their Globe. At
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the same time I apprehend that the Perfection of every one of these Circles consists not in their being more or less large, but in being perfect as to their Bigness, and their being fit for the use which they are design'd. Understandings are Naturally Subordinate one to another. They are True and also Perfect, not according to their Elevation toward the Pole of Morality, but according to their fulness, and the space which they ought to take up. And provided they are above sensibility, they are ne're the less perfect for being enclos'd within superiour *Genius's*. These are below Angelick Intelligence, this is one of the Qualities of the Glorious Humanity of Jesus Christ; whence we find that whatever has any Affinity with God is under a natural and Necessary subordination, till it be fix'd in God.

After this Dissertation, of which you will know the Profit and Importance by reflecting never so little upon what passes in our selves, you demanded of me, my Lord, how many kinds of understanding there are? I answer'd, that this Question was still more vast than all the rest that you had put to me before. But not to extend it any farther than to those men that manure this Universal stock of reasoning, which is usually call'd Common sense, by the succour of Art, I admit but three sorts with relation to Precepts; that is to say, those that are beneath Precepts, those that are subjected to precepts, and those that are above Precepts.

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The first, are understandings of the lowest order: They are weak without any Elevation; incapable of acting; conceiving with Pain, and also confusedly; lastly, so bounded in the Distribution of Original light to all men, that it could not be perceiv'd that they know any thing of it, if it had not been forc'd into their Brains. They are always beneath Precepts; Art does but languish and pine away when bestow'd upon them; and the best way would be to abandon 'em onely to common sence. Experience shews that they have enough to suffice themselves. But in regard they have not enough to support the weight of Precepts, they are overwhelm'd with 'em; and far from acquiring any knowledge, they become stupid and destroy their natural Ratiocination.

The second are middling understandings, which are more vigorous then the first; but they have not enough to be determinate in things, without the help of Precepts upon which they rely, and without the assistance of which, they could never be able long to support themselves. 'Tis said of these, that they are enclos'd in Precepts, by reason of the Connexion between their understandings and the Precepts, which by the just distribution which they make of 'em, greatly contribute to form their Erudition, but their Erudition cannot subsist with Rules.

One of the Beau wits of the Times, luckily compar'd this Alliance of middling understandings to the binding of Ivy about a Wall; this Plant grows up by the support of the Wall; but it can grow no higher: It takes root, as it ascends in all the Cementings of the stones where the sap can get in. The more firm and substantial the wall is, the greener and more vigorous it is, and 'tis suppos'd that for the same reason it causes the wall to last the longer, whether it be because it fastens it in every part, or that by means of its wood and leaves it protects it from the Injuries of the weather.

Precepts are compar'd to this wall, and middling understandings to the Ivy, which lean upon 'em and preserve 'em. Their Erudition grows by vertue of this assistance, and rises proportionably as the *precepts* open, to give it entrance and liberty to fasten; nor is it a difficult thing to rise by degrees to the Elevation of the Precepts, but they can go no higher, nor forsake that support without falling: Like Ivy which being loosen'd from the wall creeps under the feet of all that pass by.

It may be said that this Connexion has a hand in making the School Doctors now a days. They instruct by Rules what they have learnt by Rules, saving to him that is desirous to apply himself to it, the liberty to apprehend as much or more then what the Precept taught him. But some will say, is there any thing above Precept, and have

have not men agreed in reference to all Arts and sciences, to enclose under Precepts and proper Terms whatever they produce of most perfect.

This objection is very frivolous, and I have ask'd those that put it to me, in my turn, whether since Learned men agreed among themselves, upon certain Rules and Terms in reference to Arts and sciences, any thing has been added? And in regard they dare not answer any otherwise then Negatively, I form this Argument upon their Confession. Whatever admits of augmentations every day, which has all along admitted 'em, since it had a being, and will admit 'em to the worlds end, is not to be lookt upon as perfect; Rules and Precepts every day admit those augmentations, and will admit 'em, as other men more Learned shall communicate more knowledge to us; therefore they cannot be that which is most perfect and elevated for the knowledge of Arts and sciences.

They serve like staires and Ladders to those who have not receiv'd from heaven that Infusion gratis which sets 'em naturally above Precepts, without opposing 'em to precepts, of which a Learned Man said very well, that they onely serve as obstructions to mean understandings, and helps to middling ones, and Generally, as an *Umbrage* to topping *Genius's*.

Is it not convenient that they who agree upon Precepts should understand one another

ther successively, to the end the one should approve and put in practise what the other had invented? He who first of all discovers a Precept, is not he above those that are to approve it? And have not these the same advantage as they supply what is wanting to perfect the first discovery? Is it not from thence apparent, that an elevated understanding will be always more capable to apprehend of it self then by the assistance of rules, since it is above 'em?

They who cannot raise themselves to that Pitch, must content themselves with replenishing their sphere, that's what they are destin'd to; but they must not suppose that there is any thing of possible or real above precepts. It will be said perhaps that these are publick discourses, such as favour societies, and that understandings of a sphere superiour to precepts being rare, it has been thought more to the purpose to regulate them according to a more Harmonious sphere, to which precepts would not be unprofitable. This is all that can be thought of most just in the behalf of Academies of Arts and sciences, which however will be oblig'd to agree, that they believe not themselves learned, but as they discover beyond Rules, tho they make use of 'em to teach others.

If School-Learning did not multiply the prejudices it takes up; even to the Exclusion of all other Learning, it would not only be very profitable, but would be also very
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necessary to reform a great number of middling understandings, which to appear great by extending themselves, make so many false steps, and so many mistakes. Would she submit to motions more elevated, which are many times more exact than her own, it could not be deny'd but that she would be one of the principle Ornaments of Civil Life, and the most solid support of Religion. But considering the present Condition of School-Learning, full of its self, convinc'd that nothing surpasses it; and that it is Mistress of the most sublime knowledge, 'tis no wonder if those Prejudices destroy the understandings of those that profess it.

Of the third sort of understandings are those which we ought to call truly Learned, because they are always Masters of matter, and for that by a natural Elevation but infus'd, tho many times it be not without Manuring, they are above Rules, they are themselves subordinate one to the other with that sweetness and Affability that causes 'em so well to know Rules; and they are so modest that the more Learned you suppose 'em to be, the more Learning they suppose in others, which they acknowledge to be wanting in themselves.

Now in regard it is Certain that these were the understandings that labour'd to make Rules, they cannot be deny'd the same Right; so much the rather, because that what they added to what was invented
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by those that proceeded 'em, plainly convinces 'em, that they who shall succeed 'em, may likewise add to what themselves invented. 'Tis neither opinionated Intoxication, nor Impatience of producing Novelty which causes 'em to act: 'Tis the necessity of expressing themselves, as they think this necessity renders 'em Insensibly unlike to other Men. And in regard this disparity makes the Character of their Learning, all those that affect perfection and new discoveries, are earnest to have it, and have dress'd it *alamode*. The custom has got reputation, and begins to make us neglect all that appears less profitable or less profound. The indifference which is observ'd in reference to other sciences provokes 'em, this despite causes 'em to ferment, that ferment would fain justify it self for fear of being thought unreasonable; and this is the original of that great alienation between Learned Men and Doctors. And I leave you, my Lord, to Judge which of the two have the most reason, the Learned Men who maintain themselves in their Elevation, or the Doctors who remain under the Bondage of Rules.

I distinguish these great understandings into three orders, with reference to the degree of their Elevation. The first order includeth those who have for their share *sublimity* in things, that is to say, an elevation of vast thoughts, and becoming the stocks that produce 'em, and which is the Reason that

that all they say and write has no proportion with what is usually said and written, not but that there is always wanting something in what those happy *Genius's* write and what they produce, who take things at such a distance, and such a height: But 'tis by means of that same Elevation in things, that what is defective appear not, and that the severest Critick cannot find any thing in those defects to balance the perfection of the work.

It may be said, that this Character represents those who have a lively, refin'd and elevated Conception; upon the opening of which they ravish all those that are capable of discernment. And if it may be lawful to pass from a General to a particular, it may be said to be the ordinary Character of the *French* and *Spaniards*, with this remark, that the Elevation of things dazles 'em so extreamly, that as they know beyond other Nations through the sublimeness of their *conceptions*, they are inclin'd to suppose that nothing can equal 'em in merit, so far they are from believing that any thing can surpass 'em. Nevertheless, this Elevation is very often attended with one *default*, which is, that these happy *Conceptions* do not always support themselves but by *productions* which are answerable to 'em; and that the *Generality* of those who have this Advantage cannot explain themselves so easily as they think.

The second order *comprehends* those who *distinguish themselves* by an exact *preciseness* as to things and persons: That is to say, through an extent and strength of *Judgment*, which sees at once the whole nature of the *thing*, and all the *aptitude* of the Person that enjoys it. *Understandings* thus qualify'd are endu'd with *Excellent Qualities*, but they have also their *failings*. For in regard this strength of *Judgment* acts as it is, they are subject never to forego their *Opinions*: And because their first *Notion* may have prov'd *defective* through the *Errours* of him who furnish 'em with the subject, or through the false or *Counterfeit Circumstance* which is added to the thing, their *Elevation* and *Capacity* support their *Obstinacy* onely, and fix 'em against the truth. The *Eastern People* and the refin'd *Italians* are accus'd of this *Intoxication*: And it may be said that all persons in *authority* are in some measure *tinctur'd* with this *Vice*.

Lastly, The third order includes those that have a *Universality* more or less extended, nor, as ought to be well observ'd, by vertue of any *Ramassment* of excellent things, which a happy *Memory* knows how to produce at several times, and at all times that they are desir'd to do it, but out of an *Exactness* of *Examination* and *Penetration*, which puts every thing in its proper place. This *Universality* has a regard to knowledge, *preciseness*, and production; and thence it comes to pass, that it is onely imperfect,

perfect, because it ought *absolutely* to know and *fathom* all the *Characters* and all the *Symptoms* of *Understandings*, to the end it may flatter it self with being arriv'd to perfection. Which is equally Vain and Impossible.

Now in regard this *Universality* consists of the more and the less, it may be said that it is Large, exquisite and rarely found, when a Man conceives happily, easily, and curiously : When he explains what he conceives *methodically* and wisely : When he knows to dispose of things according to that *exact proportion* which he knows in those who ought to be entrusted with the *Execution*, and that being oblig'd to discover himself in publick or in private, he has the *advantage* of doing it so as to be understood by the *Meanest Capacities*. This *Universality*, to say truth, receives great *Ornaments* from the Number of things which a Man knows by study, by *Travelling*, and by *Experience* ; but it is not at all thereby *aggrandiz'd*, as some believe : Because the Variety of matter will never form great Men, but wisdom *Penetration*, *Exactness*, and the Conduct of Great Men that give value and *Reputation* to matters and things.

The first order of great *Understandings* that are sublime in the Conceptions of things, forms *Illustrious Men* ; for to expect sublimity, among the Circles of understandings that compose their Miraculous Sphere of Eternal wisdom, and to excel in a Cer-

tain Quality above others, is to draw the publick suffrages upon a Mans self, and to merit a signal distinction in Civil Life. A very learned Man told me, he had observ'd, that *Understandings* of this *Character*, were very proper, to approach with ease the Lights of Faith, when the Mists and Clouds of a Corrupted Heart forbore to interpose their wonted obstructions. And thus he argu'd.

In regard that faith never begins to exact our submission, and our inward Condescendence, but where our knowledge fails; the farther it penetrates, the nearer it brings us to the proportion, between the Conviction of our understanding, as to its Inability, and the free overflowing of that divine light which seems to come to the succour of our weakness, onely to make us sensible before hand, and worthy of that Joy which we conceive, for having discover'd what we sought to apprehend. Now they who have an Elevated and refin'd Conception, with a little exactness and Uprightness of Heart, raise themselves more easily than others to that moral Proportion, seeing that the more remote they are from matter, they have always a better Apprehension of human misery, and of the *Obligation* which the wisdom of the first being has impos'd upon it self, to assist it by a means agreeable to it. This *Examination* being discourag'd from going any farther, finds it self assisted, so soon as it is willing to submit
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it self, whereas it is under a perpetual disquiet so long as it resists. The first is too great a satisfaction to Self-Love to be neglected; on the Contrary, the second offers too much violence to let us be at rest. And it may be said, that if the Passions did not intermeddle, these *Understandings* would in some sence approach the *Apprehension* of this Life.

The second order of Great understandings that act according to the Just and exact preciseness of things, and the Qualities of Persons, constitutes Publick men, or statesmen whom nothing can surprize and who are able to provide a Remedy against every thing, by an equal distribution of wisdom and Zeal. It may be said of them, as *Solon* said of *Licurgus*, *Natus in Bonum Patrie*, they are born to make others live in Peace, Plenty, Splendour, Justice and submission to the Prince and the Laws. It also contains those understandings, whose exactness so well discovers true knowledge from false, to seperate Religion from superstition with that Air of Authority against which the *Sophisms* of the Heart cannot prevail, but are forc'd to surrender to truth.

Lastly, understandings of the third order are those that partake of a sort of universality, and form Kings, or serve at least to give Counsel to those that are appointed to preside over the People: The elevation of their *Genius*, their vast and Profound knowledge, that Equity of which they

make profession, seem to call 'em and render 'em worthy of that Employment. But they cannot flatter, or if they do, 'tis very rarely. They are above all manner of Interest; because they value it much less than what they possess. They are *respectful* without *descending* to that Low and *paltry submission* which the Custom of the Court has so vainly introduc'd among great Men, for the sake of Compliance; and which is the most *assured Channel* (but the most unworthy) for Men to convey favour to *themselves*. They never make any false steps, because they are *Incapable* of false *Management*, which Courtiers make their sole Employment, they are not addicted to those Vices which are the virtues of the Court: Their way of proceeding is frank and sincere and *sometimes less fortunate*. But if they have the misfortune, as many times they have, not to *advance themselves*, they have this *Advantage* however, that they have nothing to upbraid themselves withal, but fully to enjoy, without any *Mixture*, what they have *merited* by their *virtues*.

Solon, who spoke so exactly, but so little, and who referr'd every thing to Religion, was wont to say, that *understanding* of this *Character* was design'd by God to confound *Atheism*. So much knowledge of necessity shews a Term as well as a succession in the order of acquiring it. Both the one and the other supposes a *Principle* which must be of the same nature with the effect which it produces

produces. The Art of *Governing* Souls and *Regulating* the *Passions* surpasses human Ability. Some more Intelligent being must therefore be endu'd with that Power. This *Incomprehensible* being draws near to Man by Tryals of his wisdom, and the *universality* of his knowledge, every time that he bestows it upon any one : Nor can this being be the Term of it, without precisely knowing the *Principle* and the *Dependence* which is due to it. This first knowledge produces *submission*, which confounds the Pride of others. Now in regard that meditated *Atheism* is but a Confuted Pride, it must needs be confounded at the sight of a superiour Pride which humbles it self, and out of a fulness of knowledge submits to the *Maxims* of a *Religion*, which cannot but be divine, tho it be vail'd with so many distributed *Practises* of *Humanity*. 'Tis upon this *admirable Ratiocination* that I conclude, that quick and sublime Conceptions prevent Impiety instead of producing it : That exactness and strength of *Judgment* discover and condemn *superstition*, instead of supporting it, and that *Universality* of knowledge confounds *Atheism* instead of confirming it.

This *universality*, more or less extended, chiefly consists in that quick knowledge that views things all together, and not *successively* ; as when a Man sees the Return of his particular *Interest* in the design of a publick *Interest* : When he discovers with one glance the *Intention* of his *Competitours* by their foot-

steps; and when upon the proposal of a *Proposition*, he sees at first all the *Objections* and all the *Obstacles*. This is call'd seeing not *successively*, *discovering* all together, and at the same Instant Things, Persons, and what *Judgment* to make of 'em. This Peice of *universality* is still more rare then that which I have hitherto discours'd of: And a Man must have a certain *Temperament* next to a *Miracle* to be *successful* in it.

By *sublimity* in things a Man sees above all the *Passions*, as well in himself as in others: Which is the reason it is of great *Advantage*, when a Man has merit to fall into the hands of a Man of that sort, because he always does *Justice*; whereas the generality of other Men Judge onely by their *Passions*.

By an exact precision of things and Persons, a Man encloses *universal Interests* under the *Appearance* of the same Conduct. 'Tis sufficient that this *Precision* be Elevated to enclose every thing; and to render *uniform particular Motions* very unlike in Interests, without appearing to be violently Interested, or without *disordering*. How *Admirable* a Person for *Government* is a Man of this *Character*!

Lastly, by *universality* in things, in their Precision, and in the just measure of Talents and *Temperaments*, a Man is so far above others, that 'tis no wonder if *Nature produces* so little.

Great *understandings* of the first order are rarely vain, because that the farther they

go in their *Conceptions*, the more they know that they can go yet farther; and this *Inability* humbles 'em, far from puffing 'em up. Those of the second order are *Tractable* and willing to do good, according as they are less *distrustful* of their *Abilities*: And far from thinking *themselves sufficient*, they appear to be simple even to surprize.

Lastly, they of the third order, have neither any *Passion* or *Ardent Affection* for things here below; for that being above 'em by means of their *knowledge*, they cannot but discover new *Benefits* which they may be able to procure, either to the *Church* or *State*. The first are *favorites*, through the *Vivacity* of their *Conceptions*. The Second are the *Dispencers* of *Charity*, through their *Affability*, and by the *sweetness* wherewith they suffer the defects and weaknesses of others. Lastly, The third are the *Models* of *Hope*, because they see nothing upon the Earth, which is not below 'em, and therefore must hope for something greater than all that they believe: And by this *Conduct* of theirs it is that other men regulate themselves, to the end they may rid *themselves* of the thoughts of the *World*, and aspire to something more solid and *durable*.

This, my Lord, is what I resolv'd to say upon the Art of *Knowing Understandings*, which is no less difficult to acquire, then it is delicate and nice in the *Practice* of it. I should have kept my self to this *Discourse*,
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had I not thought it necessary to add to it *The Method of Rendering Education Profitable to Youth*, which is the principal Object of this Work: and for the attaining to it with more ease, I shall make use of a Comparison that to me appears very exact.

The Obstacles which I have already Discours'd of, work the same Effect in respect of Reason, as Smoak and Vapours in respect of Glass; some black'n it, others make it look yellow, and some there are that make it look Red; but all obscure it, and stop up the Entrances of the Diaphanous Pores that cause the Transparency. But observe withal, my Lord, that none of these Vapours is inherent in the Glass; that is to say, it is not intermix'd with the Quality of it, which still remains the same; and that it is only outwardly and by accident that it always varies the Colour of the Glass. The ground of Human Reason is pure of its own Nature, according to the Measure of Distribution, Penetration and Light, which the Wisdom of the Creator thought necessary for it. The Exhalations of the Heart are the black and malignant Vapours which rise successively, and almost at all times, to obscure the Sun of the little World.

He that would cleanse the Glass, and wash away the Impurities that hinder it from being Transparent, ought to know three things perfectly. First, That Glass being brittle of its own Nature, it requires a great
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deal of Skill and Management to make it clean without breaking. Secondly, That this Management requires a Method which must be successive, and by the means of different Spunges, of which some must be soft and others of a Harther Substance; and some fuller of Moisture then others. The third is, that in regard the Glass may be *thicker and Courser*, or finer and more perfect, it would be very *useless and dangerous*, if a *workman* should think to work the *Politeness* of a *Course Glass*, to the lucid *Transparency* of a fine one; or the *Clearness* of a *Midling-Glass* to the *Perfection* of a *Chrystal*: For that would be to force nature, which has set bounds to every species, under pretence of refining it; and the success would be no less *Impossible* then the Attempt would be *Imprudent*.

The Reason of a young Man is this same Glass more or less obscur'd: But this *Obscurity* is not however *inherent*, because it is but newly *beginning*, nor is it come to its growth, because it *augments* every day; and therefore it is then more easie to be taken away, then in a Man that is grown into years: And to bring it to pass, it behoves a Tutor to make the same *Observations* in respect of his Pupil, as I have made upon the Glass. He must be convinc'd, that this first Beam of Light, or rather these Essays of the understanding (as *Theophrastus* calls 'em) are feeble, tender and difficult

difficult to manage, and that they are in great danger of being injur'd or broken. 'Tis here that a Tutor stands in need of Elevation, and that he ought to sympathize. Of Elevation, to the end he may be capable of the soil which he desires to manure; and of sympathy, to the end he may sympathize with all the managements that are necessary to that end.

In the second place it behoves him to apprehend by how many different methods he may be able to dissipate the Cloud that is already gather'd, and to prevent the rising from the heart and taking the same Course. 'Tis then that it behoves him to be extended and precise; *extended*, to discover means of obtaining success, and to turn 'em after so many ways that he may accomplish his desires; *precise*, to the end he may successively and slowly, for fear of perplexing the understanding of the young Man, instead of assisting it; making use of little force at a time, and always much Art, but above all a *Patience* proof against *Discouragement*, and the resistance he may meet with, till the Glass be as clean as ever it was, and that he has fortify'd the *Reason* against all *Rebellions*, that seem'd to be *strengthen'd* against the first Impressions of Reason.

Thirdly, he ought to have a *Precise knowledge* of the aptitude of the understanding of the young Man, with a management which

which agrees with it as it is. And upon this *Observation* it is, that it behoves him to be copious and reserv'd. By his *fecundity* he enlarges the *understanding* of the Child to that degree, that it enlarges it self much sooner, with more ease, and more *assurance*. It discovers, if I may be permitted to use the *Expression*, the very Root of his *understanding*. For in regard a young Man is desirous to imitate according to the esteem he has for him, or as he sees him to be Valued by others, there are no Endeavours which he will not make use of to come as near him as he can. 'Tis during this Moral Intentness of the Faculties that a Governour Apprehends so well whether the Temper of the Understanding of his Pupil be Lumpish, Midling or Refin'd. And after this Discovery it is, that it behoves a Tutor to be reserv'd, either for fear of forcing the Understanding of the Pupil beyond its Strength, or else to proportion his Instructions to the Aptitude of the Child, and to omit nothing that may replenish his Capacity.

You may Observe, my Lord, by what I have said, That 'tis not the Body of a Young Man that I pretend to Regulate. I leave that Care to those who make it their Business, and who never consider any thing else but what is well Receiv'd in the Nation, and that Decorum is observ'd in all Countries

tries, but that it is not always dress'd after the same manner: 'Tis only the understanding that I have a desire to mould and bring to Perfection: And I endeavour to do it after such a Manner, that what I Write may agree not only with Children, but with all Ages, and every Sex. And this is that Assistance, which for the Good of Religion, Society, and Justice, I am willing to give to all Nations after such a Manner as may be solid and durable.

Ozimanduas, King of *Egypt*, was the first Sovereign who bethought himself of setting up a Library: He was at a vast Expence in the Collection of Books, and to shew the Necessity and Importance of the Assistance which may be drawn from thence, he caus'd this Inscription to be set up over the Door of the Apartment, where he had plac'd his Books, *Animi Medica Officina*.

We find Thousands that have Wrote Instructions for the Education of Youth, and upon the Duties requir'd for the Conduct of Life in all Ages, every Sex, and all Conditions of Living. But I do not perceive that they do any great Good; because there are very few that satisfy the Understanding, that Convince it, and Furnish it with Remedies against Prejudices. 'Tis upon this Discovery that I have chiefly undertaken to
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Combat 'em, as the Source of all Disorders and Irregularities ; by preventing the Understanding in such a manner, as to Convince it by it self, of what I cause it to find in it self by Solid Precepts capable to Cure all Disturbances, and fit to Reform betimes all the Deviations of Reason. To which purpose, as it is most easy to turn the Course of Rivers near the Spring-head, 'tis in the time of Tender Years, and during the Simplicity of the Heart, that a Man may more easily prepossess the Reason against the Passions, or set the Passions at Variance with the Understanding.

All that you have told us is very true, will some say, that stand upon the Punctilio's of their Learning, no body can better dive then you have done, into the Knowledge of Understandings, nothing is so exact as what you have shown us touching their difference ; This is an Admirable way of going back to the Fountain of things, and tearing up the Mischief by the Root. But we do not agree with you, as to all the good Qualities which you bestow upon Understandings of the First Order ; we thought 'em more Dangerous then useful ; they are subject to Rebel against Religion, and sometimes to interrupt the Orders of Society : The more they are Manur'd, the more Mischief they do : They frequently Destroy themselves, and generally Spoil others ; And we not proper

per to know 'em for any other Reason, then to keep 'em low, or else to distrust 'em.

But your Objection is not so strong as you believe; I have Reply'd already to it, that it is ground'd upon so many false Prejudices, that for the more exact answering of it, 'tis requisite for me to take it in Peices. I say; In the first place, That what has happen'd to some Understandings of the First Order, in respect of Theology or Society, invincibly Justifies the Necessity of Diving more deeply, and more early into the Priviledges of Human Reason. If they who had been Entrusted with the Education of these Understandings, had insensibly clear'd their Hearts from the Prevailing Passions, that they had given to 'em to Understand all the fatal Consequences of it, or that they had themselves sufficiently known how to prepossess the Reason as it fortify'd it self, those Understandings would not have fallen into such Disorders. The Example of so many other Good Understandings that adhere to Goodness, Justice, Vertue, or the Defence of Religion, Proves what I alledg. Have we ever seen Great Understandings that have not had Great Failings? How many do we find in History that have Submitted to Reason most Signal Defects of Temperament, thro' Trouble and Vexation? Notwithstanding

ing all the Precautions of the Philosophers and Sages of Antiquity, to hide their Defects from Posterity, are they not Convey'd to us through so many Channels, that it may be said, they are still more Known then the Wisdom which they Profess'd. 'Tis in vain to Deny it; I must return to my Principle: The Vapours of Corruption are they that Obscure the Reason; which if it should be infus'd into Children from their youth, Reason would be at least convinc'd of the force and Irregularity of this Corruption, which would very much contribute to preserve 'em from it.

But there are Temperaments, say some, that nothing can reduce, and which are so transported that all the precautions imaginable would serve to little purpose in that respect.

I answer, that if after all the care imaginable you cannot prevent a good soyle from producing so many thistles, what would it be were it not manur'd at all? The example of the former *Ottoman* Princes that reign'd in *Europe*, is a perfect Justification of what I have said. The more they were left to themselves, when they were destin'd to ascend the *Throne*, the more Sanguinary, Bloody and Tyrannical they were. They made their Cruelties the Principles of their Prudence, putting their Brothers to death so soon as they were proclaim'd, and all

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those that might be able to do 'em an Injury or were suspected to 'em. But as they began to be maner'd in their youth, they are become more humane and more tractable. So that they have almost banish'd that custom from among the volent maxims that render'd 'em so odious.

I return to the first part of the objection, and say, that the Generality of Arch *Heretics* never pass'd for great understandings, tho they have been the occasion of such great Changes. This is verifi'd by the Quality of those who have undertaken the defence of the Church against 'em, whose Conduct it has been to pursue 'em in all the Deviations of their Hearts, which have been always different, according to the Passions that caus'd 'em to act: And in regard these Passions themselves had nothing fix'd, their Inconstancy form'd their various deviations upon the opposition of those who withstood 'em, and reduc'd 'em either to disclaim their Errours or to become more obstinate.

I could justify what I have alledg'd by the Changes which have happen'd in all Sects, many times during the life time of those that erected 'em. There is nothing more vehement in *Origen* against *Celsus*, in *St. Austin* against *Pelagius*, nor in *St. Hillary* against *Arrius* then this variation in their systems. Those great Men made use of it with good success in favour'd of the truth against the Prepossessions of the Heart,
which

which pretended to strengthen the Deviation by extending it farther, and by defending it after different manners. Which sufficiently Justifies that the Heads of *Heresy* as well as their Disciples, were not above other understandings. On the other side, that Providence has oppos'd Greater understandings against 'em, such as onely their obstinacy could withstand.

I could here Enumerate a great number of sects which Prejudices have rais'd against the *Orthodox* faith; but in regard such a display would lead me too far, I shall onely speak of that which is *Alamode*, and of which the followers, tho' Conceal'd, fall into the same deviation as all the Rest.

Pyrrho became Chief of the sect of the *Pyrrhonites* after he had been the Disciple of *Disso*, who taught in *Elis*; and afterwards of *Anaxarchus*; and after he had consulted the *Gymnosophists* and *Magicians*, whom he went to seek out among the *Baby'oniens* and in *Egypt*, he brought no other fruits of his Travels and his Inquiries back, but to doubt of every thing, and to make no difference between Good and Evil. For as he was a Man of rare endowment, he was honour'd every where. The People of his Nation made him their high Priest, and the *Athenians* granted him the Freedom of their City, a favour most difficult to be obtain'd among 'em. Nevertheless *Pyrrho* could not agree with himself: And in regard he was irresolute in all things, he made less noise than

the rest of the Philosophers, which made him so mad that it hasten'd his death, tho he liv'd fourscore and ten years, as some *Historians* relate.

His disciples could not hold altogether to his Irresolution, tho like him they doubted of every thing, under pretence of a Continual Enquiry into truth. Every body knows how many different names they have gone by, according to their systems, which have so much of good in 'em that they destroy one another, and that after they have boldly affirm'd that we can judge of nothing but by Prejudices and Comparison, they have given occasion to wise Men that come after 'em to discover their Deviations, by searching into the Prejudices that arise from the Heart, and which oppose one another without interrupting the Actings of Reasons, and without being able to prescribe Bounds to it.

If they who addict themselves to this pretended Delicacy would but take the pains to apply themselves a little to this Discussion, they would soon discover that either they have not that Strength and Elevation of Understanding which they imagine, or that the Prejudices that put a stop to 'em arise from their Hearts, without having a pre-eminence to alter their Reason, or the Knowledge of the Truth. *Pyrrhonism*, as much in Fashion as it is, is not well admitted, but only through the Diversity of so many Midling Understandings

ings that Erect themselves into Doctors and cannot themselves Fathom what they Teach so Irregularly. There are Human Customs in Religion, and Divine Motives to submit to 'em. Those Customs are subject to Human Failings; is there any help for that? The Motions are above Human Reasonings; can that deceive a Man? The Customs agree not one with another, I grant it; but are they opposite to the Motives. What a Weakness, what an Irregularity of the Understanding it is to determine the Motives by the Inconstancy of Customs! Would it not be more Rational to Reform the Illusion of Headstrong Adherence to Customs by the Prudence and Authority of Motives?

A good Understanding raises it self so high above knowledge, that they draw near, as it were Naturally, to Faith, if the Vapours of Corruption interpolate not to hinder their Union, and to suspend their intercourse. The Desire I have still to know more, after I have study'd every thing, raises my imagination above every thing that can possess, or fill it up in the ordinary use of the Sciences. By that means there arises in me a necessary submission, or a near inclination to receive instruction by some other knowledge that surpasses mine; or else I must stop there, which is impossible; or else I must recoil back, which would be to prosecute my Reason, and my continued itch after more knowledge; or else, lastly, I must submit to Revelation.

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For this same strength of Understanding, that has form'd Great Men, and which are wrested out of *Aristotle's* Mouth, as he lay a dying, that great Sentence; *Ens Entium miserrere mei.* This is the Character of an Understanding that will confound *Pyrrhinism*: This is that which absolutely justifies, that sublime and Exact Understandings are capable of doing more Good then Mischief to Religion, and that it is a gross error to believe that they are more dangerous then they can be useful.

The second part of the Objection is no truer than the first; and if they go about to cite me a Number of Examples of Disorders and Troubles occasion'd by Great Understandings in Kingdoms, I can bring an infinite Number that will prove the contrary. Now the Matter appearing to me at least Equal, I argue thus. Is there the same Management to be observ'd in reference to the Good we would actually procure, or the Evil we would avoid: That is to say, Does the Apprehension of a Mischief, still uncertain, oppos'd to the knowledge of a present and assured Good, permit a sound Understanding to uphold this Objection? Great Genius's have been always the Preservation of Kingdoms; and an Obstacle that other Genius's, disaffected, were never able to surmount, when a Reign has been so happy as to produce some One of those Towering Understandings to oppose the Mutinies and Disorders of the Other. On which side then ought now a-days the balance to incline? Must Great Genius's be excluded
from

from their share of Publick Authority, because 'tis in their power to do Mischief, and must not the more happy Genins's be admitted, because they may do good, and prevent or repair the Mischief that others have done?

I might deliver many more things, my Lord, upon this subject, did I not fear to tire you with too long a Letter. I shall discourse in the next place of the Education of a Virgin of Quality. You desir'd it, altho I excus'd my self; and I am afraid my Obedience will cost me somewhat dear: All Truths are not to be spoken at all times; and I am the worst at concealing Faults; besides, that 'tis oft-times dangerous to meet with 'em in the Fair Sex. Nevertheless, because the Subject has been handled by several Authors, I shall add no more to what they have said, but only what they seem to me to have omitted. Not that I pretend to surpass 'em. That delusion will never fall into my Thoughts; but to begin a little nearer the Fountain, and to dive a little deeper than they have thought fit to do, to the end I may follow the Method I have all along propos'd; That is to say, to mould the Understanding, fortify the Reason, clear the Judgment, and raise it above the usual Corruption of the Heart. I leave to others the Care of the Out-side; that is to say, the Customs, Decorum and Maxims of a Nation, which render a Man agreeable and polite, to launch into the World. 'Tis to the Essential Matter that I stick: whatever is only superficial, daubing, Agreement, Manners, the Art,

Art of complying, are things that agree neither with my Talent nor my Relish. I am most respectfully,

My Lord,

Your most Humble and

Most Obedient Servant.

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